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Abstract 
This thesis examines the contribution made by twelve important and influential individuals to 
the development of a policy of physical and economic reconstruction, political renewal and 
personal reconciliation in the British Zone of occupied Germany in the first three years after 
the end of the Second World War. The selected individuals all possessed power, authority 
and influence, at different levels of the hierarchy, and collectively represent the view of the 
‘governing elite’ of the occupation, including some of its internal differences.  They have 
been categorised in three groups of four: those at the top of the hierarchy, the three Military 
Governors and one of their senior generals; four senior civilian diplomats and administrators 
responsible for promoting democracy in Germany; and four young officers with no adult 
experience but war, who held responsible and influential positions despite their youth.  
A biographical approach is a novel methodology for studying the British occupation of 
Germany. It highlights the diversity of aims and personal backgrounds and in so doing can 
explain some of the apparent contradictions in occupation policy. Personal influences were 
especially important in a period of transition from war to peace, when official policy 
guidelines appeared unclear or inappropriate and organisational structures created for the 
occupation were short-lived and changed rapidly.  
A wide range of sources has been used including memoirs and autobiographies, official 
documents, personal papers and oral history interviews. Although sources were created at 
different times for different purposes, most accounts were found to be remarkably consistent, 
both internally and with each other. Subjective accounts have been placed in their historical 
context in order to understand individuals’ perceptions, motivations and personal interests, 
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1.1 Research questions, scope and purpose of the thesis 
In a personal message to his troops issued on VE Day, 8 May 1945, Field-Marshal 
Montgomery wrote ‘We have won the German war. Let us now win the peace.’
2
 This 
message was repeated many times in the months that followed,
3
 but what he meant by 
‘winning the peace’ was never entirely clear. British policy in occupied Germany after the 
Second World War is full of apparent contradictions. Despite extensive planning undertaken 
before the end of the war, much of the work of the occupation authorities was characterised 
by hasty improvisation. Economically, a policy of restricting industrial growth was pursued in 
parallel with one of rebuilding the physical infrastructure and promoting economic 
reconstruction. Though convinced of the superiority of the British way of life, the occupiers 
were reluctant to impose a British model of democracy by dictatorial means, preferring to 
allow the Germans to devise their own solutions to constitutional reform. ‘Parallel worlds’, in 
which occupiers and occupied could live separate lives without meeting each other, 
coexisted with extensive cooperation at work, numerous individual encounters through social 
and cultural activities, and personal relationships that in some cases resulted in lifelong 
friendships and marriage. Whether examining the economic, political, social or cultural 
aspects of the occupation, these contradictions make it difficult to identify any logical, 
coherent and distinctive ‘British’ policy in occupied Germany.  
A general uncertainty concerning British policy towards Germany and the German people 
was to be expected in the transition from war to peace, as the primary task of the Allied 
armies changed from achieving victory in battle to the civilian administration of a defeated 
enemy. Politicians in London had other priorities, not least the dissolution of the wartime 
                                                     
1
 Brigadier Donnison, the author of the relevant volume of the British official history of the Second World War, Civil 
Affairs and Military Government, North-West Europe, 1944-46, (London: HMSO, 1961), ended the book with a 
‘personal impression’. Although regular officers at first disliked a posting to ‘Civil Affairs’, many of those he met in 
the course of his work told him that by the time they left  ‘they had come to feel it was the most rewarding work they 
had ever undertaken.’ One even said it was ‘the only really worth while thing he ever did in his life.’ 
2
 Bernard Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (London: Collins, 
1958), p341 
3
 E.g. British Zone Review, Vol.1, No.6, 8 Dec. 1945, p2; Vol.1 No.18, 25 May 1946, p3 
11 
coalition and the general election. The new Labour government, when it assumed office in 
August 1945, had an ambitious programme of domestic reform and little time or inclination to 
issue new guidance or instructions to the authorities in Germany. Policy directives prepared 
earlier had assumed that a central German government would remain in place and did not 
provide for unexpected circumstances, such the scale of destruction in the cities, acute 
shortages of food and raw materials, and the influx of millions of refugees expelled from the 
former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Those responsible for Military 
Government, at all levels, had to use their own initiative to decide what course of action to 
take in unfamiliar circumstances.  
Despite these uncertainties, the overall course of the occupation in the British Zone from the 
end of the war in Europe in May 1945 to the formation of an independent West German 
government in September 1949 was fairly straightforward. The largely negative policies 
agreed by the three wartime allies, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, at the 
Potsdam conference in July and August 1945, were replaced by more positive policies 
culminating in the European Recovery Programme, the transfer of power to elected German 
authorities, and numerous social and cultural exchange programmes. The negative policies 
are often summarised as the ‘Four Ds’ of the Potsdam Agreement, though different 
historians have used more than four words starting with the letter ‘D’ to describe these, 
referring variously to: Disarmament, Demilitarisation, Denazification, Decentralisation, 
Decartelisation, Deindustrialisation, Dismantling and Democratisation.
4
 Historians have not 
given the same shorthand description to the positive aspects of British (or US) occupation 
policy, but these could be similarly characterised as the ‘Three Rs’ of physical and economic 
Reconstruction, political Renewal and personal Reconciliation, relating to the economic, 
political, and social and cultural aspects of occupation policy respectively.
5
  
The ‘Four Ds’ were clearly intended to avoid a repetition of the policy of appeasement in the 
1920s and 1930s, which had so obviously failed to prevent another war. Complete 
disarmament and demilitarisation were considered essential to destroy the power of the 
German army and officer class. Denazification was designed to remove former Nazi Party 
                                                     
4
 http://howitreallywas.typepad.com/how_it_really_was/2009/11/the-4-ds-of-the-potsdam-agreement-1945.html, 
viewed 28 Nov. 2012 
5
 Re-education might be considered as a fourth ‘R’, but this was a contested term and an aspiration rather than a 
policy. 
12 
members from positions of influence and responsibility. Decentralisation and decartelization 
were intended to reduce the excessive power of the state and large industrial combines. 
Deindustrialisation and dismantling of heavy industry were aimed at reducing Germany’s 
economic capacity and ability to produce war plant and equipment and also to enable 
reparations to be paid, in the form of surplus capital equipment, to the victorious Allies and 
liberated countries. Democratisation cannot be described as negative, but was presented in 
the agreement in very general terms, as a long term goal to ‘prepare for the eventual 
reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis’ and for the ‘eventual peaceful 
cooperation in international life by Germany.’
6
 There was no disagreement in principle 
among the Allies on these policies, although there were disputes about the detail, such as 
the mechanism for the payment of reparations, and significant differences soon emerged 
over how they were implemented.  
The reasons for adopting the more positive policies of the ‘Three Rs’, Reconstruction, 
Renewal and Reconciliation, are more difficult to understand and explain. The Allies 
operated relatively autonomously and applied different internal policies in their zones at 
different times, which means that each needs to be considered separately. There was little 
formal cooperation before the second half of 1946, when the British and Americans agreed 
to unify their zones economically with effect from 1 January 1947, to form the ‘Bizone.’ 
Discussions at the Allied Control Council in Berlin exposed disagreements rather than, as 
originally intended, coordinating the implementation of generally agreed policies.  
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the contribution made by twelve important and 
influential British people ‘on the ground’ in occupied Germany to the development and 
implementation of a policy of Reconstruction, Renewal and Reconciliation in the British Zone 
of occupied Germany. It seeks to discover what these individuals aimed to achieve, and why, 
and how their aims changed over time. Through focussing on the motivation and intentions 
of individuals, it can contribute to a fuller historical understanding of British policy and actions 
during a period of transition; from war to peace, from conflict to co-operation. One of the 
main claims made is that, in the British Zone, the positive policy of the ‘Three Rs’ started to 
                                                     
6
 Beate Ruhm von Oppen (ed), Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954 (London, New York, Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1955), p42, p43. Also available online: Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) 
Conference 1 Aug. 1945, Section III, clauses 4a and 4b.  
[http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/truman/psources/ps_potsdam.html accessed 17 May 2010] 
13 
be applied very soon after the start of the occupation in the summer of 1945, under the 
direction of the Military Governor, Field Marshal Montgomery, with the active support of his 
senior generals. These more positive policies did not replace the ‘Four D’s’ but were 
implemented in parallel and over time superseded them, as the negative policies were 
considered to have been substantially achieved.  
This thesis is not intended to be a history of the occupation. Some significant aspects have 
been covered briefly or not at all. However, in examining the aims and intentions of 
individuals, it can address questions of motivation and agency and explain the reasons for 
some of the apparent contradictions in British policy. It can help answer questions such as 
how and why British attitudes changed in the transition from war to peace, and why, despite 
knowing of the crimes and atrocities committed by Germans during the war, many British 
officers and civilian administrators devoted so much time and energy to the reconstruction of 
their former enemy. In so doing, it is hoped it can contribute to a re-evaluation of the British 
contribution to post-war Germany, at a critical time in the first three years after the war. 
1.2 Methodology: A biographical approach 
The research methodology adopted for this study was to follow twelve individuals through 
the archives, to gather as much information as possible on each from a variety of sources, 
while maintaining the professional discipline of cross-checking for accuracy and assessing 
evidence for internal and external consistency.  
A biographical approach to the subject is novel. Collective biography
7
 has not been used 
previously as an historical method for studying the British occupation of Germany,
8
 though it 
has a long tradition in other areas, from classical and medieval collections of ‘lives’ to 
feminist and social historians researching those ‘marginal to the historical mainstream’,
9
 and 
biographical methods have been used in three recent historical studies of personal 
                                                     
7
 My use of the term ‘collective biography’ follows that of Krista Cowman, ‘Collective Biography’ in Simon Gunn and 
Lucy Faire (eds.), Research Methods for History (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), pp83-100. 
Cowman used the term to describe historical works which set the ‘lived experiences’ of two or more individuals 
within their historical context, rather than ‘prosopography’, large scale statistical surveys of defined groups of 
people, as used in the social sciences. 
8
 With the possible exception of an unpublished PhD thesis by Barbara Schwepcke, The British High 
Commissioners in Germany: some aspects of their role in Anglo-German relations, 1949-55 (PhD Diss: London, 
1991). This was a political history rather than a collective biography and covered a later period.  
9
 Cowman, ‘Collective Biography’ 
14 
experiences of war, conflict and violence before, during and after the Second World War.
10
 In 
adopting a biographical approach, I have tried to follow principles outlined in two theoretical 
studies by Krista Cowman and Simone Lässig,
11
 and strike a balance between exploring the 
subjective experiences of individuals and the collective generalisation, analysis and historical 
judgement required to make sense of a mass of data from diverse sources.  
 
Cowman emphasised the importance of placing subjective material in its social and political 
context. She argued that collective biography was a valuable historical method in its own 
right, that retained a focus on the individual, while locating this within collective experiences 
and the historical context,
12
 quoting Ian Kershaw that individual actions ‘can only be 
understood within the framework of the structures which conditioned them.’
13
 According to 
Lässig, social historians in the 1970s, especially in Germany, attempted to create a theory-
driven historical science and biography was seen as ‘an antiquated and unreflective 
approach to history.’
14
 Reacting against this trend, others argued that the weakness of a 
history concerned with structures, long term processes and mass phenomena was that ‘a 
science of human societies will entirely lose sight of the human beings’,
15
 and there was a 
need ‘to bring the actors back on stage.’
16
 A biographical approach, she concluded, should 
not be concerned with either structure or agency, but with both. 
Advantages and disadvantages of a biographical approach 
A collective biography offers distinct advantages for a subject, such as this thesis, that 
crosses the boundaries of national, political, social and cultural histories. It enables the 
subjective experiences of some of the leading British members of the occupation to be given 
due prominence, rather than subsumed within references to the policy and motivation of the 
‘Anglo-Americans’ or ‘Western Allies’. The reasons why the selected individuals acted the 
way they did and the influences upon them can be tracked in considerable detail, thereby 
                                                     
10
 Mary Fulbrook, Dissonant Lives: Generations and violence through the German dictatorships (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011); Hester Vaizey, Surviving Hitler’s War: Family Life in Germany, 1939-48 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Charles Glass, Deserter: The last untold story of the Second World War (London: 
Harper Press, 2013) 
11
 Cowman, ‘Collective Biography’; Simone Lässig, ‘Introduction: Biography in Modern History – Modern History in 
Biography’ in Volker R. Berghahn and Simone Lässig (eds.), Biography between Structure and Agency: Central 
European Lives in International Historiography (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), pp1-26 
12
 Cowman, ‘Collective Biography’, pp84-5 
13
 Ibid, p96 
14




 Ibid, p3, citing David Kaiser, ‘Bringing the Human Actors back on Stage: The Personal Context of the Einstein-
Bohr Debate’, British Journal for the History of Science, 27, (1994), pp129-152 
15 
avoiding over-simplistic generalisations that fail to account for the complexity of British policy 
or fully explain the motivation of those responsible.  
As an historical method, a collective biography has particular advantages for studying a time 
of transition, when a group of people were given a task, that of governing a country in 
peacetime, entirely different from the work they had been trained to perform during the war. 
It enables us to examine how their previous experience of, for example, the occupation of 
the Rhineland after the First World War or the administration of the British Empire, influenced 
their later actions. I have termed these personal influences the ‘mental baggage’ they 
brought with them, by which I mean their family background, education, social status, 
previous experience at work, networks of friends and colleagues, religious, political and 
moral beliefs. These personal factors were especially important at times when official policy 
guidelines appeared unclear or inappropriate for the circumstances they found on the 
ground, but do not emerge easily from studies based on official documents or from statistical 
surveys.  
As with all historical methods, there are disadvantages to a biographical approach. It 
emphasises the interconnectivity of personal lives and public responsibilities but can make it 
difficult to examine any one subject or theme comprehensively over an extended period. A 
focus on the aims and intentions of a selected group of British people tends to underestimate 
the importance of the German responses, how policies were played out in practice and the 
eventual outcomes. Information on these matters had to be obtained from secondary 
sources and additional primary research. Furthermore, because much of the source material 
was subjective and some created with hindsight, evidence collected for the study had to be 
carefully validated. Where this could not be done, conclusions have been expressed with 
due caution. Despite these disadvantages, biographical methods, modified to place the 
subjects firmly within their historical context, seemed appropriate for a study of a relatively 
short period when policies and attitudes changed rapidly, and preferable to a structural, 
thematic or chronological approach, due to the temporary nature of the occupation and the 
fragmentary state of much of the evidence. 
16 
Selection criteria and categorisation 
The individuals considered in this study were chosen because they possessed authority, 
power and influence at different levels in the hierarchy and reflected some of the diversity of 
background and opinion among British people in occupied Germany. They therefore 
collectively represent, as far as possible given constraints of time and space, the view of the 
‘governing elite’ of the occupation, including some of its internal differences and 
contradictions. All were based in Germany and held an official position with officer status (or 
civilian equivalent) in British Military Government or the Control Commission for at least one 
year during the period from May 1945 to May 1948. This study therefore portrays the views 
of British people living and working in Germany, influenced by their personal experience of 
the destruction in Germany at the end of the war, their contacts and, in some cases, 
personal relationships with Germans, and the work they did in occupied Germany. Their 
views were not necessarily typical of those who remained in Britain, such as government 
ministers, members of parliament, civil servants, visiting journalists or the general public.     
Twelve was the maximum number who could be considered in sufficient depth within the 
time and space constraints of the thesis, whilst just enough to be representative of the most 
senior and influential figures in the occupation. No one British individual was so dominant 
that a detailed study of this one person would, in itself, explain the most significant aspects 
of the occupation, or was so representative that he could act as a model or ‘ideal-type’ for all 
the British occupiers.
17
 Also, data is not available in sufficient depth or quantity to allow a 
large-scale statistical survey of British occupiers or quantitative analysis of the themes 
examined in this study, such as their reactions to the death and destruction caused by war. 
Even if such data were available, this approach could not take into account the fact that 
some individuals were much more influential than others.  
To examine different aspects of the occupation, the twelve individuals have been 
categorised in three groups of four on the basis of three criteria: their degree of authority, 
power and influence, whether they worked in a civil or military position during the war, and 
their age. All could be considered part of the British professional middle classes, by family 
background, education and employment. All except one attended private rather than state-
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 Further categorisation by social class was therefore not required, as this 
was already implied through the primary selection of individuals with significant power and 
authority. Classification by gender was also not appropriate, as nearly all those in the most 
senior positions in the armed forces and Control Commission were men.
19
 The views 
expressed by the individuals researched in this study were therefore representative of the 
governing elite, but may not have been typical of all British people in occupied Germany, 
especially those working in more junior positions, women, who were most commonly 
employed in welfare or other support roles, or those working for the International Military 
Tribunal, United Nations agencies, or for voluntary organisations. 
Although the concept of ‘generation’ has been widely used as an explanatory category in 
studies of twentieth century Germany,
20
 categorisation by age cohort or ‘generation’ was 
found to be of limited use in this study of British individuals in occupied Germany, and was 
not privileged above the two other criteria used to categorise twelve individuals into groups 
of four: their degree of power and influence, and whether they held civil or military positions 
during the war. Classification by age or ‘generation’ has been little used in studies of British 
history, which have tended to focus on other categories of analysis, notably social class, 
gender, and political allegiance. Apart from the obvious and significant contrast between the 
military generals, born in the late 1880s and 1890s, and the younger generation of junior 
officers, born in the 1920s, there do not appear to be British equivalents for the various 
‘generations’ described by German historians, such as the ‘Hitler Jugend’, the ‘Flakhelfer’ or 
the ‘1945ers’.
21
 Although age or ‘generation’ has been used in this study, in particular to 
explain differences in outlook between the ‘younger generation’ of junior officers and their 
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 it proved most effective when used in combination with other criteria, 
rather than as a primary classification.  
The first group discussed in this study comprises those with the highest level of authority, 
power and influence: the three Military Governors of the British Zone – Field-Marshal 
Bernard Montgomery, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Sholto Douglas and General Sir 
Brian Robertson – together with one of their senior generals, Sir Alec Bishop, who held a 
position at the top of Military Government for an extended period of five years and was also 
highly influential. Montgomery, Robertson and Bishop shared similar views, which were 
typical of the army generals who ran Military Government in the first year of the occupation. 
Douglas was the exception among the three military governors. His more pragmatic 
approach is contrasted with the idealism of the other three and represents a second, 
subsidiary strand among those at the top of the occupation.   
Had the study been confined to those at the top, it would have presented a partial view of 
British policies and their outcomes. Although the army generals remained highly influential 
throughout the occupation, civilians were appointed to many senior positions as Regional 
Commissioners and departmental heads in the Control Commission. The second group 
studied comprises four civilian diplomats and administrators responsible for promoting 
democracy in Germany, whose approach to their work complemented or contrasted with that 
of the Military Governors and army generals. Harold Ingrams was a professional diplomat 
and colonial administrator with responsibility, as head of the Administration and Local 
Government branch of the Control Commission, for restoring democracy at local level within 
the British Zone. Austen Albu and Allan Flanders were two committed international socialists, 
appointed by John Hynd, the minister for Germany, to senior positions in the Political 
Division. Vaughan Berry was one of four civilian Regional Commissioners who, in May 1946, 
replaced the military Corps Commanders as the most senior representatives of Military 
Government at regional level. Studying the four selected individuals demonstrates some of 
the diversity of aims within one policy area, governmental organisation and the promotion of 
democracy. Civilian officials in other Control Commission divisions attempted, in similarly 
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diverse ways and with mixed success, to revive the economy, reform the police, control print 
and broadcast media, or restore the education system, purged of its Nazi elements. 
In order to assess whether younger officers, lower down the ranks, shared the aims of those 
at the top of the Military Government, the third group comprises four young officers 
responsible for the implementation of policy. They therefore represent the opposite end of 
the spectrum from the Military Governors on criteria of age and influence, and could be 
considered a ‘younger generation’ with no adult experience but war, in contrast with the older 
‘generation’ of military governors and army generals, and the very diverse group of civilian 
administrators. Two of the four ‘young officers’, John Chaloner and Michael Howard, held 
responsible positions with considerable freedom of action and were influential in their own 
right. This was not atypical. Many other junior officers were given positions of great 
responsibility, freedom to act on their own initiative and were highly influential in their own 
areas, for example Ivan Hirst, the British officer who ‘saved’ the Volkswagen works from 
being dismantled.  
The other two young officers were selected in order to explore the subjective experiences of 
British people in occupied Germany in more detail. Both were the subject of oral history 
interviews I conducted for this study. Jan Thexton approached the Centre for Contemporary 
British History (CCBH) in September 2007 asking if it would be possible to record his life 
history. His experience was especially relevant for this study, as his role changed completely 
during the occupation, from removing war plants and equipment as reparations, to assisting 
British manufacturers sell weapons to the newly formed West German armed services in the 
1950s. He met and married his wife in Germany. Sir Michael Palliser agreed to be 
interviewed after I met him in September 2009 at a Witness Seminar organised by the Allied 
Museum of Berlin, at which he spoke of his experiences as a young officer in the city.
23
 His 
role at the time was that of an ordinary and, by his own account, typical junior officer, which 
acts as a counterweight to the apparently more exceptional experiences of the other three in 
this group. He subsequently had a distinguished career in the Foreign Office, rising to 
Permanent Under-Secretary in 1975. 
                                                     
23
 The Allied Museum, Berlin, The Windsor Park Seminar. Berlin: The British Perspective 1945-1990, 1-2 Sep. 2009 
20 
The four selected young officers were not necessarily typical of a fairly large and diverse 
group and unlike the senior officers and civilian administrators, little written evidence of their 
activities has survived in the archives. To compensate for any bias arising from a relatively 
small sample and a dependence on personal accounts rather than contemporary 
documents, research findings for this group were validated through reference to oral history 
interviews with a further twenty young men and one woman, undertaken by the Imperial War 
Museum (IWM) Sound Archive. The views expressed by the IWM interviewees on the issues 
examined in this study, such as their personal aims, relationships with Germans and 
attitudes to Russian soldiers and Displaced Persons (DPs), were consistent with those of the 
four selected individuals and have been cited as evidence where appropriate. Exceptions 
have also been noted. The criteria used to select interviews from the IWM Sound Archive 
and methodological issues arising from the use of this particular source are discussed in 
Appendix A. 
Exclusions 
No individuals have been deliberately excluded and as far as I am aware, all the most 
significant published accounts and memoirs written by those who worked for British Military 
Government and the Control Commission have been consulted. Material written by or 
relating to a wide range of individuals, in addition to the twelve ‘protagonists’, has been used 
to provide additional background and context.
24
 
Sources in which the authors stated what they aimed to achieve, such as personal memoirs 
and correspondence, oral history interviews, official reports and policy recommendations, 
speeches, newspaper articles or radio broadcasts,
 
exist for only a limited number of people. 
Consequently the selection was affected by the availability of suitable sources. Generals 
Gerald Templer and Brian Horrocks, for example, were considered for inclusion among the 
twelve selected individuals, as both were highly influential during the first year of the 
occupation, but I found relatively little material on their time in Germany in the archives. 
There was, however, no suggestion in the materials I consulted that their views differed 
significantly from those of Montgomery, Robertson, Bishop or other influential army generals. 
Similarly Vaughan Berry, whose personal papers are held at Somerset Heritage Centre and 
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Bath Record Office, was selected in preference to his three colleagues appointed as 
Regional Commissioners in May 1946, William Asbury, Hugh de Crespigny and Gordon 
Macready, whose personal papers have been destroyed or are not publicly available. 
Some important individuals were not selected because they joined the Military Government 
or Control Commission towards the end of or after the period covered, such as the highly 
influential education advisors, Sir Robert Birley and Professor T.H. Marshall. Because the 
focus of the study is on British people in occupied Germany, I also decided to exclude 
returning German or East European exiles, many of whom volunteered to join the British 
army during the war and later worked for the Control Commission, such as the economic 
advisor, E.F. (Fritz) Schumacher, agricultural advisor Werner Klatt, and press officers 
Michael Thomas and Robert Maxwell.  
The aims and activities of politicians and civil servants based in London, including the two 
government ministers responsible for internal German affairs, John Hynd and Frank 
Pakenham, Lord Longford, were explored but not researched in depth. Contemporary 
accounts by visiting writers, journalists and other individuals who played an indirect, 
unofficial, or temporary part in the British occupation were also consulted but not examined 
in depth. A full list is provided in the bibliography. 
Time period  
The time period covered in this study is from the end of the war in Europe in May 1945 to 
currency reform and the start of the Berlin air-lift in May and June 1948. These boundaries 
are flexible. Allied troops first entered Germany at the end of 1944 and planning for the 
occupation started much earlier, so there is occasional reference to these earlier phases of 
the occupation. The election of an independent West German government in September 
1949 or the formal end of the occupation in 1955 were considered as alternative end points, 
but would have required the inclusion of more material than was possible within the time and 
space available. However, some policies took time to play out and reference is made to later 
events and outcomes where this appears relevant. The focus of the study, however, is on 
the first three years, when British military officers and civilian officials made a rapid 
22 
adjustment from occupation policies devised during the war to those they considered 
appropriate for peace. 
How the thesis is organised 
The thesis is divided into three parts, each addressing one of the three groups of four 
individuals. Although there is considerable overlap, there is also a general chronological and 
thematic progression through the thesis. The first part attempts to explain why those at the 
top of Military Government initiated a policy of reconstruction soon after the start of the 
occupation and how this developed over the first two years. The second part examines 
different approaches to achieving political renewal and how the emphasis changed over the 
three years from May 1945 to May 1948. The third part assesses the motivation of a group of 
younger and more junior officers, examines whether they shared the aims of their seniors, 
and discusses the issue of personal relationships between British and Germans and the 
contribution this made to personal reconciliation between former enemies. In the final 
chapter I have brought together common themes and drawn some conclusions which apply 
to the thesis as a whole.  
1.3 Sources 
A wide range of sources has been used, including memoirs and autobiographies, official 
documents in the public archives, personal papers and oral history interviews, with the 
advantages and disadvantages normally attaching to each. The focus of the research, the 
aims and intentions of individuals, is necessarily subjective. Much of the evidence presented 
in the thesis portrays the situation in occupied Germany through the eyes of the twelve 
individuals. In some cases, such as personal memoirs, autobiographies and oral history 
interviews, accounts were generated with hindsight and are therefore subject to the fallibility 
of memory and to conscious or unconscious attempts to distort the record to create a 
coherent narrative of past lives. For this reason, wherever possible, subjective accounts 
were checked against other sources.  
The British occupation of Germany is now on the edge of living memory. Oral history 
interviews I conducted for this study comprise the principal source for two of the twelve 
individuals, Palliser and Thexton. Interviews conducted by others were used as subsidiary 
23 
sources for Robertson, Howard and Chaloner,
25
 and interviews with twenty British men and 
one woman held by the IWM Sound Archive were consulted to provide background and 
context. Oral history offers similar difficulties in analysis and interpretation to memoirs and 
autobiographies and, as with all historical sources, the context and the purpose for which the 
record was created needs to be understood. However, it can reveal aspects which are not 
easily accessible from the official record, in particular the subjective experience of the 
individual: how it felt at the time, why they believed they were there, assumptions taken for 
granted and only understood, expressed and recorded in later accounts.
26
  
Some historians have claimed that oral interviews and personal life histories are more 
problematic than other sources.
27
  What is left out can be as important as what is included 
and errors can reveal hidden meanings.
28
 Sociologists have pointed out that biographies are 
not only sources of raw data, but social artefacts, created at the time of re-telling. Differences 
between what happened at the time and the story told in a later account may arise in three 
ways: through differences between what happened and what was experienced by the 
subject; through the fallibility of memory; and through the process of re-telling and 
construction of a narrative after the event.
29
 However, the same issues apply to 
contemporary written documents in the public archives, though normally over a shorter time 
period, as these are also social artefacts, constructed for a specific purpose.
30
  
Life histories and biographies may be especially problematical when used to research events 
and experiences which have been contested, and subsequently re-interpreted in personal or 
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 As Alessandro Portelli has noted, the subjectivity of the speaker is an advantage for oral history, conveying 
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 In other cases the interviewee may have performed an action, 
participated in an event, or seen or heard something of which they were later ashamed, 
which they thought might cause conflict with the interviewer, or which was traumatic, leading 
to later adjustment in how it was remembered or re-told. Although valuable in helping to build 
a model of good interviewing practice, it should not be assumed that similar difficulties apply 
in all situations. Gabriele Rosenthal’s critique of life history stories,
32
 for example, was based 
on her experience interviewing former Hitler Youth members, German people ‘living with a 
Nazi past’, and Holocaust survivors in Israel. The example of a German train driver reluctant 
to talk about driving a trainload of prisoners to Auschwitz, or her own experiences as a non-
Jewish German woman interviewing Holocaust survivors in Israel, were likely to raise issues 
regarding the interpretation of evidence, which do not necessarily apply in the much less 
contested circumstances of British army veterans interviewed for the IWM Sound Archive, 




Wherever possible, personal accounts were validated through reference to contemporary 
sources. There is an abundance of contemporary written material in the archives. Although 
this is often fragmentary, poorly indexed and, in the case of personal papers, not located in 
its original context, I was able to find many documents which provided direct evidence of 
individuals’ aims and intentions, as expressed at the time in different contexts. For the first 
two groups, the military generals and civilian administrators, contemporary written materials 
in the National Archives and collections of personal papers in other archives comprised the 
principle sources used. In the case of the four young officers discussed in chapter seven, 
however, relatively few contemporary written sources were available and a comprehensive 
validation of personal evidence was not possible. As Paul Thompson has noted, lapses in 
memory and confusion over specific events are not uncommon, especially among elderly 
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people, whose memories are usually better at recalling recurrent events, atmosphere and 
characters, than specific details of past events.
34
 Nevertheless, by cross referencing 
individual accounts with one another and with contemporary records, it was possible to form 
a judgement as to their accuracy and reliability. Perhaps surprisingly, despite using sources 
created at different times for different purposes, and in contrast with well-documented 
concerns regarding the fallibility of memory, later memoirs, oral history and other interviews 
were remarkably consistent with the contemporary record,
35
 though there were some errors 
and omissions, assumptions based on hearsay rather than personal experience and 
differences in emphasis and interpretation.
36
 As expected in a study of twelve individuals, 
with great differences of age, personal background, previous experience, official 
responsibilities and political views, attitudes were diverse, but there was little evidence of any 
significant distortion, concealment, or gaps in the evidence collected.  
As Mary Fulbrook has argued, ‘subjective perceptions and self-representations themselves 
form a crucial part of history.’
37
 Individuals have different experiences and perceive the same 
or similar events differently. Tracking how their self-perceptions changed over time can 
reveal hidden expectations and unspoken assumptions. Their perceptions can be related to 
each other, and to the historical context, to identify patterns and trends. Although many of 
the sources used in this study are subjective accounts, they can therefore help us 
understand the historical context and structures within which the individuals lived and 
worked. 
The overall impression I gained from reading many different accounts, was that their 
understanding and personal interpretation of the occupation, and their role within it, had 
been created while they were in Germany or soon after they left, and remained largely 
unchanged since. It was an seen as an exceptional time, in some cases a formative 
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influence on the rest of their lives, but also as a neglected period, not well understood by 
those who had not been there in person, and one which deserved greater prominence as 
one of the ‘untold stories’ of the war and its aftermath.  
A more detailed note of the various sources used, and the advantages and disadvantages 
pertaining to each, is provided in Appendix A. 
1.4 Historiography 
This thesis lies at the intersection of the national histories of Britain and of Germany, at a 
time of transition between two contrasting periods described by Eric Hobsbawm as ‘The Age 
of Catastrophe’ and ‘The Golden Age’.
38
 Historians of modern Germany have generally 
treated the occupation as part of the pre-history of the Federal Republic (BRD) in the West 
and the German Democratic Republic (DDR) in the East, leading to liberalisation, 
democratisation and eventual reunification in 1990.
39
 Alternatively, they have emphasised 
the legacy of death and destruction, twelve years of Nazi dictatorship and the Holocaust on 
the subsequent history of Germany.
40
 This thesis aims to contribute to both approaches. It 
clarifies the motivation and intentions of the British governing elite in occupied Germany, at a 
critical time during the first three years of the occupation. It also provides a view of their 
reactions to death and destruction, the war and the Holocaust, which can be compared to 
those of others who were in Germany at the same time, including Germans, the victorious 
Allies, and DPs of many nationalities.  
As a study of twelve British people who were for a short time the rulers of a country they had 
recently defeated in war, it also forms part of the history of British engagement (and 
disengagement) with the outside world, as a great power in Europe and as global empire 
builders and administrators. As the author of a recent study of Anglo-German relations in 
occupied Hamburg wrote: ‘when the British were discussing the Germans, they were also 
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 Anglo-German relations have retained a prominence created by 
over a century of economic rivalry and two world wars, which has still not been resolved after 
nearly seventy years of peace and cooperation.
42
 Angus Calder, for example, argued that 
British identity was reshaped during the war as the antithesis of everything that was 
perceived as German.
43
 A study of the occupation can contribute to the history of Britain as 
well as to that of Germany. 
The first histories of the British occupation of Germany were written by officers who were 
there at the time or with their close cooperation, notably Michael Balfour and John Mair, Four 
Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945-1946, published in 1956, and the relevant 
volume of the official history of the war by Frank Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military 
Government. North-West Europe 1944-1946, published in 1961.
44
 Subsequent historical 
studies concentrated on the political context, international relations and the emergence of 
the Cold War.
45
 Issues such as whether the division of Germany was inevitable and when 
was the ‘Turning Point’ in British policy towards Germany continued to be debated well into 
the 1990s.
46
 Many generals and senior administrators in Germany published their memoirs 
or were the subject of biographies.
47
 Most of the early studies shared a positive view of the 
occupation, the creation of a western, anti-communist alliance, and the British contribution to 
the ‘miracle’ of a stable and prosperous West Germany.
48
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In contrast to self-congratulatory accounts by British generals and officials, many historians 
in the 1970s and 1980s portrayed the British as incompetent, ineffective or as hindering 
German attempts to reform the structure of government and society, echoing earlier criticism 
in both the British and German press.
49
 British planning for the occupation had been 
‘haunted by the past.’
50
 The British Zone of occupation in 1945-6 was ‘a badly managed 
disaster area.’
51
 Radical German historians reflected contemporary left-wing concerns that 
West German society remained authoritarian and repressive and had never been properly 
democratised, liberalised or modernised. They argued, in a debate over ‘Neuanfang oder 
Restauration’, that the end of the war and the ‘collapse’ of May 1945 were not a definitive 
break with the past, as suggested by the idea of Stunde Null, Zero Hour, but the precursor to 
a conservative restoration, aided and abetted by the Allies, in which many elements of 
Weimar and Nazi Germany reappeared in the Federal Republic of the Adenauer era.
52
  
The role of the British occupiers in the immediate post-war period and their contribution to 
the early development of the Federal Republic was further marginalised or ignored, in the 
debate on whether the ‘Americanization’ of German industry, culture and society was to be 
welcomed, as helping to promote liberal democracy and the social market economy, or 
deplored, signifying a decline in quality and standards and the ‘Coca-colonization’ of German 
society.
53
 When US and German historians referred to ‘Allied’ policies or attitudes, the British 
contribution was either assumed to be identical to the American or ignored, in view of 
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increasing US dominance throughout Europe, in all spheres of human activity; political, 
economic, social and cultural.
54
 As one historian commented, writing in 1997: 
Only recently has research begun to depart from the German perspective that focused on 
unsuccessful and destructive British policies and that characterized British policy as 
hypocritical and myopic, even though British policy was quite insignificant, given the 




According to Bernd Weisbrod, this process has gone too far and historians have incorrectly 
labelled as ‘Americanization’ social and cultural change in cases such as broadcast 
television, where the example of the BBC was highly influential, different countries in Europe 
evolved their own national institutions and practices, and West Germany followed a British 
rather than an American model. Weisbrod suggested that his colleagues’ historical 
perception may be due as much to US cultural policy and the ‘Americanization’ of German 




As Robert Moeller noted, the trend towards social and cultural history came late to the study 
of post-war Germany.
57
 In addition to exploring processes of ‘cultural transmission’ and 
‘Americanization’, historians found evidence of social and cultural continuities within 
Germany which spanned the great divide of 1945.
58
 Interest in any British contribution to 
post-war German society was diminished still further, as historians discovered that, despite 
being subject to a political and economic settlement imposed upon them and to geopolitical 




More recently, historians have been interested in how a violent past has been remembered, 
commemorated and mourned. A collection of articles edited by Richard Bessel and Dirk 
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Schumann, for example, re-examined public and private memories, with the aim of 
understanding of how ordinary citizens survived and emerged from the horrors of war.
60 
There is a long-standing tradition in German historiography of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 
or critical engagement with the past. In part this was a response to the challenge posed by 
theories, such as the ‘Silence over the Holocaust’ or the ‘Inability to Mourn’,
61
 which 
attempted to explain how individual and collective memories can be distorted following mass 
violence and trauma. Following this tradition, W.G. Sebald, for example, criticised ‘people’s 
ability to forget what they do not want to know, to overlook what is before their eyes’.
62
 
Historical studies, such as the volume edited by Bessel and Schumann, have shown that 
theories such as these, based mainly on collective psychology, need to be re-evaluated in 
the light of historical evidence, to provide a more nuanced view of what Germans and others 
in Europe did and did not remember,  
In the 1980s and 1990s, after official British documents became available for study in 
accordance with the thirty year rule, historians of the Occupation produced monographs and 
articles on various subjects, covering many aspects of British policy, including, inter alia, 
economic development, industrial policy, denazification, re-education, food and rationing, 
and case studies of specific geographical areas.
63
 British aims in occupied Germany were 
described as the restoration of peace and the preservation of Britain’s status as a great 
power,
64
 economic security and economic reconstruction,
65
 the restoration of conditions of 
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 the promotion of British democracy
68
 and the 
propagation the British ‘way of life’ or ‘spreading our creed’.
69
 Although these descriptions 
are valid as broad generalisations, there has been little attempt to explain how conflicting 
aims were reconciled, how they evolved over time, or the motivation of key individuals 
responsible for the formation and implementation of policy. Whereas consolidated histories 
of the US and French Zones and of the Russians in Germany are available,
70
 there is still no 
single volume history of the British Zone which attempts to link these various threads 
together and place the activities of the British in Germany in the context of the post-war 
national histories of Germany and Britain.
71
  
In addition to the academic historiography, and perhaps in part because there is no generally 
accepted overview of the history of the British occupation of Germany, writers in other fields 
have produced works which have influenced public perceptions of the period. These include 
a five part television documentary, Zone of Occupation, first broadcast in 1981, which offered 
a highly critical account of British activities and personnel, and Tom Bower’s books written in 
the style of investigative journalism, Blind Eye to Murder and The Paperclip Conspiracy,
72
 
which provided an impassioned indictment of the Allies for not giving due consideration to 
the victims of the Holocaust. Public perceptions have also been influenced by other media, 
such as war films and Cold War spy thrillers and continue to be viewed through the distorted 
lens of popular prejudices, football rivalry and well-known fictional representations of Anglo-
German interactions, such as the television series, Fawlty Towers. 
In the course of researching twelve selected individuals, I have drawn on sources from the 
secondary literature in order to place them in their historical context. Sources are cited in the 
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footnotes where appropriate and a full list is provided in the bibliography. Some of the most 
comprehensive works on themes and issues directly relevant to this thesis have not been 
translated into English and so may not be familiar to some British historians. The most 
significant secondary sources consulted, in both English and German, include Farquharson, 
Trittel and Wildt on the food crisis,
73
 Reusch on local government and administrative 
reform,
74
 Hurwitz on the ‘Fusion’ campaign in Berlin,
75
 Hodenberg on the West German 
media,
76
 Kramer on the West German economy,
77
 numerous works on German socialist 
exiles in Britain, an unpublished thesis by Frances Rosenfeld on the Anglo-German 
encounter in occupied Hamburg,
78
 Brawand on John Chaloner and the origins of Der 
Spiegel
79
 and Jacobmeyer on DPs.
80
      
In summary, the historiography of the British occupation of Germany has progressed from 
eye-witness accounts from Allied officers who were there at the time, through a period of 
critical revision and re-interpretation in the 1970s and 1980s, when historians raised new 
concerns and questioned the assumptions on which the early Federal Republic of Germany 
was based, to the present, when historical study of the British in Germany remains a field of 
specialist interest, but appears to have little connection with much of the mainstream national 
historiography of post-war Germany or Britain. This study seeks to contribute to the relevant 
historiographies, by providing a better understanding of the motivation, aims and intentions 
of the British governing elite in occupied Germany. Through identifying some of the 
limitations and constraints under which they operated, it also places individuals within their 
historical context and explores one aspect of British engagement with the outside world, and 
with Germany in particular. 
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Physical reconstruction:  
The military governors and army generals 
  
34 
2 Bernard Montgomery, Brian Robertson and Alec Bishop: 
Creating order out of chaos and ‘rebuilding civilisation’: May 
1945 – April 1946 
 
‘Out of the chaos and confusion which the war has inflicted on Europe  




Historians have debated when and why British Policy changed after the end of the Second 
World War, from holding Germany down to ‘putting Germany on its feet again.’
2
 Was this 
due to ‘a change of mood in Britain’ in early 1947,
3
 economic pressures in the winter of 
1946,
4
 or the emergence of the Cold War and the perceived threat from the Soviet Union, in 
which case, was the key turning point the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ conference in April 
1947,
5
 the Paris conference a year earlier,
6
 or perhaps the Berlin blockade in 1948? This 
chapter explores why three of the most important and influential members of British Military 
Government – the first Military Governor, Field-Marshal Montgomery, his deputy, Brian 
Robertson, and one of his senior generals, Alec Bishop – devoted so much time and energy 
to rebuilding a country they had so recently destroyed in battle. Based on an examination of 
what they aimed to achieve, as stated in contemporary documents such as instructions to 
subordinates and articles in the press and in their later memoirs, it would appear that in the 
British zone of occupation, the key turning point was none of the above, but the transition 
from war to peace from May to September 1945.
7
  
In the first year of the occupation, the government in London was generally content to leave 
internal policy in the British Zone in the hands of the military, who were expected to act in 
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accordance with a set of directives issued by the War Office in October 1944.
8
 When the 
new Labour government was formed in August 1945, there was uncertainty over which 
minister and Civil Service department would be responsible for the internal administration of 
the British Zone. This had previously been shared between the Foreign and War Offices.
9
 
After internal discussions in Whitehall, the new Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, decided that 
responsibility should be transferred to a new department, the Control Office for Germany and 
Austria (COGA), which would act as the liaison between Military Government in Germany 
and Civil Service departments in London.
10
 However, at the Foreign Secretary, Ernest 
Bevin’s, request, it was agreed that that no formal announcement would be made until after 
the Allied Foreign Ministers’ conference in the Autumn.
11
 As a result, COGA was not 
established and the new minister for Germany, John Hynd, did not take up his post until 
October 1945.
12
 The embryonic civilian Control Commission for Germany, which had been 
established in London in June 1944, transferred to Germany in July and August 1945.
13
 It 
was gradually integrated with army ‘Civil Affairs’ staff by the end of the year, but 
Montgomery’s three military Corps Commanders retained responsibility for civil 
administration at regional level until civilian Regional Commissioners were appointed in May 
1946. For at least the first six months of the occupation, there was therefore no independent 
civilian authority established in Germany, and no clear reporting lines from Military 
Government back to London.
14
  
Montgomery and his generals were left to govern an area half the size of the United 
Kingdom with a population of over twenty million. The directives issued in October 1944 did 
not provide guidance on many of the problems they had to face once victory had been 
achieved, such as food and housing shortages, chronically low levels of industrial 
production, massive population movements and, above all, the absence of any central 
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German authority. As a result, they adopted procedures they knew and understood from 
their experience in the army. The overall direction of policy was determined by Montgomery, 
as Military Governor and Commander-in-Chief, in a series of notes, memos and conferences 
with his senior staff. Responsibility for translating these into detailed directives and issuing 
instructions to subordinates lay with his Chief of Staff and Deputy Military Governor, Brian 
Robertson. Implementation was delegated to the army Corps Commanders and various 
Control Commission heads of division.  
Although some British officers, soldiers and administrators were motivated by a desire to 
bring the perpetrators of war crimes to justice,
15
 and others took advantage of the situation to 
indulge in theft and looting
16
 or live a life of luxury,
17
 soldiers were expected to obey orders. 
The predominant tone, which came from the top, was endorsed by senior officers and 
reflected in all the official publications, was that of reconstruction, from the start of the 
occupation. The views expressed by Montgomery, Robertson and Bishop described in this 
chapter were typical of the most senior ranks of army officers in Germany. These men knew 
each other personally, had a strong esprit de corps and often shared experiences, such as 
attendance at the army staff college at Camberley, overseas postings in the Empire and, in 
the Second World War, service in London as staff officers or under Montgomery’s command 
in North Africa, France and Germany.  
The similarities in outlook between Montgomery, Robertson and Bishop were greater than 
any differences. All were educated in public schools, fought as young men in the First World 
War, served in the Empire between the wars and held strong personal religious beliefs. After 
a brief outline of the personal background, previous experience and role in Military 
government of each, they are treated together in this chapter, as a representative group of 
three of the most senior army officers who determined and implemented Military Government 
policy in the British Zone. 
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2.1 Classically educated soldiers in the service of the British Empire 
 
‘Let us take as our motto a line written many centuries ago by wise friend Horace: 
“Justum et tenacem propositi virum”’
18
 
(The just man, firm of purpose) 






Montgomery’s year as Military Governor of Germany is rarely covered in any detail in his 
biographies.
20
 He was born in 1887 in London, where his father was an Anglican clergyman 
and vicar of St Mark’s, Kennington. Two years later, his father was appointed Bishop of 
Tasmania and moved there with his family, before returning to London in 1901, to become 
secretary of the Christian missionary Society for the Propagation of the Gospel.
21
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On his return from Tasmania, aged 14, the future Field-Marshal went to St Paul’s School in 
London, and spent his summer holidays at the family estate in Ireland. On leaving school, he 
entered the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and was commissioned as an officer in 
1908. After serving in India, he fought in the First World War and was wounded in France.
22
 
He commanded a battalion in the British Army of the Rhine during the first British occupation 
of Germany and after a chance meeting with the commander, Sir William Robertson, was 
successful in gaining entrance to the Staff College at Camberley in 1920.
23
 He was stationed 
in Ireland during the fighting which led to the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1923. In 
1926 he was appointed as an instructor at the Staff College and subsequently served in 
Egypt, India and Palestine, being promoted to Major-General in 1938.
24
  
At the outbreak of the Second World War, he was sent to France in command of a division of 
the British Expeditionary Force and took part in the retreat and evacuation at Dunkirk. 
Goronwy Rees, who acted as his liaison officer in 1941, later described him as having ‘an air 
… of extraordinary quietness and calm’, more like a priest than a general.
25
 In 1942 he was 
transferred to North Africa to command the 8
th
 Army. After successfully holding the position 
at El Alamein, he counter-attacked in October 1942 and broke through the enemy lines. This 
was the first decisive Allied victory and considered by many in Britain to be the turning point 
in the war. It was followed by the retreat and evacuation of German forces from North Africa 
and the invasion of Italy in 1943. Montgomery returned to Britain and acted as Commander-
in-Chief of all Allied ground forces, over two million British, US, Canadian and other troops, 
during Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy. Owing to the growing preponderance 
of American forces, he was replaced by General Eisenhower at the end of the campaign, but 
continued to command the Allied 21
st
 Army Group in its advance through France, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands and across the Rhine into Germany. On 4 May 1945 he accepted the 
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unconditional surrender of all German forces in North-West Europe, shortly before the formal 





He was appointed Military Governor of the British Zone of Germany and British member of 
the Allied Control Council on 22 May.
27
 A year later, on 1 May 1946, he returned to England 
to take up the position of Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). In later years he was 
part of the command structure for the Western European Union and NATO before retiring in 
1958. In the same year he published his memoirs, which aroused considerable controversy, 
due to his criticism of other Allied commanders, including General Eisenhower. His military 
record has remained controversial, although he attracted tremendous loyalty from those who 
served under him and was often greeted by cheering crowds in the streets of Britain in the 
years immediately after the end of the war.
28
 He was created Viscount Montgomery of 
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Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Robertson 
 




Brian Robertson was born in 1896 at Simla in India. His father, Sir William Robertson, had a 
distinguished military career and was the only British soldier to rise from the ranks to field-
marshal, the most senior position in the army. In 1915 his father was appointed Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (CIGS), a position he held until 1918. From 1919-1920 he was 
Commander-in-Chief of the British Army of the Rhine, during the occupation of the Rhineland 
after the First World War.
31
 
The family was not wealthy and, with no private means, Brian Robertson had to work hard to 
win a scholarship to Charterhouse.
32
 He was reasonably content at school,
33
 unlike his fellow 
pupil, the author and classical scholar Robert Graves, who wrote about his experiences in 
scathing terms in his autobiography Goodbye to all That.
34
 At least one in three of their 
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generation at school died during the war.
35
 In 1913 Robertson entered the Royal Military 
Academy at Woolwich. At the outbreak of the First World War he was commissioned in the 
Royal Engineers but, owing to the influence of his father, did not fight at the front and had a 
relatively easy time as a staff officer and ADC, firstly to his father and subsequently to 
Generals Haig and Haking. After the war he spent five years in India, from 1920-25, and in 
1926 gained a place at the Staff College in Camberley, where two of his fellow-students 
were the future generals Harold Alexander and Alec Bishop; Montgomery was one of the 
instructors. In 1928 he was appointed as an intelligence officer at the War Office and in 
1932-3 was a member of the British delegation at the disarmament talks at Geneva.
36
 In 
1933 his father died and, uncertain of his future prospects in the army, he accepted a 




When the Second World War broke out, he campaigned for South African support for the 
British war effort and volunteered to re-enlist. He served in the East African campaign and in 
May 1942 was appointed Quartermaster General for the 8
th
 Army, during the retreat from 
Tobruk to El Alamein. He wrote to his wife in November, after the victory at the second battle 
of El Alamein, of the change he experienced when Montgomery was appointed Commander-
in-Chief: 
What gave me confidence, more than anything else was Monty’s attitudes and methods. To 





After the invasion of Italy in 1943 he was appointed Chief Administrative Officer to the 
Commander-in-Chief, General Alexander.
39
 He was in Italy in July 1945, when he received 
an urgent summons to take over the position of Deputy Military Governor and Chief of Staff 
for Montgomery in Germany.
40
 When Montgomery left Germany in May 1946, Robertson 
continued as deputy to his successor, Sholto Douglas, and when Douglas resigned in 
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November 1947, he was appointed Military Governor. Following the establishment of an 
independent elected government in West Germany in September 1949, he became the first 
British High Commissioner to the Federal Republic.
41
 
He left Germany in June 1950 for a position as Commander-in-Chief Middle East land 
forces. He was disappointed not to follow in the footsteps of his father, when he was 
considered but not selected as Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1953
42
 and once again 
left the army for business, to become head of the British Transport Commission, a position 
he held until 1961. He died in 1974, aged 77.
43
 
After Montgomery left Germany in May 1946, Robertson was the most influential soldier and 
administrator in the British Zone, chairing committee meetings, issuing instructions and 
directives, and acting as the spokesman for Military Government at press conferences.
44
 He 
was a shy and private man, who often appeared reserved and aloof,
45
 though it is clear from 
the official papers that he had a tremendous capacity for work. He described his role, in a 
brief he wrote in 1946 for the newly appointed civilian Regional Commissioners, as 
equivalent to the ‘Prime Minister’ of the Zone.
46
 He developed a strong working relationship 
with Ernest Bevin,
47
 the British Foreign Secretary, and with Konrad Adenauer, the first 
Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, who paid a tribute to him in his memoirs.
48
 As 
an administrator, rather than commander, he would appear to have seen his primary 
responsibility as implementing policy agreed by others. However, as he said many years 
later in an interview for the Truman Presidential Library, when comparing himself to his US 
counterpart, Lucius D. Clay: 
General Clay was a very powerful character. He was highly thought of in his own country … 
I am not such a strong character, perhaps, but maybe I have a way of getting my own way. 
However it may be, it is certain that policy in Germany, in fact, emanated very largely from 




                                                     
41
 Richardson, ‘Robertson’, DNB   
42
 Williamson, A Most Diplomatic General, pp167-8 
43
 Richardson, ‘Robertson’, DNB 
44
 A ‘Profile’ of Robertson in The Observer, 8 Dec. 1946, stated that: ‘There is no doubt that Robertson is the most 
powerful man in the British Control Commission.’ 
45
 Richardson, ‘Robertson’, DNB; Williamson, A Most Diplomatic General, p84 
46
 FO 1030/308, paper on ‘The Functions of Regional Commissioners’, p1, enclosed with a letter from Robertson to 
the military commanders of the five regions in the British Zone, 29 April 1946 
47
 Bishop, Look back with Pleasure, p105  
48
 Adenauer, Memoirs, p274 
49
 Robertson, Truman presidential library interview  
43 
Perhaps reflecting the classical training he received at Charterhouse,
50
 he ended the second 
of two articles he wrote in early issues of the British Zone Review, the official journal of 
Military Government, by quoting a Latin verse by Horace, Justum et tenacem propositi virum 
(The just man, firm of purpose), adding that if his readers knew the poem and were still able 
to translate it, they would ‘find that Horace wrote that Ode specially for the Control 
Commission in Germany.’
51
 Two years later, at a press conference for journalists in 1947, he 
quoted the same line again, adding: 
If you want to know what I think should be our attitude in Germany then I recommend to you 




His reference to a Latin verse, which he had probably learnt at school, suggests he was a 
man of firm principles, who believed they were self-evident to those who shared his 
background and education and there was no need to express them explicitly. In the twenty-
first century, when very few civil servants, army officers, academics or journalists have 
studied Latin, or share his outlook on life as a classically educated army officer, what he 
assumed was obvious to all may not be so evident. His role and that of his colleagues 
deserve further historical investigation. 
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Major-General Sir Alec Bishop 
 
Alexander Bishop, by Walter Stoneman, 1945 © National Portrait Gallery 
 
Alec Bishop was born in 1897 in a small village near Plymouth, Devon. In his unpublished 
autobiography, he wrote that his father had not served in the army, but ‘most of my forbears 
on my Mother’s side had been soldiers’ dating back to the ‘Parliamentary Wars of the 
seventeenth century’ and it was assumed that he too ‘would follow the profession of arms.’
53
  
He went to school at Plymouth College and in the Autumn of 1914 gained a scholarship to 
Sandhurst. Two years later he was sent to Mesopotamia, in charge of a draft of 500 men. In 
January 1917 he took part in the offensive which was to lead to the capture of Baghdad on 
17 March. He was lightly wounded in action after an engagement in which his senior officer 
was killed and he took over command. After three weeks in hospital he re-joined his 
regiment and again took over command of the company. He was still only 19 years old.
54
 
After the war he spent six years in India, where ‘The big game shooting was first class, and 
included tiger, bison, wild boar, sambhur, cheetah and spotted deer…. Life was very 
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pleasant in those days for young officers serving in India. We were in fact a very privileged 
body of young men.’
55
 He returned to England in 1925 and after a brief move to Yorkshire at 
the time of the General Strike, in case of ‘an emergency’ in the coalfields,
56
 gained a place at 
the Staff College at Camberley in 1926.
57
 
In 1931 he joined the Colonial Office in London and travelled extensively in Africa on tours of 
inspection of the Colonial Forces. At the outbreak of the Second World War he was in 
Tanganyika, where he organised the arrest of German settlers, in response to concerns that 
they would ‘form themselves into commandos and take to the bush.’
58
 He spent the rest of 
the war in various positions in Africa and as a staff officer at the War Office in London where 
he was appointed Director of Quartering in 1944, with the rank of Major-General.
59
 For the 
last three months of the war, he was Deputy Director of the Political Warfare Executive, 
(PWE), deputising for the director, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, who was ill at the time. 
Presumably this led to him taking charge of Information Services in Germany. Apparently he 
had no choice in the matter, as his appointment was negotiated between Bruce Lockhart and 
Sir William Strang, political adviser to Montgomery.
60
 Bishop moved to Germany in June 
1945, one month after the end of the war. After a year as Head of Information Services and 
Public Relations, he was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff to Robertson and two years later 
Regional Commissioner for North Rhine-Westphalia.  
Although not as senior or influential as Montgomery or Robertson, Bishop’s career is 
interesting and relevant for a study of British aims in occupied Germany. In the first year after 
the end of the war he had overall responsibility for communicating the work done by British 
Military Government internally to its own staff, and externally to those at home in Britain and 
to the local German population. In addition, unlike many other senior officers, he served in 
Germany for an extended period of five and a half years and his work spanned three 
important areas of administration: public relations and information services; general policy; 
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and the administration of North Rhine-Westphalia, the largest and most industrialised Land,
61
 
or region, in the Zone.  
Bishop left Germany on New Year’s Eve 1950 to take up a position as Assistant Secretary at 
the Commonwealth Relations Office. From 1957-62 he was the British Deputy High 
Commissioner in Calcutta. After another brief period at the Commonwealth Relations Office, 
he was appointed High Commissioner for Cyprus in 1964, but had to retire due to ill-health a 




2.2   ‘Almost overnight’: The transition from war to peace 
 
'The British forces, which had hitherto been locked in mortal combat with their  
German opponents, turned almost overnight the whole of their energies, strength and 




In his memoirs, Montgomery described the situation in Germany following the unconditional 
surrender on 8 May 1945: 
The immediate problem that now faced us was terrific. We had in our area nearly one and a 
half million German prisoners of war. There were a further one million German wounded, 
without medical supplies, and in particular with a shortage of bandages and no 
anaesthetics. In addition, there were about one million civilian refugees who had fled into 
our area from the advancing Russians; these and ‘Displaced Persons’ were roaming about 
the country, often looting as they went. Transportation and communication services had 
ceased to function. Agriculture and industry were largely at a standstill. Food was scarce 
and there was a serious risk of famine and disease during the coming months. And to 
crown it all there was no central government in being, and the machinery whereby a central 
government could function no longer existed. 
Here was a pretty pickle. 
I was a soldier and I had not been trained to handle anything of this nature. 
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 Montgomery, Memoirs, p345 
47 
He flew to London on 14 May to meet the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and argue the 
case for urgent action. Though he was frustrated by delays, his appointment as Military 
Governor and Commander in Chief of the British armed forces in Germany was confirmed on 
22 May.
65
 The next day he addressed Control Commission staff in London and said: 
‘Between us we have to re-establish civil control, and to govern, a country which we have 
conquered and which has become sadly battered in the process.’ His official biographer, 
Nigel Hamilton, commented that: ‘Monty’s sympathy with the plight of Germany came as a 
shock to those in the auditorium who pictured him as a ruthless, Cromwellian commander, 
until two weeks ago waging implacable war upon the Nazis.’
66
  
Montgomery’s memoirs and similar accounts by Robertson, Bishop and other generals such 
as Brian Horrocks, of a rapid change in policy, ‘almost overnight’,
67
 may have reflected 
prevailing attitudes in the 1950s and 1960s at the height of the Cold War, but the change can 
also be traced in contemporary documents, such as a series of Information Control policy 
directives issued by British Army Headquarters in Germany. Directive no. 1, dated 12 May 
1945, a few days after VE Day, adopted a harsh tone, instructing staff to emphasise issues 
such as: ‘The completeness of Germany’s defeat in the field … The common responsibility of 
all Germans for Nazi crimes’ and ‘The power and determination of the Allies to enforce their 
will.’
68
 In this respect the directive was similar to orders issued before the end of the war, 
such as Montgomery’s first message on non-fraternization, in March 1945, instructing British 
troops to ‘keep clear of Germans, man, woman, and child’ and not to:  
walk out with them, or shake hands, or visit their homes, or make them gifts, or take gifts 
from them. You must not play games with them or share any social event with them. In 




There was no change in the second directive, but the third, issued only two weeks later, on 
27 May, stated that whilst earlier themes remained valid, ‘the emphasis should now be 
shifted to more positive aims’:  
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The immediate need, from both Allied and German points of view, is for a supreme effort by 
the Germans at all forms of reconstruction work … Use every opportunity that honest 
reporting allows to emphasise with good space and prominence reconstruction activities by 




Montgomery returned to Germany as Military Governor on 26 May, the day before the third 
directive was issued. Although there is no specific evidence in the file, it is likely that the 
change reflected new instructions from above, ultimately emanating from him. The fourth 
directive, issued on 8 June, stated that the ‘predominantly negative attitude’ specified in the 
first directive was now superseded.
71
 Subsequent directives and memos, such as 
Montgomery’s three ‘Notes on the present situation’
72
 and his third ‘personal message’ to the 
German people,
73
 all emphasised the need for a new policy of reconstruction and of giving 
the Germans ‘hope for the future.’
74
 
‘You have to see it to believe it’ 
In common with many of their colleagues, Montgomery, Robertson and Bishop were 
surprised and shocked at the extent of the physical destruction of Germany. Numerous 
published accounts, by British soldiers, administrators, diplomats and journalists, included 
descriptions of the devastation they saw when they first arrived in Germany, looking out of 





 for example, described his first impressions of ‘The Early Days’, in an article in 
the British Zone Review in November 1945.  
Military Government was met by chaos. A team of four officers and six other ranks would be 
confronted by an area of many square miles. There was no local authority whatever with 
whom to deal. Devastation was often on a prodigious scale. There were no 
communications, no power. Fields were deserted. Crops and cattle had been left 
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unattended. Half the population had been evacuated eastwards. Those that remained were 




Bishop described his first impressions in similar terms in his memoirs: 
It is very difficult for anyone who did not see the situation in Germany when the war came to 
an end to realise what it was like. The first impression was of the appalling destruction 
which had been caused by the Allies’ bombing. Very few towns had escaped wide-spread 
destruction. In some of the Ruhr towns such as Duisburg, over eighty per cent of the 





The majority of senior officers were completely unprepared for their new role as civil 
administrators of a defeated enemy country. Bishop had no choice in his selection as Head 
of Public Relations and Information Services Control. Robertson described his recall from 
Italy, when his predecessor as Montgomery’s deputy in Germany, General Weeks, retired 
due to ill-health after only two months in post: 
I was suddenly sent for. I was told to take over this job, and I went to Germany the next 
day. I didn’t speak a word of German; I’d never been in the country before. I had been in 
South Africa for half a dozen years or more. I knew nothing about the situation at all, 





If the generals felt unprepared for their new roles, they nevertheless believed they knew 
more than the politicians. In 1965, in a speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Robertson told the audience that, at the end of the war, Churchill, Roosevelt and other 
politicians in Britain and the United States had ‘an entirely false picture in their minds as to 
what the situation would be in Germany, and they were aiming at a completely wrong 
objective.’
80
 The ‘misconception in the mind of President Franklin Roosevelt’, he believed, 
‘dominated American thought and action during the first two, very important years following 
the German collapse.’ 
The ‘Grand Design’ of President Roosevelt for the future peace of the world was based 
upon a United Nations dominated by an American-Russian partnership, and this probably to 
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British attitudes, Robertson continued, were different. When he arrived in Germany in July 
1945, he found the ‘men on the spot’ including Montgomery and Templer, ‘had their minds 
on other things’: 
Very soon I could see that the assumptions on which our policy had been based were false, 
and that the objectives chosen were quite irrelevant. The real menace for the future of 
Europe and to world peace was not Germany, but Russia. The immediate objective was not 
to batter Germany down – she was sprawling in the dust already – but to build her up and 
to do so wisely. We had to save Germany physically from starvation, squalor and penury, 




Twenty years earlier, in October 1945, in an article for the British Zone Review, he had 
expressed a slightly different perspective.
83
 Rather than referring to a threat from Russia and 
Communism, he justified a policy of reconstruction on the need for reform within Germany. 
He acknowledged the need for disarmament and de-nazification, but considered these 
‘relatively straightforward’ and already largely completed following unconditional surrender 
and military occupation. He told his colleagues in Military Government that they now needed 
to focus on the more positive aspects of their work, which he believed was not just a matter 
of physical or economic reconstruction, but more like educating a child.
84
 Bishop made a 
similar point in an article in the British Zone Review in January 1946 on ‘Re-educating 
Germany’, emphasising the scale of the task, but concluding with the view that it was difficult 
but not impossible to achieve as: ‘During the war years we have learnt that nothing is 
impossible, though perhaps an “impossible task” may take a little longer to accomplish.’
85
 
In summary, Montgomery, Robertson and Bishop, three of the most influential men in the 
British Zone of occupied Germany, were career officers, with little if any experience of civilian 
administration, no knowledge of the German language, culture or society, had played no part 
in British post-war planning and preparation for the occupation and felt unprepared for the 
job they were expected to perform. Nevertheless, their first impressions, when they arrived in 










 ‘Re-educating Germany’, British Zone Review, Vol.1, No.6, 8 Dec. 1945, pp3-4, initialled W.H.A.B. 
51 
Germany, of a devastated country and a demoralised people, led them to conclude that the 
politicians at home knew even less than they did. They were in no doubt of the need for 
complete disarmament and denazification as agreed at the Potsdam conference, but they 
also assumed it was part of their duty and personal responsibility to rehabilitate Germany 
and, great as the task was, they believed they knew, or could learn, what had to be done to 
achieve this. 
‘First things first’ 
The unquestioned assumption of all three men, Montgomery, Robertson and Bishop, was 
that their most urgent tasks in Germany were to restore law and order, prevent starvation, 
guard against the spread of disease, find shelter for the homeless, keep young people off the 
streets and start to rebuild the economy.  
Montgomery, as Commander-in-Chief and Military Governor, had no confidence in the ability 
of the civilian Control Commission to deal with the problems on the ground, as they were 
based in London until July and August, and ‘out of touch with the immediate realities of the 
situation.’
86
 He therefore decided to make use of the army and treat the work that needed to 
be done as if it were a military operation.
87
 The battles he and his troops had fought to win 
the war were followed by another to win the peace, which he called ‘The Battle of the 
Winter’, the objectives of which were not to repel enemy attack or win territory, but to provide 
‘food, work and homes.’
88
 Operations ‘Overlord’ (the invasion of Normandy), ‘Market Garden’ 
(the attack on Arnhem described in the film ‘A Bridge too Far’) and ‘Plunder’ (the final assault 
across the German border to the Rhine) were followed, after the end of the war, by 
Operations ‘Barleycorn’ (the release of captured German POWs to work on the land and 
help bring in the harvest), ‘Coalscuttle’ (a further release of POWs to work in the coalmines 
of the Ruhr) and ‘Stork’ (the evacuation of young children from the British Zone in Berlin).
89
 
The role of British Military Government was described by Robertson in his first article in the 
British Zone Review as similar to that of a policeman taking control at the scene of an 
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accident. He told the story of a horse and cart careering down a street, overturning and 
causing chaos, when: 
Into this crowd came a British Military Policeman who immediately took charge of the 
situation. He was not an expert in horses and carts, but he saw very clearly that certain 
essential things were to be done. 
 
This is a simple story. We have all seen things like this happen. It has a moral for us. The 
German apple-cart has been upset, the madmen who were in charge of it are dead or in 
prison, the German people lies bleeding and helpless. We represent the policeman 




In a second article, published in January 1946, he wrote in similar terms of the need for 
improvisation and the application of common sense, in unexpected conditions: 
The directives were not many, and much was left to the initiative of individuals … The 
detachments entered into a land of desolation and bewilderment. Government above the 
level of the parish council had ceased. Everything was in disorder; people were stunned 





Initial concerns that they might have to deal with resistance from units of the German army 
who refused to surrender, die-hard Nazis or German nationalists, turned out to be completely 
unfounded. Montgomery reported in a memorandum to Sir Arthur Street, Permanent 
Secretary of the Control Office in London, that: ‘The British Zone has remained quiet. So far 
scarcely a spark has occurred. I do not think we shall have any trouble with the Germans this 
winter; they are fully occupied with their own immediate troubles.’
92
  
According to contemporary accounts, crime committed by Displaced Persons, or ‘DPs’, as 
the millions of liberated slave workers in Nazi Germany, were known, was a greater problem 
than resistance from Germans.
93
 There was considerable sympathy among British officers 
for DPs as victims of the Nazi regime, but their priority was the enforcement of law and 
order, not humanitarian concerns, and crimes had to be punished, whoever committed them. 
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Bishop expressed this ambivalence in his memoirs: ‘We all felt great sympathy for these 
unfortunate people who had suffered so much … Many were well educated and responsible, 
others were unruly and lawless.’
94
 In an address to the Newspaper Society in October 1945, 
Montgomery made it clear that, whatever their personal sympathies, murder, rape, looting 
and the illegal possession of firearms would not be tolerated.
95
 In a conference for Corps 
Commanders in August, he had been more explicit, giving instructions that: 
Present looting and murder by Poles and Russian DPs must be stopped by ruthless means. 




The German police, forbidden to carry firearms after the end of the war, were unable to 
prevent crime by armed DPs. British junior officers on the front line, responsible for enforcing 
law and order, soon found their sympathies lay increasingly with the local German population 
and came to share the Germans’ perception of DPs as lawless troublemakers.
97
  
Food: ‘A Buchenwald in Germany’ 
In a telegram to Montgomery sent on 5 June 1945, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, 
wrote that: 
I am alarmed by the winter prospect in Germany. I expect they will do everything you tell 
them and hold you responsible that they are fed. I wonder myself whether anything but 
German responsibility can secure the full German effort. It would NOT be thought a good 





With hindsight, we know that Churchill’s understanding of the numbers was wrong. Millions 
of people rather than thousands died in the Holocaust, and thousands, rather than millions, 
died of starvation and disease in the British Zone after the end of the war. However, at the 
time, famine and mass deaths from starvation in Germany and Europe, as had occurred 
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during and after the First World War,
99
 seemed a very real possibility. Before he left London 
in March 1945, General Templer was told by P.J. Grigg, Secretary of State for War, that:  
You must resign yourself to the fact that two million are going to die of hunger in Europe 





For three years after the end of the war, food rations in the British Zone for the so-called 
‘normal consumer’ varied between around 1,000 and 1,500 calories per day, well below the 
League of Nations’ estimate of 2,000 calories as the minimum required to support a working 
adult. In comparison, the normal British ration at the time was around 2,800 calories.
101
 
For the first three years of the occupation, food was the single most important issue for the 
British authorities.
102
 At its simplest, their policy could be reduced to the question of what 
actions had to be taken to prevent starvation. Economic reconstruction could not proceed 
unless the workers were adequately fed; attempts at democratic political and social reform 
were pointless if all people could think about was their next meal. For example, a cut in 
rations in early 1946 resulted in an immediate reduction in coal production from 181,000 to 
160,000 tons per day.
103
 Absenteeism was high as workers took time off on ‘hamster’ visits 
to the countryside to try to find food for themselves and their families.
104
 During the cold 
winter of 1946-7 the entire economy ground to a halt and factories, such as the Volkswagen 
works, ceased production for 3 months.
105
 
A series of short term measures alleviated the problem without solving it: the use of Allied 
stocks of food held in reserve following the invasion in 1944, the diversion of supplies from 
the US, the reduction of stocks of wheat held in Britain and attempts to increase production 
within the British Zone. The fundamental problem was that food production within the 
Western Zones, and the British Zone in particular, was not sufficient to feed the population, 
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and until, and unless, industry revived, there was no revenue from exports to pay for food 
imports. The British Government was therefore faced with the choice of reducing rations 
further, paying for food imports with scarce foreign currency or, as eventually happened but 
not until 1948, persuading the US to assume financial responsibility for maintaining the 
British as well as their own Zone.
106
 
During this period, but especially in the eight months from October 1945 to May 1946, 
Montgomery and Robertson fought a continual battle with government ministers in London to 
maintain supplies of food above what they considered to be starvation level. In October 1945 
Robertson sent an urgent request for additional wheat allocations to the War Office. The 
existing 1,550 calorie ration was already inadequate, he wrote, as ‘2,000 calories is the 
minimum ration to prevent disease and unrest.’ Only 27,000 tons per week were available 
from the German harvest against a requirement of 61,500 tons.
107
 On 24 October 
Montgomery met Bevin during a visit to London. On his return to Germany, he restated his 
position in a telegram, saying that he had learned that the government were considering 
delaying further supplies. The ‘already inadequate’ ration of 1,550 calories would have to be 
reduced by 40% and this, he continued, would mean ‘famine conditions to an extent which 
no civilized people should inflict upon their beaten enemies.’
108
 
On 26 February the following year, the matter had still not been resolved. Montgomery wrote 
to John Hynd, the minister responsible for Germany in London, to say he would have to cut 
the ration, with dire consequences: 
I have just returned from Switzerland and am utterly shocked by the latest telegrams from 
the Control Office regarding food supplies to the British Zone…. 
 
I have therefore ordered an immediate reduction of the ration by 33 1/3% for the normal 
consumer. This means a ration of 1000 calories for the normal consumer which is well 
below the hunger mark…. 
 
In my opinion we must immediately have substantial imports of wheat or equivalent for 
Germany. If we do not do so we shall produce death and misery to an extent which will 
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disgrace our administration in history and completely stultify every effort which we are 




On 5 May Robertson wrote again to Street, enclosing a strongly worded paper on the food 
situation. The 1,000 calorie ration had been introduced in March but, he added: ‘It is not 
possible for an adult human being to subsist on 1,000 calories…’ If there were no further 
imports, food grains would run out by 27 May and rations would be reduced to 450 calories: 
‘Coal production will stop. The trains will stop. The lights will go out.’
110
 
With the introduction of bread rationing in Britain on 21 July 1946, and agreement to allocate 
an additional 200,000 tons of US wheat to the British Zone, the situation eased, but rations in 
Germany continued at a low level and did not exceed 1,500 calories until after the 
introduction of Marshall Aid in the second half of 1948. In October 1946 an American 
dockers’ strike brought food shipments almost to a standstill. In the Spring of 1947, after 
rations were reduced to 750 calories in the Ruhr, there was a string of hunger strikes and 
demonstrations. Conditions did not improve until 1948-9, following substantial increases in 
US aid and food imports.
111
  
‘Epidemics need no Passports’ – disease and communism 
Montgomery and his officers in Germany believed that the restoration of law and order, the 
provision of enough food to prevent starvation and economic reconstruction to provide a 
reasonable standard of living were necessary, not only to help the German people, but 
because it was in their own interest to prevent disease and social unrest spreading from 
Germany to the rest of Western Europe.
112
 A precedent which concerned them greatly was 
the epidemic of influenza at the end of the First World War, which was widely believed to 
have killed more people than the war itself.
113
 Unlike enemy armies, disease could not be 
stopped by physical barriers.
114
 A starving population was more susceptible to disease and 
‘epidemics need no passports,’ as the author of an article in the British Zone Review wrote in 
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September 1945.
115 Alec Bishop made a similar point in his memoirs after describing 
conditions in Germany at the end of the war: 
Without vigorous help and support it was inevitable that epidemics would spread throughout 
the country, endangering the health of the Occupying Forces and of the whole of Western 
Europe.  
 
He continued by saying: 
It was also clear that unless the German people were helped to transform the conditions 
then existing into a situation which would provide a bearable if modest standard of living it 




British anti-communism pre-dated the Cold War and was not new in 1945. The idea that 
communism was a ‘disease of the mind’ had been widespread among Conservative Party 
politicians and the popular press since the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.  
In a recent article on ‘The Creeds of the Devil’, Antoine Capet provided numerous examples 
of Churchill’s use of medical imagery between the wars, describing the ‘menace of 
Bolshevism’ as ‘the poisoned peril’ or ‘a plague bacillus’ infecting civilisation.
117
 In the 
following passage, published in 1929 but based on a newspaper article written in 1920, 
Churchill graphically linked the geographical country of Russia with the triple threat of war, 
disease and ideology: 
[To the East of Poland] lay the huge mass of Russia—not a wounded Russia only, but a 
poisoned Russia, an infected Russia, a plague-bearing Russia, a Russia of armed hordes 
not only smiting with bayonet and with cannon, but accompanied and preceded by swarms 
of typhus-bearing vermin which slew the bodies of men, and political doctrines which 




The emotional connection between war, disease and political doctrines could appear equally 
relevant in 1945. Between 1918 and 1922 an estimated three million people died in Russia 
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from typhus, a highly infectious disease spread by the human body louse.
119
 Outbreaks of 
typhus were widespread in Germany in 1945 and were controlled by the Allies only by 
routinely dusting with DDT anyone suspected of being a source of infection, regardless of 
their nationality or status.
120
 
Capet does not agree with some revisionist historians, who have claimed that Churchill’s 
greatest lifetime struggle was against a ‘Bolshevist’ Soviet Union and its communist allies, 
rather than against the fascist dictatorships of Germany, Italy and Japan,
121
 arguing that 
whereas he was convinced that Nazi Germany had to be destroyed, Churchill eventually 
came to terms with the existence of Soviet Russia, however much he disliked it. However, 
once Nazi Germany had been defeated in 1945, it was easy for Churchill to revert to the role 
of anti-communist crusader and claim that he had always been consistent in his views. He 
had, after all, proposed to the War Cabinet on the eve of the Armistice in 1918 that ‘[We] 
might have to build up the German army, as it was important to get Germany on its legs 
again for fear of the spread of Bolshevism,’ and told Lloyd George in April 1919 that their 
policy should be to ‘Feed Germany; fight Bolshevism; make Germany fight Bolshevism.’
122
 
Lloyd George famously remarked of Churchill: ‘His ducal blood revolted against the 
wholesale elimination of Grand Dukes in Russia.’
123
 Similarly, as army officers and privileged 
members of the British professional establishment, Montgomery, Robertson and Bishop 
spent their working lives defending Britain’s position in the world and any threat to it, whether 
from Nazi Germany, Communist Russia, or elsewhere, affected them personally. For all 
three in 1945, as for Churchill in 1919, starvation, disease, communism and social unrest 
were four aspects of the same problem, which could be summarised as a breakdown of the 
established social order and the need to ‘rebuild civilisation’, as they understood it. Nazi 
Germany had been destroyed, but the other threats remained. As Montgomery said in June 
1945 in a speech on receiving the freedom of the City of Antwerp, echoing Churchill in his 
reference to ‘toil and sweat’: 
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Our first task is now ended. Together we have won the war, and have destroyed the Nazi 
tyranny of Europe. Our hardest task remains to be tackled. Out of the chaos and confusion 
which the war has inflicted on Europe we have to rebuild our European civilisation. In 
destroying the Nazi power, we have destroyed one great evil; much that was good and 
beautiful has also been destroyed, and the economic organisation of Europe lies in ruins. 





It is unlikely that Churchill, while still Prime Minister in 1945, issued any direct instructions to 
Montgomery to rebuild Germany with the aim of countering a perceived direct military threat 
from the Soviet Union, though documents released by the National Archives in 1998 showed 
that, immediately after the end of the war, secret plans, codenamed ‘Operation Unthinkable’, 
were made for a surprise Anglo-American attack on the Soviet Union, with the assistance of 
ten German divisions.
125
 However there is evidence that both Churchill and Montgomery 
were concerned that the Soviet Union would encourage communist agitators within 
Germany. For example, in an exchange of telegrams on 5 June 1945, Montgomery wrote: 
I have increasing evidence every day of communist propaganda going on in the British 
Zone and agents are working in the Russian DP camps and these meetings are being 
attended by German agents. The DP camps are being evacuated to the Russian Zone but 
this is a slow business and in any case communist ‘cells’ will be left behind for certain. I am 




In August 1945, after the Potsdam Agreements, the immediate military threat from Russia 
receded and Montgomery was able to report to his Corps Commanders that: 
The military problem has now changed in light of the Berlin meetings. The military situation 
via-a-vis the Russians is now 100 per cent all right. It is evident that the Russians will 




For the remainder of his year as Military Governor, there is little mention in Montgomery’s 
papers of any direct threat from Russia. However, the ideological threat of communism to the 
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established order continued to underlie his concerns, expressed for example in his 
valedictory memo of 1 May 1946, that they might ‘fail in Germany’ due to food shortages, 
economic conditions, the attitude of the local population and the need for a ‘change of heart’. 
If conditions did not improve, an increasingly hostile German population would, he believed, 
‘begin to look EAST. When that happens we shall have failed, and there will exist a definite 
menace to the British Empire.’
128
  
The creation of a new directive on Military Government  
The policy of German reconstruction was elaborated and confirmed in a new directive issued 
by Robertson, as Montgomery’s chief of staff, on 10 September 1945, following two months 
of discussions within Military Government. In his second ‘Note on the Present Situation’, 
issued on 6 July 1945, Montgomery stated that over the past two months the ‘full extent of 
the debacle’ had become apparent and they now knew the ‘magnitude of the problem that 
confronts us in the rebuilding of Germany.’
129
 Part of the problem was ‘a tendency to adhere 
rigidly’ to instructions issued earlier by SHAEF, the joint US and British Supreme 
Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force.
130
 These instructions, he continued, were 
now out of date and a new general directive was required. A week later in his third ‘Note’, he 
wrote that: 
Our present attitude towards the German people is negative, it must be replaced by one 




Montgomery’s ‘Notes’ did not provide much detail about the specific actions required from 
his subordinates, but on 21
 
July army commanders and Control Commission heads of 
division were sent the ‘rough draft’ of a new detailed directive.
132
 This stated that: ‘the 
following action will be taken by 21 Army Group and the Control Commission.’ There 
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followed twenty pages of specific instructions on steps to be taken to reconstruct Germany, 
under thirty headings including: ‘Shortage of Food’, ‘Shortage of Coal’, ‘Inadequate 
Transportation Facilities’, ‘Re-Starting of Vital Industries’, ‘Housing Shortage’, ‘Freedom from 
Disease’, ‘Reopening of Schools’, ‘Trade Unions’, ‘Churches’, ‘German Youth’, ‘Freedom of 
Assembly’, ‘Freedom of Speech’, ‘Political Parties’ and ‘Elections’. Recipients were 
requested to submit comments, rewriting paragraphs if necessary, no later than the evening 
of the following Wednesday, 25 July.
133
 Over the next month the draft was revised, a few 
aspects toned down,
134
 and the final directive issued on 10 September 1945.
135
  
The timing was significant, as the first ‘rough draft’ directive was issued on 21 July, after the 
General Election in Britain on 5 July, but before the announcement of the results on 26 July 
and the formation of a new Labour government. The draft was issued while Truman, Stalin 
and Churchill, later Attlee, were meeting at Potsdam to decide the future of Germany, but 
before agreement was reached and the conference closed on 2 August. It appears as if 
Montgomery was trying to establish a new policy for the British Zone and pre-empt the 
outcome of both the election in Britain and decisions reached at Potsdam, while he had the 
freedom to act on his own initiative. The timing also coincided with the replacement of 
Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, General Weeks, by Robertson. Robertson’s appointment was 
confirmed by the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, on 21 July and he arrived in Germany to 
take over from Weeks on 25 July.
136
 Perhaps one reason Montgomery placed such urgency 
on Robertson’s appointment, was to ensure that a chief of staff was in place whom he knew 
well and could trust to implement the new directive.  
The extent of the change in direction is evident from comparing the new directive to the 
previous set of directives issued by the War Office in October 1944. Many of the earlier 
directives covered diplomatic and legal issues, such as international treaties, relations with 
neutral countries and the reform of Nazi laws. Others concerned disbanding the German 
armed forces, the status of prisoners-of war, the destruction of war material and the control 




 For example, headings such as ‘Shortage of Food’ and ‘Inadequate Transportation facilities’ were changed to a 
more neutral ‘Food’ and ‘Transportation Facilities’. 
135
 FO 1050/1040, ‘Directive on Military Government from Chief of Staff (British Zone)’, 10 Sept. 1945. For the 
Foreign Office reaction to the directive, which they received on 14 Sept. see FO 371/46735, C5962. A senior official, 
Con O’Neill, minuted: ‘It gives me, in general, the impression that British Military Govt. has now embarked on a 
policy of Full Speed Ahead for German rehabilitation.’ 
136




 The September 1945 directive created new policies for previously 
unexpected circumstances and did not conflict directly with previous instructions. Taken as a 
whole, however, it represented a change in direction from prevention, control and restrictions 
on German economic and political activities, to reconstruction of the physical infrastructure 
and the economy, and the renewal of social and political life. 
Montgomery was probably well aware that a constructive policy towards Germany was 
unlikely to receive much sympathy in Britain among politicians and public opinion. Public 
hostility towards Germany reached its highest point in April and May 1945, as people reacted 
to numerous reports of war crimes and atrocities, culminating with the newsreel films of 
concentration camps.
138
 The following sections explore further the reasons for the change in 
Military Government policy, so soon after the end of the war. They show that, while it was 
partly a pragmatic response by Montgomery and his generals to physical destruction, food 
shortages, disease, lawlessness and possible social unrest in the British Zone, it can also be 
explained as an idealistic interpretation of lessons they had learnt over the previous fifty 
years, in particular their memories of the First World War, their understanding of the British 
Empire as a force for good in the world and their personal moral and religious beliefs.  
 
2.3   Missionary idealism: the occupation as a moral crusade 
 
‘We have won the war; we now have to rebuild a new civilisation: a new world in which all 
nations may live in peace and prosperity. We cannot achieve success in this great task 




 ‘A strong and united Empire, united in a common belief in freedom and justice, is one of the 
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Memories of the First World War 
In the first few months after the end of the Second World War, Montgomery and many of his 
colleagues assumed that the occupation would last twenty years or more, to prevent any 
new German government from re-arming and industrialists from building weapons, as had 
happened after the First World War.
141
 Material written for dissemination to the troops and 
Control Commission staff made frequent reference to avoiding mistakes made earlier, when 
the British army occupied the Rhineland. Montgomery’s first letter on non-fraternisation, for 
example, issued in March 1945, warned that: 
Twenty-seven years ago the Allies occupied Germany: but Germany has been at war ever 
since. Our Army took no revenge in 1918; it was more than considerate, and before a few 
weeks had passed many soldiers were adopted into German households. The enemy 
worked hard at being amiable… 
 
Meanwhile the German general staff prepared for war, and  
‘Organising sympathy’ became a German industry … So accommodating were the 





Similar cautionary messages were contained in a series of articles in early issues of the 
British Zone Review. Readers were told that the Rhineland occupation was used by the 
Germans to divide the Allies, by courting sympathy from the British whilst complaining to 




Contemporary accounts, written in the 1920s, described how the troops generally got on well 
with the local population and in many cases returned home ‘definitely pro-German’,
144
 but 
some authors criticised the Allies for not actively supporting democratic forces within 
Germany.
145
 Violet Markham, who spent two years in Germany with her husband, the chief 
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demobilization officer for the British Army of the Rhine, wrote in A Woman’s Watch on the 
Rhine that ‘Life in Cologne is very pleasant for the occupying army’ and ‘surely no Army of 
Occupation was ever so well housed or so comfortable as we are.’
146 Although she had no 
doubts as to the ‘noble ideal’ for which the British had fought the war, and was irritated at 
Germany’s ‘refusal to say she is sorry’, she was critical of Allied post-war policy, especially 
the continuation of the economic blockade and the Treaty of Versailles which, she said, had 
‘scrapped the fundamental ideals for which we fought the war.’
147
 In her view, the democratic 
government which emerged in Germany in 1918 had an impossible task as it was 
‘confronted by hunger, defeat, despair, and the miseries which resulted from the blockade’ 
and the Allies were to blame for the rise of the extreme parties and the decline in the vote for 
the Social Democrats in the elections of 1920.
148 
A group of British intelligence officers, given the task of observing conditions in Germany in 
1919, were more concerned with the threat of social collapse or ‘Bolshevism’ than with a 
revival of German militarism, which shows that in some respects there was little change in 
British attitudes between then and 1945. One of the officers wrote in his report that 
Bolshevism was a dangerous doctrine spread by agitators, who were either ‘Adventurers’ 
receiving financial support from Russia, or ‘Idealists’ who came ‘from the “modern” 
intellectual and artistic classes.’ In normal times, when people were contented and 
prosperous, the ‘ordinary German’ would pay no attention to the ‘doctrines of the 
revolutionary’, but: 
Under the increasing stress of famine and unemployment, there is no question but that the 
whole country will be consumed by the flame of Bolshevism which will spread with such 




The conclusion to be drawn, according to a Foreign Office memo summarising the reports, 
was that it was in British and Allied interests to relax the blockade and permit food supplies 
to enter the country and so assist the Germans to resume a normal economic life.
150
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These contemporary views of Germany after the First World War, written and published in 
1919 and 1921, help explain some of the ambivalence in British policy and attitudes after the 
Second World War. On the one hand, a concern not to be deceived again by a duplicitous 
people, who had courted sympathy from well-meaning Allied soldiers, claiming they were 
victims of an unjust peace settlement, while planning their revenge and preparing for war. 
But on the other hand, a concern that the hunger, despair and unemployment which followed 
the First World War should not be repeated, for fear that an even worse disaster might occur 
in the not so distant future, and a belief that restrictive measures alone, however strictly 
enforced, were insufficient to avoid mistakes made previously.  
The lessons Robertson learnt from his father, who had commanded the British Army of the 
Rhine from 1919-1920, were different from the conventional wisdom prevalent in 1945 
among British Members of Parliament. Robertson described later how, following his 
appointment as Deputy Military Governor in July 1945, he was given a copy of Brigadier 
Morgan’s book Assize of Arms
151
 as ‘our guide in preventing clandestine re-armament by the 
Germans.’
152
 His copy was one of 800 printed by the War Office for distribution to British 
members of the Control Commission.
153
 Morgan had been a member of the Inter-Allied 
Military Control Commission in Germany from 1919 to 1923 and was fiercely critical of the 
British failure to prevent German re-armament. During the Second World War, he worked 
closely with a post-war policy group of members of both Houses of Parliament, which 
produced two reports on German disarmament and advocated a harsh post-war policy 
towards Germany.
154
 Robertson remarked that, at first, ‘it all seemed to make good sense’, 
but then referred to his own experience as a member of the British delegation at the League 
of Nations in Geneva in 1932-3 and how this had made him: ‘a first-hand witness of the 
failure to deal properly with Germany after World War 1.’ He continued by saying: 
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My father had been Military Governor for a period then. He often talked to me about the 
mistakes and problems of those years. ‘The idea that you can hold down a country like 




If it was not possible to ‘hold Germany down’ for ever, there had to be an alternative policy to 
one that was purely negative, based on disarmament, demilitarisation and economic 
controls, as at the end of the First World War. 
The lessons Montgomery, Robertson, Bishop and many of their generation learnt from their 
understanding of the First World War, the Rhineland Occupation, the Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917, inflation in Germany in the 1920s and economic depression in Britain and elsewhere in 
the 1930s, were that poverty and unemployment were a prime cause of social unrest and 
political dissatisfaction. They did not question the need for disarmament and demilitarisation, 
but believed this had to be combined with economic reconstruction, active support for 
democratic political parties and willingness to work together with those Germans who were 
prepared to accept their professed values and principles. 
Some historians of Germany have criticised the British authorities for not supporting the 
antifascist groups that emerged very widely in Germany at the end of the war.
156
 The 
background and outlook of the British officers responsible for Military Government meant that 
they were unlikely to sympathise with people they saw as potential communist sympathisers 
or revolutionaries. Their priorities, as army officers and members of the British professional 
middle classes, were dealing with chaos and disorder, disease and the threat of starvation. 
The German armies had been utterly defeated. There was no sign of resistance, the German 
population was cooperative and did as it was told. The last thing they wanted was anything 
that might encourage social unrest, let alone spread dangerous ideas that might disturb the 
established order at home. 
Echoes of Empire 
A number of commentators have observed that British policy and actions in occupied 
Germany showed many similarities with those used to govern the British Empire, especially 
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the strategy of indirect rule and appointment of local, district and regional commissioners. 
Donald Cameron Watt, for example, wrote that:  
It will be obvious that the method of control and re-education bears a strong resemblance to 
the systems of indirect rule administered in the 1890s by Lord Cromer in Egypt and Lord 




Before the outbreak of war in 1939, Montgomery, Bishop, Robertson and other senior army 
officers of their generation had spent most of their working lives in India, Africa, Egypt or 
Palestine and their outlook on the world was permeated with the ideals, values and 
prejudices of the British Empire. In the preface to his memoirs Bishop wrote that: 
This book is about a life mostly spent in the service of the British Empire. Although it is 
fashionable at the present time to decry this period of our history, the author hopes that his 
story may make some contribution towards a better understanding of our successes and 




For them, the Empire was a force for good in the world, and it was only by drawing on the 
strength, manpower and resources of the empire, that Britain could succeed in defeating the 
continental powers of Germany and Italy. British rule was also, so they believed, in the best 
interests of the local population. As Bishop wrote in his memoirs: 
I feel no doubt that when an authoritative history of our Colonial Empire comes to be 
written, the part played by the British officials who administered it in establishing and 
maintaining law and order, in holding the interests of the people above all else and in 





Robertson expressed a similar view in a speech to Control Commission staff in July 1947, in 
which he said: 




Montgomery’s view of the Empire transcended a narrow English or British nationalism. In two 
speeches in September 1945, on being made Honorary Burgess of the City of Belfast and 
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awarded the Freedom of the City of Londonderry, he referred to himself as an Irishman, and 
to Londonderry as ‘almost his home town’.
161
 Although he was born in London, his family 
had owned an estate for several generations at Moville, twenty miles from Londonderry, 
across the border with the Irish Republic in County Donegal. A republican inhabitant of the 
city of Derry would not have agreed with the content of these speeches then, let alone now, 
but we have no reason to doubt that the views Montgomery expressed were sincere and a 
genuine reflection of what he thought and felt at the time: 
Before the war, the Empire was everywhere weak … A weak Empire is a danger to 
ourselves and to the whole world. But a strong and united Empire, united in a common 
belief in freedom and justice, is one of the greatest forces for good in the world today. 
 
This ancient city of ours can well understand these things, since it has itself been through 
difficult times and suffered great tribulations: the ancient city of Derry being finally reduced 
to ashes early in the seventeenth century. But the people of London assisted in the work of 
reconstruction, and a new city arose on the ruins of the old: and was called Londonderry, 
on account of its connection with the capital of the Empire. 
 
We of Londonderry thus have a link with the Empire that can never be broken: a link that 




This idealistic view of the Empire was echoed by Bishop, when he wrote of the idea of 
imperial trusteeship: 
Today ‘Colonialism’ has become for many a term of reproach, but no one who saw British 
Colonial officials in action could fail to appreciate the sense of responsibility which animated 
them all … It is hardly realised today how seriously these men took their responsibilities as 
the trustees of the people whose affairs they were administrating until the time came when 




The idea of imperial trusteeship could be translated into a similar view of the British role in 
occupied Germany, whereby the British would administer a country until the ‘natives’ could 
be trusted to govern themselves. In the absence of any other framework, the British Empire 
was a model Montgomery and other officers, born before 1900, believed they knew and 
understood and could apply, with modifications, to the problems they faced in the chaos of 
post-war Germany. 
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‘Saving the soul of Germany’ 
Montgomery, Robertson and Bishop held strong moral and religious beliefs and it is 
impossible to understand their motivation and aims in occupied Germany, without some 
reference to what might be called ‘missionary idealism’. On several occasions they referred 
to their task as a moral crusade, helping the Germans to ‘find their own salvation’
164
 or 
‘fighting a battle over the soul of Germany’,
165
 as if they were missionaries trying to convert 
the heathen, rather than victors in war, administering a defeated enemy country. 
They were not alone in this. General Eisenhower started his personal D-Day message to all 
‘soldiers, sailors and airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force’: ‘You are about to embark on 
the Great Crusade’.
166
 His memoirs of the period are called Crusade in Europe. For many 
British and American soldiers, the crusade did not end when the war was won. A British 
colonel wrote that, ‘the re-birth of Germany is fundamentally a moral and not a material 
issue. It is in fact a moral Crusade … Too much talk about “democracy” (that overworked 
word) and not enough about Christianity will tend to place the whole of the vast undertaking 
to which we are committed on too low a plane.’
167
 In December 1947 Robert Birley, shortly to 
be appointed education adviser to the Military Governor in Germany, said that the 
experience of the First World War had ‘taught us that military victory was not enough and 
that Germany would only cease to threaten the peace of the world if there were a change in 
the mind and outlook of the German people. Above all we were faced with what was pre-
eminently a spiritual problem.’
168
  
Both Birley and Montgomery believed that the need for ‘a firm spiritual basis on which to 
build’ applied to Britain as well as Germany, and could form the basis of the relations 
between the two countries.
169
 Over a quarter of the German protestant clergy joined the Nazi 
Party before 1933.
170
 Although there were notable individual examples of resistance, such as 
pastors Dietrich Bonhöffer and Martin Niemöller, many prominent individuals in the German 
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churches were sympathetic to at least some elements of Nazi ideology, or, at best, failed to 
condemn evident crimes and atrocities.
171
 But for men such as Montgomery, Robertson and 
Bishop, faced at the end of the war with problems that appeared all but insoluble, it was 
important to seek out common ground with Germans who shared their values.  
Although Nazi Germany represented the epitome of evil, a shared belief in Christianity could 
form a common bond with their defeated enemy. Bishop recalled Montgomery saying that: 
All the bridges are down between ourselves and the Germans except one, we both share a 




Montgomery, Robertson and Bishop, shared the view, widely held in Britain at the time, that 
political, social, economic or historical explanations for the rise of Nazism, for the war and 
the atrocities committed during it, were not enough. Some conservative thinkers argued that 
the war had a religious and spiritual dimension. It was a battle between good and evil, and 
the rise of the Nazi Party within Germany was due to spiritual factors, or more accurately, to 
a lack of spirituality and a lack religious faith.
173
 
An insight into this way of thinking can be gained from Amy Buller’s Darkness over Germany 
published in 1943, in which she referred to the ‘fundamentally religious appeal to the Nazi 
youth in much of the teaching given to them.’
174
 In her view, the growing secularisation of 
society, in Germany and elsewhere, meant that young people were all too easily attracted to 
an ersatz religion, with the ceremonies and the sense of belonging that the Nazi party 
provided. Many had suffered hardship and unemployment during the economic depression 
and the experience of fellowship and the ceremony of the party gave them, she wrote, a 
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‘new life and energy [which] transcended as well as transformed their immediate tasks and 
gave their own little existence a cosmic significance and eternal destiny.’
175
 
Bishop wrote in similar terms in May 1946, in an article in the British Zone Review entitled 
‘Ave atque vale’
176
 on Montgomery’s retirement as military governor. He described their 
practical achievements in the first year of occupation under ‘Field Marshal Montgomery’s 
guidance and inspiration’, seamlessly combining the positive and negative aspects of their 
work: disarming and disbanding the Wehrmacht, destroying quantities of ammunition, 
repatriating two million displaced persons, restoring road, rail and canal systems, 
denazification and internment of 50,000 Nazi leaders and officials, the encouragement of 
new political parties, licensing of newspapers, opening of schools and universities and so on. 
However, this was only part of their task as:  
The war unleashed by Nazism on the world has left Germany not only shattered materially 
but faced with grave spiritual difficulties … None of these efforts can … succeed unless 




The ‘greatest task facing the British authorities’, he continued, was to ‘hold out some 
measure of hope to the German people’ that an acceptance of the Christian principles of 
‘humanism and democracy’, would eventually produce the economic benefits of ‘a 




On 4 May 1950, shortly before he left Germany, Bishop’s faith appeared to have been 
rewarded, when he was able to speak with confidence, at the opening of the ‘British Centre’, 
Die Brücke, in Cologne, and say: 
You and I may hear, at times, the remarks of pessimistic people who say that we have so 
little in common, and that we can, therefore, learn so little from one another. That is not 
true. We have much in common, and much to learn from one another. The most important 
thing that we have in common is, of course, this. 
 
                                                     
175
 Buller, Darkness over Germany, p193, p196 
176
 The quote is from Catullus, ‘Atque in perpetuum, frater, ave atque vale’, which the Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations translates as ‘And so, my brother, hail, and farewell evermore!’ 
177




We both believe that there was once a man who, although he never went to a university, or 
wrote a book, or travelled more than 200 miles from where he was born, yet became the 
centre-piece of the human race, and the leader of the column of progress. 
 




Exactly five years after Montgomery received the unconditional surrender of all German 
armed forces in North-West Europe, Bishop was able to refer to their common belief in 
Christianity, the great ‘kindness and hospitality’ he had received in Cologne; to the ‘one 
overriding wish’ shared by ‘ordinary peoples of all countries’ that their children would live a 
better and more peaceful life than he or his generation had experienced; and to his 





2.4   Conclusion 
We know a great deal about what life was like in Germany after the war, but mostly from the 
point of view of German writers and politicians, such as novels by Heinrich Böll, plays by 
Wolfgang Börchert, numerous historical works and personal memoirs. In addition, many 
historians have tried to reinterpret the past critically, writing deliberately with hindsight, on 
topics such as the failure to pursue those guilty of Nazi war crimes, how the past is 
remembered and commemorated, or highlighting social and cultural continuities across the 
great divide of 1945. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to re-visit these debates, but to provide an alternative, now 
largely forgotten, perspective; that of three British senior army officers who were present at 
the time. Historians are sometimes tempted to judge the past on the basis of what they 
believe people should have done, rather than what they did. This study does not attempt to 
make any value judgement and approve or criticise the individuals researched. It describes 
the situation in Germany as perceived through their eyes, together with their aims and 
intentions, and to some extent, their achievements and failures as they perceived them. This 
is, of course, a partial view, which does not take full account of other evidence, such as the 
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views of the Germans they dealt with, or the limitations and constraints under which they 
acted. It may, however, help correct some misunderstandings where historians have argued 
that a particular British or Allied policy was ‘a failure’ or ‘ineffective’, based on not fully 
appreciating what men such as Montgomery, Robertson and Bishop aimed to achieve at the 
time. Their view of Germany Zero Hour, Stunde Null, was not unlike a contemporary German 
perspective as told in many personal memoirs: chaos and destruction, hunger and 
starvation, a sense of hopelessness and fear for the future, but despite all this, a 
determination to try to make things better. Shocked at the destruction they saw around them, 
they worked to restore the basic elements of what they perceived as civilised society: 
enforcement of law and order; provision of enough food to prevent starvation, control of 
disease and rebuilding the economic infrastructure. This seemed a huge task, both more 
important and more difficult than enforcing the negative provisions of the Potsdam 
Agreement to disarm, demilitarise and denazify Germany.  
The greatest task of all, that of ‘winning the peace’, was more difficult to define. The three 





, ‘the growth of truly democratic thought’
183
, the ‘re-birth of moral and 
intellectual enlightenment’
184
, ‘the acceptance of the principles of Christian humanism and 
democracy’
185
 or simply the ‘administration of Germany according to the principles which we 
hold to be right.’
186
 To understand what they and other senior officers of their generation 
meant, it is necessary to refer to their family and social backgrounds, education at public 
school, experiences in the First World War and after, understanding of the British Empire, 
and personal religious and moral beliefs. They had tremendous confidence in the strength of 
their own traditions and sought to apply these to the situation they found in Germany.  
People were more important to them than organisational structures and the principles that 
meant most to them were those of fairness, (being ‘stern but just’), individual responsibility, 
(those who rule should do so not in their own interest but in that of those they serve) and 
personal character (‘justum et tenacem propositi virum’ – the wise man firm of purpose), 
                                                     
181
 Bishop, ‘Can we re-educate Germany?’ British Zone Review, Vol.1, No.6, 8 Dec. 1945, pp3-4, initialled W.H.A.B. 
182
 Montgomery, BLM 88/7, memorandum on ‘The Problem in Germany’, 1 Feb. 1946 
183
 Robertson, FO 1030/328, DMG press conference, 29 April 1947 
184
 Ibid  
185
 Bishop, ‘Ave Atque Vale’, British Zone Review, Vol.1, No.17, 11 May 1946, initialled W.H.A.B. 
186
 Montgomery, ‘Introductory Message by the Commander-in-Chief British Zone’, British Zone Review, Vol.1 No.1, 
29 Sept. 1945, p1 
74 
together with a firmly grounded sense of morality and religious belief. Perhaps this approach, 
of never forgetting that people mattered, was best summarised in a personal letter sent to 
Bishop, shortly before Christmas 1949, by Karl Arnold, a leading German politician, Christian 
socialist and Minister-President for North Rhine-Westphalia from 1947-1956:  
I am an honest admirer of your ability, not to lose sight of the human angle [Das 
Menschliche niemals aus dem Auge zu verlieren] in the most difficult situations, which is the 
decisive factor in the relationship between victor and vanquished, if our great and common 




In subsequent years, Montgomery, Robertson and Bishop looked back with pride on their 
achievements in Germany. The policies of physical and economic reconstruction, political 
renewal and personal reconciliation, which they started to implement in 1945, continued to 
apply throughout the occupation, despite changes in personnel, changes in emphasis and 
increased involvement by politicians in London. The next chapter discusses Montgomery’s 
successor as Military Governor, Sholto Douglas. His more pragmatic and less idealistic 
approach to a different set of challenges highlights the complexity and some of the 
contradictions of the occupation. 
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3  Sholto Douglas: ‘The unhappiest period in my entire official life’: 
May 1946 – November 1947 
 
‘It is still impossible for me to think of the time that I spent as Military Governor 
 and Commander-in-Chief in Germany as anything but the unhappiest period 









Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Sholto Douglas, was the exception among the three 
British Military Governors. His formative experience as a young man was fighting as an 
airman over the Western Front in the First World War. He portrayed himself in his memoirs 
as one of a select group of fighter pilots, engaged in heroic individual combat with an equally 
brave and determined enemy, describing encounters with German fighter aces such as von 
Richthofen and Hermann Goering.
3
 Whereas Montgomery enjoyed his time in Germany
4
 and 
Robertson looked back with satisfaction at having contributed to the ‘miracle’ of a prosperous 
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and contented West Germany,
5
 Douglas recalled it as the unhappiest period in his official life 
and wondered why he, an air force officer, was asked to solve problems ‘which should have 
been in the hands of the politicians.’
6
 Though nominally in charge, he acted as a figurehead, 
with Robertson taking an increasingly important role in all aspects of administration.
7
 
Douglas’ tenure as Military Governor from May 1946 to November 1947 coincided with the 
most difficult period of the occupation. Initial goodwill and relief that the war was over were 
succeeded by hunger strikes and protests.
8
 Many Germans blamed the British for the 
deterioration in their living standards after the food ration was cut in March 1946 from 1550 
to a near-starvation level of 1014 calories per day. Despite significant imports, the ration did 
not return to over 1500 calories until May 1948, six months after Douglas had left Germany.
9
 
There was little he could do to improve matters. It was not possible significantly to increase 
agricultural production in the British Zone, which had traditionally obtained much of its food 
from other parts of Germany.
10
 The failure of the victorious allies to apply a common 
economic policy across the whole of Germany meant there was no prospect in the 
immediate future of increasing industrial production to generate sufficient exports to pay for 
food imports. In the meantime, the British taxpayer had to cover the deficit.  
Douglas wrote in similar terms to Alec Bishop and other British army officers of his 
impressions of destruction in 1945 when he first visited Berlin,
11
 but showed no signs of 
being motivated by Montgomery’s ‘missionary idealism’ or by Robertson’s belief that they 
were ‘fighting a battle over the soul of Germany.’ In his later memoirs, he described the 
situation and his own role in personal terms, rather than expressing his opinions on 
geopolitical matters such as the reconstruction of Germany, the future of the British Empire 
or the need to ‘rebuild civilisation.’ This chapter contrasts his personal background and aims 
in Germany with those of the more ideologically motivated army generals.  
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3.1   ‘A professional airman’ 
 
‘The years of the First World War provided us with an experience that was so 
 extraordinary that it was impossible to understand immediately what it all meant,  




William Sholto Douglas was born in Oxford in 1893, to a junior branch of an old-established 
aristocratic family distantly related to the Marquess of Queensbury. According to Douglas, 
the family was ‘swindled’ out of the ownership of estates in the West Indies. His grandfather 
inherited little and became a clergyman. His father, who also trained as a clergyman, was 
Assistant Chaplain at Merton College, Oxford. Soon after Douglas and his two brothers were 
born, his father moved to Siena, in Italy, and then left the church to become a successful art 
critic and dealer. He divorced his wife and accepted a position as Professor of Medieval 
History in Australia. After returning to Britain, he was appointed Director of the National 
Gallery of Ireland, married again twice and, according to Douglas, fathered at least eighteen 
children, eight of whom were illegitimate. He emigrated to the United States in 1940, 
converted to Roman Catholicism and died in 1951 in Italy.
13
 
While his father travelled the world, Douglas and his two brothers were brought up by their 
mother in relative poverty in Balham, South London, although his father continued to support 
them and paid for their education at Tonbridge School.
14
 Douglas obtained a classical 
scholarship to Lincoln College, Oxford, and, with further support from his father, attended 
university for one year before the outbreak of war in 1914. He claimed to have become a 
socialist at Tonbridge and Oxford, influenced by an ‘aversion to snobbery’ and sympathy for 
the underdog, but, as a serving RAF officer, he was not active in politics until after his 
retirement from Germany in 1947, when he accepted a peerage and supported the Labour 
Party in the House of Lords.
15
   
On the outbreak of war in August 1914, Douglas was commissioned in the artillery. He left 
for France in November, volunteered as an air observer for the Royal Flying Corps and 
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qualified as a pilot in July 1915. He wrote later that obtaining his wings was ‘one of the 
proudest moments that I have ever known in my life.’
16
 He was promoted to command a 
squadron and was awarded the Military Cross and Distinguished Flying Cross. Casualties 
were high, pilots flew without parachutes and mechanical breakdowns were frequent. He 
was seriously injured when he hit a horse during take-off and he had to recover in hospital in 
Britain before returning to the front in late 1917. His brother trained as an air observer and 
was killed in action.
17
 Yet, despite the personal dangers, in later years he regretted the 
passing of this ‘time of comparative innocence’,
18
 when pilots fought each other above and 
apparently a stage removed from the mass slaughter of troops on the ground. He ended the 




After a short break as a pilot in the embryonic civil aviation industry, Douglas rejoined the 
RAF in 1920. He attended the newly formed Air Staff College, where his fellow students 
included Charles Portal
20
 and Keith Park,
21
 and he was one of four RAF officers selected for 
the first course at the Imperial Defence College, where he subsequently served as an 
instructor. His only overseas posting was from 1929-1932 in Egypt and as area commander 
in the Sudan. From 1936 he occupied senior administrative positions in the Air Ministry and 
succeeded Keith Park as head of Fighter Command in 1940. Other positions followed, as 
head of Middle East Command in December 1942 and Coastal Command in January 1944.
22
  
Despite his experience and seniority, success at the highest level eluded him. Military 
historians have argued that he was on the wrong side in debates over strategy, such as his 
advocacy of offensive sweeps over enemy territory in 1941, which resulted in casualties 
higher than those incurred during the Battle of Britain for little strategic benefit, and his 
support for Churchill’s unsuccessful Aegean campaign in 1943.
23
 He was disappointed to be 
rejected for the post of Allied commander in South-East Asia due to US opposition, and at 
not being offered command of Allied air forces for the invasion of Normandy. When Charles 
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Portal retired as Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) in 1945, Douglas was one of three candidates 
considered to replace him, but was again unsuccessful. He was promoted to the rank of 
Marshal of the Royal Air Force, but shared with Arthur Harris, head of Bomber Command, 
the dubious distinction of being one of only two officers who attained this most senior rank in 
the RAF, without serving as CAS.
24
  
From August 1945 to January 1946 Douglas served in Germany as Commander-in-Chief of 
the British Air Forces of Occupation (BAFO).
25
 He claimed later that he did not want the post, 
writing that ‘I felt less like going to Germany than to anywhere else’, but he accepted it 
because the position required an officer ‘of the most senior rank’, he had previously worked 
well with Montgomery and he was curious about the fate of the German air force.
26
 The work 
did not appear particularly onerous, as RAF and naval commanders in occupied Germany, 
unlike the army Corps Commanders, had no civil responsibilities. Douglas was nominally 
responsible for the disarmament of the Luftwaffe but left this to his deputy, Philip 
Wigglesworth, to manage.
27
 The main activities, he recalled later, were difficulties over the 
repatriation of Czech and Polish airmen.
28
 He was thankful that his responsibilities did not 
extend beyond those of an air force commander, disliked the working environment and 
resented being increasingly ‘drawn in to the web of international politics.’
29
 In January 1946 
he heard he would be appointed Military Governor and Commander-in-Chief of all British 
forces in Germany, when Montgomery took up his post as Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
on 1 May.
30
 Meanwhile, he left Germany and returned to the Air Ministry in London. 
Robertson wrote to Douglas on 28 February 1946, suggesting he should establish his own 
personal organisation as soon as possible, as Montgomery intended to hand over his 
personal staff to the new army commander rather than to the new Military Governor,
31
 but 
Douglas took no direct action, leaving all arrangements to the officials in Germany.
32
 He 
decided to take three weeks holiday in the United States, to visit his father in New York and 
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stay in California with the actor, Robert Montgomery, returning to London three days before 
leaving for Germany.
33
 He complained later ‘more in sorrow than in anger’ that he received 
no briefing on his new role and was not sent a copy of Montgomery’s valedictory ‘Notes on 
the German Situation’ addressed to Attlee, Bevin and Hynd.
34 
It does seem to me that it was an extraordinary state of affairs that such a vitally important 
document should have been handed around in London while the man who was most 
intimately concerned – the man who was literally on the spot in taking over from 




This comment is disingenuous. Montgomery’s ‘Notes’ repeated many of the points made in 
his earlier memo of 1 February 1946 on ‘The Problem in Germany’ which, though 
confidential, was distributed to all Military Government heads of Divisions and army Corps 
Commanders.
36
 Austen Albu, for example, recently appointed to a position in the Political 
Division of the Control Commission, was shown a copy soon after his arrival in Germany.
37
 
Albu was also given a copy of Montgomery’s ‘Notes’ of 1 May, as he referred to this in a 
memo to Robertson dated 19 June 1946.
38
 This suggests that, had he wished to do so, 
Douglas could have obtained a copy of Montgomery’s ‘Notes’ and could have familiarised 
himself with his views on current policy quite easily, by asking Robertson or other members 
of his staff. It is possible that, rather than a lack of briefing, he objected to what he 
considered to have been a personal slight by Montgomery in sending the memo to the 
politicians in London, but not to him. 
Douglas’s appointment as Military Governor is surprising, as is his decision to accept the 
post, given his limited overseas experience, his intense dislike of working in Germany and 
his stated desire not to become involved in issues outside his personal competence, such as 
international politics. Despite later denials, he may have been attracted by the status and 
prestige and may have seen it as a consolation for earlier disappointments. He claimed later 
he did not want to return to Germany, but Montgomery recommended him and Arthur 
Tedder, the newly appointed Chief of the Air Staff, persuaded him to accept the post. 
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Douglas added that after returning to London in January 1946 he had second thoughts and 
only finally agreed after a personal meeting with Attlee.
39
  
I have not found any record of this meeting or other official documents relating to his 
appointment, apart from a letter in which Montgomery told Robertson it was ‘fairly certain’ 
that Douglas would succeed him as Military Governor.
40
 This tends to confirm Douglas’ 
account that Montgomery recommended him for the position, but does not explain why the 
government thought him a suitable candidate. General Joseph McNarney, who replaced 
Eisenhower as Governor of the US Zone in November 1945, had served as an airman on the 
Western Front in the First World War
41
 and it may have been thought advisable to follow the 
US lead by appointing an air officer rather than an army general to succeed Montgomery. 
Douglas’s appointment may also have been intended to improve relations between the 
London and German arms of the administration, as Sir Arthur Street, Permanent Secretary 
of the newly created Control Office for Germany and Austria (COGA), had previously worked 
with him at the Air Ministry.
42
 Overall, it would appear he was a safe choice, acceptable to 
the Labour Government and to all three armed services in Germany, and able to maintain 
good working relations with his US, French and Soviet counterparts and with the Civil 
Service administrators in London.  
 
3.2   Conflicting aims 
 
‘There was always this endless stream of problems: the handling of our  
international affairs, the supply of food, the health of the people of the country, a host of 
economic affairs, education, intelligence and information, local administration and politics, 
denazification, disarmament and reparations and refugees and legal affairs.  




Shortly after his appointment as Military Governor, Douglas spoke publicly for the first time, 
at the opening of an exhibition in London on ‘Germany under Control’, of his understanding 
of British aims:  
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What are the objects of our occupation of Germany? In the first place we aim to destroy the 
military power of Germany and to eradicate Nazi-ism. We must not forget that these objects 
rank first in priority. Next we want to see Germany develop a sound sense of democratic 
government and social justice, to rebuild her peaceful industries and raise her standard of 




This was entirely consistent with British policy as it had been formulated over the previous 
year by Montgomery and his generals, in combining the ‘negative’ aspects of demilitarisation 
and denazification with the more ‘positive’ policies of economic reconstruction and 
democratisation. However, little thought had been given to the cost, and how this could be 
justified to the British public. The physical reconstruction of Germany was an objective from 
the start of the occupation, to help create order out of chaos and prevent starvation and 
disease, but from early 1946, despite Douglas stating in his speech that demilitarisation and 
de-nazification were their highest priority, the need to reduce costs led to an increased 
emphasis on economic reconstruction for another reason, the hope that German exports 
would offset the cost of food imports paid by the British taxpayer. 
The government provided conflicting directions. John Hynd, the minister with responsibility 
for Germany, was one of the strongest advocates of the view, agreed in principle by all, that 
their primary aim was to make another war impossible, through fundamentally changing the 
structure of German politics and society. He spoke on the same occasion as Douglas, in 
June 1946, in idealistic terms of the importance of their task of creating a free and 
democratic Germany. He acknowledged that the occupation would be costly and justified this 
by referring to the sacrifices of the previous six years and the need to secure peace, security 
and prosperity for their children, arguing that ‘investment for peace is better, and infinitely 
cheaper than investment for war.’
45
 However Hynd’s views were not shared by the 
government as a whole. Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, was increasingly 
concerned at the costs, estimated at £80 million for the 1946-7 financial year.
46
 Around £70 
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million was required to pay for imports, mainly food,
47
  which could only be recovered by a 
higher level of German exports.  
Douglas and his colleagues resolved the conflict between the principle of economic controls, 
as agreed at Potsdam to prevent future German re-armament, and the aim of economic 
reconstruction, to generate exports to offset the cost of food imports paid by the British 
taxpayer, by assuming that reviving the economy would make the Germans more receptive 
to democratic ideas and therefore less likely to start another war. In his speech at the 
exhibition opening, Douglas claimed that the positive and negative aims of the occupation 
were ‘completely interdependent: you cannot re-educate a starving and unemployed 
people’.
48
 A year later, in June 1947, he made substantially the same points in a speech at 
the Imperial Defence College, speaking on his home ground, as a former student and 
instructor, in front of an audience of like-minded individuals. He quoted Germans as saying 
that: ‘it’s no use talking to us about democratic ideals unless you first fill our bellies’ and 
added that ‘leading thoughtful Germans’ were very insistent upon the need to give them, 
echoing a phrase that had been used frequently by Montgomery, ‘hope for the future’ [my 
italics].
49
 He and his audience may have agreed with Dalton that paying to feed their former 
enemy was an unwelcome necessity, but by implying agreement with the views of ‘thoughtful 
Germans’, Douglas indicated that they shared a common interest. Food was the key to the 
situation as without food Germans were unable to work. ‘Short of letting Germans starve to 
death’, he concluded, the only solution was ‘to build up German industry to the point where 
Germans can pay for their own food by their own exports.’
50
 
Douglas presented a third reason for economic reconstruction in his lecture, when he 
addressed the question of Russian attitudes to Germany. Russia, he said, had 
a desire to convert Germany into a Communist state working under their control. They 
undoubtedly hope that the wretched conditions and low standard of living in the Western 
Zones will turn the eyes of the people towards communism, and that when a united 
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This comment followed the conventional wisdom shared by many of his colleagues, in 
assuming that poor economic conditions would result in higher levels of support for 
communism, thereby reinforcing the converse argument he had previously attributed to 
Germans, that better living standards were a pre-condition for democracy. Quoting a 
common saying, he said that the Russians wished to extract as much as they could in 
reparations from Germany, as ‘a cow fed from the west and milked from the East.’
52
 No 
British Government could accept this ‘in view of the financial strain in which we find 
ourselves today.’
53
 Douglas ended his speech by saying that he thought it likely that the 
division of Germany would persist, despite British attempts to work for unification.
54
 For 
financial as well as political reasons, British and US support for economic reconstruction had 
to be on their terms and therefore limited to the Western Zones.  
 
3.3   Concerns over the death penalty 
 
‘I did not think that the Foreign Secretary or anybody else had any right whatsoever  
to tell me what I should do, and that it was up to me to give my decision  




The official papers show that Douglas was generally pragmatic in the decisions he took, 
following policy agreed by his predecessor and delegating implementation to his deputies. It 
could be argued that his unhappiness as Military Governor was partly due to his facing 
greater difficulties than Montgomery before and Robertson after him, but in his memoirs he 
advanced another explanation, which he described as ‘a matter of conscience’: his concerns 
over the use of the death penalty by the Nuremberg Tribunal and British Military Courts. 
Once economic reconstruction came to be seen as an essential prerequisite for political 
renewal, denazification assumed a lower priority, especially if former Nazis possessed skills 
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or knowledge that were useful in rebuilding the economy.
56
 Douglas later justified a 
pragmatic approach towards those who had supported a criminal regime by writing that ‘cries 
for vengeance’ had to be discouraged, in order to reduce the cost of the occupation: 
I had no particular liking for the Germans as a people, but I felt that it was imperative, in the 
position in which I was placed, that I should approach this problem with as broad and as fair 
a frame of mind as possible. There was more than enough vindictiveness in the air, and I 
felt that there was a very great need for caution over what could all too easily become 
vengeance. What we had suffered at the hands of the Germans during the war, and what 
we had discovered when we occupied Germany, were enough to encourage the cries for 
vengeance, but they had to be stilled if we were to achieve at least the relief of the very 




Douglas’ relatively tolerant attitude towards former members of the Nazi Party may have 
been influenced by his self-image as a professional airman and his identification with the 
German fighter pilots he had fought against in the First World War, believing that they shared 
similar values, such as individual bravery and a ‘swashbuckling attitude to life’. He wrote 
favourably about the exploits of both British and German fighter pilots during the war
58
 and of 
his admiration for ‘the famous German ace Ernst Udet’.
59
 They met in the Sudan when Udet 
had to make a forced landing after filming wild animals in Kenya. They compared 
experiences as fighter pilots on the Western Front and Douglas wrote later that he ‘came to 
appreciate [Udet’s] honesty and sincerity.’
60
 Udet’s death in November 1941 gave him ‘cause 
for feelings of a distinct personal sadness.
61
 Together with Hermann Goering and Edward 
Milch, Udet was one of three former German First World War pilots responsible for rebuilding 
the Luftwaffe in the 1930s.
62
  
Douglas felt an even greater affinity for the head of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Goering, writing 
later that Goering’s ‘experiences in the air service had run along lines that were curiously 
parallel to my own.’ Goering was born in 1893, the same year as Douglas, and there were 
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similarities in their family background. In 1915, Douglas wrote, Goering was ‘doing exactly 
the same kind of work I was from across the other side of the lines.’
63
 Douglas speculated 
what might have happened had he shot him down in one of their many encounters:  
Whatever his subsequent crimes, Goering as a young man was undoubtedly a brave and 
good fighter pilot. I have wondered many times about the extent to which the course of 
history might have been changed if, in one of our encounters in the air at this time, I had 
managed to draw a bead on him long enough to finish him off. It would later have saved the 




These remarks about Goering did not imply that Douglas sympathised with the Nazis, or with 
Goering’s conduct of the war in the air, but the fate of someone who had performed a similar 
role to his was, as he wrote later, ‘almost of personal concern to me.’
65
 Other British military 
commanders showed similar concerns for German generals they had fought against. 
General Horrocks, for example, visited Rundsted in prison after the war ‘to fight some of the 
battles over again with him’
66
 and Alec Bishop took steps to improve living conditions in Werl 
prison where Kesselring and other German generals were held.
67
 
As the British member of the Allied Control Council, Douglas had to hear appeals for 
clemency and mitigation of the death sentences imposed by the Nuremberg War Crimes 
Tribunal, including that on Goering. He took ‘the strongest exception’ to being told by Bevin 
that he could not use his discretion but had to follow instructions from the government in 
London.
68
 In particular he objected to being prevented from following his conscience, when 
German generals were sentenced to death on the basis that they had accepted orders, 
instead of following their conscience. The dilemma he faced was especially acute in the case 
of Goering. Douglas justified his decision to confirm the death sentence on the basis that 
Goering had almost certainly known of one atrocity which he felt, as a former pilot, affected 
him personally – the shooting of British airmen after their escape from the POW camp, 
Stalag Luft III – but he still felt uneasy, writing later that: 
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Twenty-eight years before, Goering and I, as young fighter pilots, had fought each other in 
the cleaner atmosphere of the air. As I spoke the words that meant for Goering an 
inevitable death sentence, I could not help feeling, for all my loathing of what he had 





When he heard that Goering had committed suicide by taking poison, his reaction was not 
that Goering had evaded punishment, but some ‘slight relief’ at the news. Commenting on 
the decision of the Allied Control Council not to investigate further, he added: ‘I was only too 
glad to be finished with the whole sordid business.’
70
 
In addition to war criminals tried at Nuremberg, Douglas had to make the final decision in 
‘hundreds of cases’ tried by British Military courts, where those sentenced to death included 
not only concentration camp guards and other war criminals, but Polish displaced persons 
who had shot and killed Germans in revenge attacks or armed robbery after the war, a 
‘German peasant’ ordered by his senior officer to shoot a British parachutist, and a British 
soldier who had strangled his German girlfriend.
71
 In these cases he was allowed to use his 
discretion and commuted most of the sentences to life imprisonment. He claimed later that 
his experiences in Germany led to his conviction that the death penalty should be abolished, 
writing that: 
It is one thing to kill a fellow human being in the heat of battle, but these cold, judicial 




Colleagues who worked with him in Germany confirmed his account. Alec Bishop wrote later 
that Douglas found the use of the death penalty ‘particularly repugnant.’
73
 
Like many others at the time, Douglas did not fully comprehend the true nature and extent of 
the crimes committed during twelve years of Nazi dictatorship in Germany and Europe. As a 
result, he focussed on what he believed he understood: his formative experiences as a pilot 
over the Western front, his knowledge as a ‘professional airman’, his conscience and 
understanding of individual morality, and a concern for the fate of those with whom he could 
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identify, such as British POWs shot after escaping from Stalag Luft III, or a former German 
fighter pilot such as Hermann Goering. He confirmed all the sentences passed by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal,
74
 despite his personal reservations, but felt unprepared and unqualified 
for a role as Military Governor that included the power of life or death over individuals who 
had performed a similar role to his in wartime, or for whom he felt some personal sympathy.  
 
3.4   Criticism at home and allegations of corruption 
 
‘There was something so inexcusable about the shameful criticism that was expressed of us 
by our own people at home at that time, and I can still feel the anger that it caused in my own 




A few days after Douglas arrived in Germany, the Conservative MP Godfrey Nicholson 
expressed grave concerns in Parliament over ‘alarming allegations of corruption’ among 
Military Government staff.
76
 The Prime Minister asked the Chiefs of Staff to investigate and 
they in turn referred the matter to the Control Office in London (COGA) and to Robertson.
77
 It 
emerged that Nicholson’s source was a certain Captain R.C. Tarlton, a junior Military 
Government officer whom Nicholson knew personally. When asked for a written statement, 
Tarlton could only provide vague and imprecise allegations, such as unnamed Control 
Commission officers obtaining ‘luxury goods’ from German manufacturers in exchange for 
coal allocations, and others who used pre-war connections with German businesses to make 
‘gains unheard of in the normal business.’
78
 Public Safety Branch, the Control Commission 
internal police force, investigated further and produced a report in October 1946 which 
dismissed most of the allegations.
79
 Robertson wrote that: ‘It is quite clear to me that the 
majority of the allegations made by Tarlton are based on chatter and groundless rumour.’
80
 
At the end of December Hynd minuted the Prime Minister, a little more circumspectly, that 
there was ‘little substance in the charges’ but he was setting up a new organisation under a 
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‘senior detective officer from Scotland Yard’ to continue investigations into ‘alleged 
malpractices by the staff of the Control Commission in Germany.’
81
  
This was the first of many allegations that extended to the highest levels of Military 
Government, including some of Douglas’ closest colleagues in the RAF.
82
 The evidence 
which has survived in the archives is not sufficient to judge with any degree of certainty 
whether they were exaggerated, or if they represented the tip of an iceberg, with extensive 
corruption hidden from public view. The research conducted for this study suggests that, 
despite official denials, corruption was widespread, but not to the extent claimed by reports 
in the popular press or by the Conservative opposition in Parliament, who used the issue as 
a convenient stick to beat the government. A senior official at COGA was probably correct 
when he minuted on the official report into Tarlton’s claims that: 
The upshot has been to reveal a number of things which, to use General Robertson’s 
words, ‘are not as they should be.’ The matters revealed are very different from the 
sensational happenings at which Mr. Godfrey Nicholson seemed to be hinting in his speech 
to the House on 10
th





Allegations included the theft of jewels and cash in May 1945 from Schloss Glücksburg,
84
 
thefts of paintings and antiques from Villa Hugel, the former home of the Krupp family 
converted into the headquarters of the North German Coal Control,
85
 and a twelve page 
internal report into illegal trading by British and US officers, produced in July 1946 by the 
Economics Information section of the Control Commission.
86
  
The report alleged that investigations into the whereabouts of precious stones and metals 
with an estimated value of £250 million, formerly owned by the Nazi government, had 
revealed large scale black market activities in stolen works of art, looted museum pieces 
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from across Europe, drugs and narcotics.87 Two senior officers from the Metropolitan Police 
were sent to Germany to investigate and recommended that: 
There is a real need for an organisation to deal with serious crime committed by British Civil 
and Military personnel. Such crimes include serious ‘Black Market’ offences and the 




A joint British and US exercise codenamed ‘Operation Sparkler’ had some success in finding 
a small proportion of the missing precious stones and metals, to the value of £435,642.
89
 
The final report compiled in April 1947 showed a small increase in the value of materials 
traced in the British Zone. Results were better in the US Zone, locating property to the value 
of over $7 million.
90
  
While it is difficult to judge the true extent of major black market activities, there is no doubt 
that small-scale illegal trading was widespread among British military and Control 
Commission personnel. Paul Chambers, Head of the Control Commission Finance 
Department, estimated this cost the Exchequer £41 million,
91
 half the estimated net cost of 
the occupation to the taxpayer in 1946-7. British personnel bought goods cheaply in staff 
canteens and NAAFI shops, which were reserved for their use only, and sold them on the 
black market for German Reichsmarks (RM).
92
 At first, Reichsmarks were accepted in British 
canteens and shops and could be used to buy more goods, or converted into sterling and 
sent home as money orders. For example, a packet of cigarettes, which cost 1-2 shillings (5-
10p) in a British staff canteen, could be sold for 160RM on the black market, worth £4 at the 
official rate of exchange of 40RM to £1. The practice was partially stopped by issuing British 
army forces vouchers for use in NAAFI shops but, until currency reform in May 1948, British 
soldiers and Control Commission staff could live well, by buying goods and services cheaply 
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Allegations of corrupt practices among military and Control Commission staff were linked in 
parliamentary debates with more general criticisms of mismanagement, muddle, 
deteriorating conditions in Germany, and above all, the cost to the British taxpayer. The 
Conservative opposition leapt on ill-judged remarks by Hugh Dalton in his budget speech in 
April 1946, which they took as an open invitation to criticise his Labour Party colleague and 
minister for Germany, John Hynd. Dalton announced that expenditure on Germany and 
Austria for the coming year was estimated at £80 million, including the net cost of civilian 
staff, supplies and imports of food for the German population. This was a ‘large figure’, 
Dalton said, and  
So far, we are getting disappointingly little in return, and that is a matter which may have to 
be probed in the House one of these days. I am quite sure that the British taxpayer cannot, 
and should not, much longer be expected to go on paying, on this scale, what are, in effect, 




Responding to the Chancellor, Anthony Eden picked up immediately on the idea of ‘paying 
reparations to Germany’, adding that he wished to know more and the situation had to be 
remedied.
95
 In two debates called by the Opposition, on 10 May and 29 July 1946, 
Conservative front bench spokesmen quoted Dalton’s budget speech and launched personal 
attacks on Hynd.
96
 One called him a ‘minnow floating about amongst the whales’, referring to 
the difference in size and stature between Hynd and the rather larger Foreign Secretary, 
Ernest Bevin.
97
 Hynd received some support from Labour backbenchers,
98
 but little from his 
party leaders. Attacks on the Control Commission in Parliament continued throughout 1946 
and 1947, while Douglas was Military Governor.
99
 
In the meantime, the press latched on to the story and sent reporters to Germany to 
investigate. On 8 July 1946 a full page article appeared in the Daily Mirror under the headline 
‘£160 million a Year – to teach the Germans to despise us.’
100
 It purported to be the result of 
a seven week investigation into ‘widespread racketeering in the British zone of Germany’ 
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based on discussions with a large number of army and Control Commission officers. The 
article was written in a sensationalist style, with the tone set in the first paragraph: 
Lavish supplies of inexpensive drinks and easy, but dirty, money are causing widespread 
demoralisation and corruption among British personnel in Germany today at the expense of 




Articles later in the week placed the issue of the cost of the occupation in the wider context 
of the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris to discuss the future of 
Germany,
102
 reporting Bevin’s ‘warning’ that if no agreement was reached, ‘Britain would be 




Press criticism of the Control Commission continued throughout 1946 and 1947, in up-
market liberal journals and newspapers such as the Manchester Guardian and New 
Statesman as well as in the popular press.
104
 On 8 July 1947 the lead article on the front 
page of the Daily Mail raised the allegations of corruption to a new level, by naming Douglas 
and three of the most senior RAF officers in Germany as ‘assisting inquiries’ into the 
disappearance of old master paintings, Gobelin tapestries, antique furniture, gold and silver 
plate and cutlery, carpets, china and glassware, from the home of the aristocratic 
Schaumburg-Lippe family, Schloss Bückeburg, which had been requisitioned at the end of 
the war to serve as headquarters of the British Air Forces of Occupation (BAFO).
105
 The 
allegations affected Douglas directly, as he was the senior officer commanding BAFO from 
July 1945 to January 1946 and had been based at Bückeburg.
106 
In his memoirs, Douglas wrote that ‘vindictive suggestions and personal allegations about 
looting [were] levelled against even those of us who were in the most senior 
appointments.’
107
 He commissioned a report by ‘an officer from Scotland Yard’ which, he 
claimed, ‘proved conclusively the falsity of the newspaper attacks’.
108
 The report, by 
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Inspector Hayward, who conducted the earlier ‘Operation Sparkler’ investigations, has 
survived in the archives. It confirmed there was not ‘a shred of evidence’ Douglas ‘ever 
removed a single article’ from Germany.
109
 According to the report and related documents, 
he and other senior British officials received items from Schloss Bückeburg which they used 
to furnish their official residences, but ‘with the exception of very minor losses of small 
articles which can be safely attributed to normal domestic wastage or petty pilfering by staff, 
all was intact and could be accounted for.
110
 The report, however, stated that a large quantity 
of material was still missing and, although an RAF investigator had attributed this to petty 
theft and ‘souvenir hunting’, in Hayward’s view it had probably been subject to large scale 
removals.111 
The most serious allegation related to Douglas’ predecessor as Commander of British Air 
Forces in Germany, Sir Arthur Coningham. According to the report, Coningham had 
arranged for an ‘unknown quantity’ of silver, porcelain and carpets from Schloss Bückeburg 
to be flown to his villa in Cannes, in July 1945, some of which was returned to Germany in 
August 1945 and some late in 1947, but, Hayward added: ‘we have no means of 
ascertaining whether all that was originally taken was in fact returned’.
112
 An earlier interim 
report by Hayward alleged that 38 chests of silver had been removed from the Schloss to a 
‘farmhouse’ on the estate that Coningham used as his living quarters. Sixteen chests of 
silver were given to the RAF Welfare branch and made available for use by senior officers 
and messes. A further quantity of silver and other valuables was packed and ‘accompanied’ 
Coningham in his Dakota aeroplane when he left Germany for Cannes. When he arrived he 
found he had more than he needed, so the silver was re-packed and driven in his Rolls-
Royce car to his house in Brussels, from where another officer collected it and returned it to 
the collection held by Welfare at Bückeburg. At no point, Hayward added, was any inventory 
made or record kept of the material.
113
  
Hayward reported that Douglas told him in July 1947, when he started his enquiries, that 
while neither he nor two other senior RAF officers had received any property other than that 
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‘lawfully requisitioned’ for use in their official residences, Coningham was ‘open to criticism’ 
for taking material to his house in Cannes.
114
 Douglas added he was sure this had been 
done ‘in good faith’ and all would be returned in due course,
115
 but his comment could be 
interpreted as an indication to Hayward of the line his inquiry should take. A few days later, 
Douglas received a letter from Coningham in which he acknowledged that he still had 
material from Bückeburg in his house, ‘Villa Rosalie in the South of France’, and now wished 
to ‘return sundry articles of German furniture and equipment which were sent down there at 
the end of the war.’
116
 
The matter ended tragically. In January 1948, before Hayward completed his final report, 
Coningham vanished without trace when his aircraft, including all crew and passengers, 
crashed into the sea near Bermuda.
117
 Robertson was approached by the chief of the RAF 
Police, who asked if he could inform Lady Coningham, who was naturally distressed at her 
husband’s sudden death, that ‘as far as Sir Arthur is concerned, the allegations are without 
foundation’.
118
 Robertson declined the request, replying that while he hoped this would be 
the case, it would be wrong to prejudge the outcome of the report.
119
  
The files show that there had been disagreements dating back to 1945 between the RAF 
and local Control Commission branches, nominally responsible for the property. It was 
possibly unfortunate for the RAF officers that Prince Wolrad, the owner of the estate, had 
been a member of the paramilitary Stahlhelm organisation which merged with the Nazi SA 
after Hitler came to power in 1933.
120
 He was therefore subject to automatic arrest at the 
start of the occupation and management of his property was transferred to the Control 
Commission’s Property Control Branch, pending denazification proceedings. According to 
Hayward, the branch ‘did in fact take charge of his financial affairs but were prevented from 
exercising control of the personal property by the attitude of the R.A.F. who claimed that it 






 FO 1032/1371, letter from Coningham to Douglas, 30 July 1947 
117
 Vincent Orange, Coningham, A Biography of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham KCB, KBE, DSO, MC, DFC, AFC 
(London: Methuen, 1990), p250 
118
 FO 1032/1461, letter from de Putron to Robertson, 10 Feb. 1948 
119
 FO 1032/1461, letter from Westropp, who was dealing with the case for Robertson, to de Putron, 27 Feb. 1948 
120
 FO 1032/1371, memo from Petterson, Regional Economic Officer to Lingham, Acting Regional Commissioner, 
13 July 1947, enclosing ‘Report on the Estate of Prince Wolrad at Schaumburg-Lippe as at 7 July 1947’ by E.S. 
Hawarth, Property Control Branch; FO 1032/1370, memo from Goff to Parker, 8 July 1947 ‘Prince Wolrad’s Estate 
in Schaumburg-Lippe’ 
 95 
had been properly requisitioned for their use.’
121
 A report by a Property Control Officer dated 
7 July 1947, the day before the Daily Mail article appeared, was highly critical of the RAF, 
naming several senior officers including Douglas and Coningham.
122
  
Files on the refurbishment of Douglas’ official residence, Schloss Ostenwalde, formerly used 
by Montgomery, include a receipt for 72 items of silver and furniture from Bückeburg, and for 
a small number of items requisitioned from other stately homes.
123
 There is no evidence that 
any material was taken for his personal use, but Douglas and his wife appeared to have a 
taste for grand living that was in contrast with the dislike for pomp and ceremony he later 
claimed in his memoirs.
124
 A letter from the brigadier responsible stated that redecoration 
had to be of the highest standard as ‘visiting royalty will be entertained at the schloss.’
125
 A 
swimming pool was required and provided by army engineers.
126
 A large quantity of furniture 
was also ordered, to the designs of a Mr Dohler in Berlin, who had worked for other British 
officials. Wildfowling was arranged on a nearby lake and two guns reserved for Douglas and 
‘visiting VIPs’, roads to the residence were repaired, but arrangements to construct a new 




The evidence available is far from complete, but suggests that, while there is no reason to 
believe that Douglas exploited the situation for his personal gain or removed any items of 
value from Germany, he appears to have known of other senior officers who did so and did 
little to stop it. He also appears to have had little regard for official procedures in his own 
dealings. When he complained that Dohler had not been paid for furniture ordered from him, 
Paul Chambers, head of Finance Division, wrote a terse reply suggesting he should have 
followed ‘normal channels’:  
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There is in this country, as at home, a regular procedure for the authorisation and payment 
of work, the cost of which has to be borne by the public purse and where that procedure is 




More generally, it would appear that corruption, petty theft and, in some cases, large scale 
illegal activities were widespread in parts of the military forces of occupation and the Control 
Commission. On the other hand, from 1946 onwards, the Control Commission branches 
responsible for establishing and enforcing controls appear to have become reasonably 
effective and were prepared to investigate cases at the highest levels, with support from 
politicians in London. Inspector Hayward’s report did not result in further prosecutions, but 
was shown to Lord Henderson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, who 
commented that: 
Mr Hayward’s report makes very disturbing reading. R.A.F. administration is shewn to be 
casual and negligent and to say the least, there is an atmosphere of irresponsibility about 





The worst abuses occurred in the chaotic conditions of 1945, before the Control Commission 
was fully established in Germany. By 1946, issuing receipts and compiling inventories of 
items requisitioned appeared to have become standard practice.
130
 Property Control Branch, 
continued to compile inventories of material from Schloss Bückeburg and attempted to trace 
missing items until 1949.
131
 In January 1948, Robertson, now Military Governor, refused a 
request from the Chief of RAF Police to suspend Hayward’s enquiry ‘until every effort has 
been made to trace the bulk of this property and to bring to book any who may be 
responsible for the disappearances of large quantities of it.’
132
 It proved impossible to 
recover material stolen more than two years earlier, but the corruption issue, which had 
tainted Douglas’ Military Governorship, appeared to have been brought under control. 
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3.5   Conclusion 
Douglas left Germany on 1 November 1947. Earlier in the year in May, following press 
reports that he was going to resign, he wrote to Bevin that, rather than going when times 
were tough, ‘as a rat leaving a supposedly sinking ship’, he was prepared to stay as long as 
Bevin wished.
133
 In June, however, Attlee and Bevin agreed he should go and be replaced 
by Robertson, who had turned down an earlier offer from Montgomery of an appointment as 




There was no suggestion in the files that the decision was influenced by the Schloss 
Bückeburg, or other allegations. Pakenham, who replaced Hynd as Minister for Germany in 
April 1947, had a high regard for Douglas and recommended he be given a peerage. The 
recommendation was endorsed by Bevin, on the grounds that it would provide a clear 
demonstration of the government’s support for the Control Commission and so improve staff 
morale. Moreover, as a Labour Party supporter, Douglas could be useful in the House of 
Lords.
135
 He was enobled, as Lord Kirtleside, in the 1948 New Year Honours. In March 1949, 
following the nationalisation of civil aviation, he was appointed Chairman of BEA, (British 
European Airways), where he remained for fifteen years and was considered one of the most 
successful chairmen of a nationalised industry, overseeing the airline’s growth from 750,000 
passengers in 1949 to 5.6 million in 1964.
136
  
Sholto Douglas illustrates some of the contrasts in the British occupation. He tried to improve 
living conditions for the German population
137
 and fulfilled his responsibilities as Military 
Governor to the best of his abilities, despite his evident personal dislike of the job. At the 
same time, if not directly involved, he turned a blind eye to illegal activities undertaken by 
some of his colleagues, who exploited the chaotic situation in Germany for their own benefit. 
He did not share the ‘missionary idealism’ of Montgomery and the army generals, nor their 
idealistic vision of the British Empire as a force for good in the world, but pursued pragmatic 
policies to reduce the cost of the occupation to the British taxpayer and, so far as he could, 
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promote economic revival. As the British member of the Allied Control Council, he confirmed 
the death sentence imposed on Hermann Goering and other Nazi leaders condemned to 
death at Nuremberg, but had doubts about the legality of the proceedings and later 
supported the abolition of capital punishment.  
The issue of corruption among British military and Control Commission personnel has been 
covered at some length in this chapter, but this should not imply that theft and looting by the 
British in Germany was comparable to earlier wartime looting on a far greater scale, by 
Germans in Nazi occupied Europe, or to the theft and looting of Jewish property within 
Germany. However, the issue of corruption during the British occupation is important for two 
reasons. Firstly, the debate in the House of Commons in May 1946 marked the start of a 
period of transition, in which the British in Germany lost the moral high ground, not in their 
own eyes, but in the eyes of many of those at home, and in the eyes of Germans who read 
the articles in British newspapers which criticised the occupation. It was difficult to ask 
Germans to emulate the British democratic ‘way of life’ when some prominent Britons 
appeared so obviously not to practice what they preached. Secondly, it provides a different 
perspective, which contrasts with the narrative presented by Montgomery, Robertson and 
Bishop, of a benevolent occupation that contributed to a democratic and prosperous West 
Germany. That may have been the outcome when viewed from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s 
but, to many observers in Britain in 1946 and 1947, the occupation appeared corrupt, 
muddled, poorly managed and, despite good intentions, likely to sow the seeds of a third 
world war.
138
 This study suggests that both were correct to some degree and one view does 
not necessarily exclude the other.  
Robertson continued to issue the occasional exhortation to his staff, such as his speech on 
31 July 1947 reminding them why they were in Germany,
139
 but after Dalton’s budget speech 
in April, the Commons debates in May and July 1946 and criticism in the press, the 
occupation was perceived by many in Britain to be part of the problem, not the solution. 
Military Government policy remained the same, but the emphasis changed, from staying in 
Germany as long as necessary to change German culture and society, to reducing costs, 
                                                     
138
 HC Deb 05 February 1947 vol. 432 cc1775-916, opening speech by the Conservative spokesman, Richard Law, 
in the Adjournment debate on Germany 
139
 FO 1030/329, ‘Verbatim notes of speech by Deputy Military Governor to Staff’, 31 July 1947, in which he told 
them they were ‘the Empire builders … the Empire of true democracy’. 
 99 
provided this could be done without chaos, communism or a Nazi revival. Despite this 
change in emphasis, many idealistic individuals remained in Germany and did what they 
could to further the original aims for which they believed Britain had fought the war and 
established the occupation. The next three chapters discuss four civilian administrators who, 





Political renewal:  
Four civilian diplomats and administrators 
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4  Harold Ingrams: ‘Trying to beat the swastika into the parish 
pump’: July 1945 – August 1946 
 
‘We are trying to beat the swastika into the parish pump  









Harold Ingrams was a former colonial official who was appointed head of the Administration 
and Local Government (ALG) branch of the British Control Commission for Germany. He 
and his colleagues in the branch believed that it was not sufficient to abolish Nazi structures 
and practices and return to the pre-1933 system of local government in Germany; Weimar 
democracy was fundamentally flawed and had to be changed, as it had not prevented the 
Nazi seizure of power. Ingrams believed that British democracy was the best in the world, 
and the only practical way to reform German local government was to replace it with as 
much as possible of the British system, as he perceived it.  
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Ingrams’ attempt to impose structural administrative reforms was not typical of British policy 
in other areas
3
 and has been considered a failure by historians,
4
 but the arguments he used 
to justify the attempt are relevant to a study of British aims in occupied Germany, as they 
provide a clear example of how idealistic notions of the British Empire as a force for good in 
the world, and a belief in the intrinsic superiority of the British ‘way of life’, influenced 
occupation practice in at least one important area – local government and the promotion of 
democracy – as well as permeating the rhetoric of those at the top of the administration.
5
  
Ingrams’ perception of a robust parish democracy in Britain was similar in some respects to 
that of Sidney and Beatrice Webb and their successors at the London School of Economics 
(LSE). The Webbs believed that an ‘extra-legal democracy’ had been established in some 
localities in Britain by the early nineteenth century, and regretted that this model had not 
been extended more widely in the 1830s, when municipal boroughs were reformed and rural 
parishes ceased to be an effective unit of local government.
6
 However, Ingrams had no 
practical experience of local government and his application of the British model to Germany 
was heavily influenced by his experience of imperial rule, a textbook understanding of 
classical democracy and a nostalgic view of the rural British parish he may have acquired 
from his clergyman father. As a result, he attempted to impose an antiquated perception of 
British ‘parish pump’ village democracy on post-war Germany. He had an idealistic view of a 
leisured class of individuals meeting together after attending Church on Sunday to discuss 
and resolve their problems. He believed that independent ‘men of goodwill’ should take 
responsibility for public works and activities in their communities, such as keeping the streets 
clean, rather than depending on political parties to represent their views, or relying on 
professional officials appointed by the state.
7
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The arguments Ingrams used to justify his proposed reforms – the intrinsic superiority of 
British democracy and his colonial experience of introducing it overseas – did not convince 
members of the German Working Parties convened to discuss his proposals. They agreed 
with many of his aims, but disagreed with his methods. Most of his specific reforms were 
never fully implemented or were rolled back in later years. Yet, despite this apparent failure, 
arguably these early attempts at democratic reform were part of a successful ‘learning 
process’,
8
 which resulted in the progressive democratisation and liberalisation of post-war 
German politics and society. A short-term failure, by promoting debate and dialogue, 
contributed to long-term success. 
 
4.1   Harold Ingrams: colonial administrator  
 




Ingrams’ personal background was similar to that of Field-Marshal Montgomery and 
Generals Robertson and Bishop. He was born in 1897, the same year as Bishop and one 
year later than Robertson. His father was a clergyman and assistant master at Shrewsbury 
School.
10
 He fought and was wounded in France in the First World War. He joined the 
Colonial Service in 1919 and was posted to Zanzibar, Mauritius and Arabia, where he served 
with great distinction.
11
 In 1936 he brokered a peace agreement between warring Bedouin 
tribes in Southern Yemen, which is still known as the ‘Ingrams Peace.’
12
 During the war he 
served in various senior diplomatic posts in the Middle East, in Aden and the southern 
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 He was seconded by the Colonial Office in July 1945 to the 
Administration and Local Government (ALG) branch of the Control Commission for Germany 
and in December that year was made head of branch.
14
 He stayed in Germany for just over 
a year, leaving in August 1946.
15
 
Ingrams was an influential member of the British Control Commission, chairing working 
parties on local government and electoral procedure.
16
 He was also the British member of 
the Allied Control Council sub-committee on governmental structure and participated in 
bilateral meetings with his US counterpart in July 1946 to consider greater coordination 
between the British and US zones.
17
 Although he reported to the Deputy Military Governor, 
General Robertson, through a brigadier who was initially his head of branch, and General 
Philip Balfour, head of the Internal Affairs and Communication division of the Control 
Commission, he discussed many issues directly with Robertson.  
It is difficult to judge the extent to which Ingrams originated policy, as well as being 
responsible for its implementation. In an early study published in 1968,
18
 Wolfgang Rudzio 
claimed that British local government policy was largely determined by Professor William A. 
Robson, an expert in public administration at the LSE,
19
 who advised Control Commission 
staff while they were based in London. Rudzio’s claim may be exaggerated, as although 
Robson was a highly respected figure and his ideas were undoubtedly influential,
20
 he 
played no part in the work of the Control Commission after they left Britain for Germany in 
July 1945. Ingrams’ personal papers show he thought through many issues for himself, but 
his conclusions were often similar to those described in other contemporary sources
21
 and 
he may have been influenced by his colleagues in the branch.  
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Ingrams agreed with his British colleagues that the pre-Nazi German system was 
undemocratic and should be changed, but the rhetoric he used to justify his proposed 
reforms was distinctive and reflected his personal background and experience. Robson saw 
the problem in organisational and structural terms, claiming that local government in Weimar 
Germany was fundamentally undemocratic, due to the privileged position of the bureaucracy, 
executive power vested in senior elected local officials such as town and city mayors 
(Bürgermeister), and local authorities acting as an arm of the state with accompanying police 
and regulatory powers.
22
 The ‘established bureaucracy’ Robson argued, was one of the ‘four 
pillars’ of Nazi rule, the others being the Party, the Army and the large industrialists.
23
 
Ingrams, while not disagreeing with the need for structural reforms and a complete break 
with the past, believed that democracy was essentially a matter of individual behaviour with 
its basis in Christian morality.
24  
 
4.2   Echoes of empire and ‘missionary idealism’ 
 
‘In my experience nothing is more sure than that if you give responsibility to people they are 




Not content with repealing Nazi laws and restoring the German local and regional 
administrative system as it had been in 1933 before Hitler came to power, Ingrams acted as 
if he were a secular missionary for democracy, as he understood it. He decided that, as far 
as possible, the British model of local government should be introduced in Germany. He 
assumed that the British ‘way of life’ represented the essence of democracy and was the 
‘antithesis’ of the German system.
26
 The Weimar system of democracy had ‘proved an easy 
prey for the Nazis’ and ‘to restore the pre-1933 system could be nothing more than 
ineffectual patch-work.’
27
 Above all, he believed it was essential to make it as difficult as 
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possible for anyone in Germany to re-establish the authoritarian Führerprinzip or ‘leadership 
principle’ which Hitler had made the basis of Nazi society.
28
  
Soon after he arrived in Germany, Ingrams recorded his thoughts on the implications of the 
October 1944 policy directives issued to senior British officials in Germany as a Military 
Government handbook.
29
 Apart from a general requirement to promote decentralisation and 
the development of local responsibility,
30
 the directives provided no guidance on local 
government and administration. Possibly reflecting a point of view he had learned at school 
or from his father, Ingrams wrote that true democracy was based on Christian principles, and 
the biblical ‘thou shalt not’ of the Old Testament must be replaced by, in his words, ‘the 
principle of duty towards one’s neighbour’, adding that ‘if we are to change German methods 
our only yardstick is our own system.’
31
 This sentence embodied three principles he stuck to 
throughout his time in Germany: the need for a fundamental change to the former German 
system; his belief that the essence of democracy lay not in collective social or political 
structures or institutions, but in personal relations between individuals conducted in a spirit of 
Christian morality; and a conviction, based on his imperial experience, that the only 
practicable way forward was to introduce as much of the British model of democracy into 
Germany as possible, as this was not only ‘the most robust in the world’ but the kind of 
democracy he and his British colleagues knew and understood best. 
The same fundamental principles were expressed in different ways in many other 
documents. In February 1946 he prepared a one page paper with the title ‘On Promoting 
Democracy in Germany’ which he showed to General Robertson, the Deputy Military 
Governor. According to Ingrams, Robertson ‘read it through carefully and then passed it 
back saying, with some emphasis “I agree with every word if it.”’
32
 The paper was printed as 
the Foreword to a revised edition of the directive on local government issued the same 
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month and circulated widely to Control Commission staff.
33
 The views Ingrams expressed 
were therefore endorsed at the highest level by the Deputy Military Governor, issued as part 
of an official publication and can be considered typical of many of the older generation of 
British officers, diplomats and senior administrators in Germany. 
Ingrams’ colonial experience led him to the view that the ‘character of a people’ depended on 
their physical environment and determined their social and political organisation. He wrote in 
the paper that: 
Our democracy, the most robust in the world, is the product of our character and our 
country. It is on British soil that it flourishes best but we do export it and tended carefully it 




British democracy, he believed, was based on the superior character of the British people 
and on Christianity. It was their duty to set an example to the Germans (who if not British 
were at least Christian) by practising it themselves and, in so doing, encouraging the 
Germans to adopt the same beliefs, values and standards of behaviour: 
The democracy we seek to establish is based on Christianity, the fulfilment of our duty 
towards our neighbours. The welfare of everyone of us is the concern of each of us and this 
is the idea which we have to practise ourselves and help the Germans to practice in each 




In November 1945 Ingrams went on a lecture tour, in which he explained the thinking behind 
the newly released directive on local government to the commanders of British Military 
Government units across the zone. In the lecture, he stressed the difficulty of ‘selling 
democracy in extremely trying economic conditions’ but also the opportunity, even greater 
than that of a former conqueror, Napoleon, to introduce administrative reform in Germany.
36
 
He told his audience that Government was the concern of every individual man and woman 
and it was ‘to the individual in the first place we have to turn our attention’. He described the 
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British role in Germany as similar to that of a doctor with a patient, though, in some ways, his 
words read as though the role he had in mind was that of priest and sinner, or missionary 
and potential convert.
37
 He later elaborated on the idea of the colonial administrator as a 
secular missionary, not specifically in Germany, but throughout the Empire. The colonial 
administrator, he wrote, should not claim to possess ‘the whole monopoly of truth and the 
only fold in which there is salvation.’ The administrator’s role was not to convert the heathen, 
but to bring peace, prosperity and democracy to the inhabitants of other nations. His task 
was ‘to help in achieving that peace, and happiness too, which is promised to men of 
goodwill of whatever faith they be.’
38
 
Ingrams did not perceive the British Empire as weak or in decline. After leaving Germany in 
1946, he was appointed Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 
modern Ghana. In an account of his journey to take up the post, published in 1949, he 
provided an insight into what we might call his personal philosophy of empire.
39
 He wrote in 
classic imperial terms of how the British went to Africa and Asia, in the same way that Julius 
Caesar and St Augustine had come to England two thousand years earlier, to bring ‘the 
civilisation of Rome and Christian faith to these lands’.
40
 He was not, however, an old-
fashioned imperialist. His experience travelling overland across the Sahara through British 
and French colonial territories confirmed his view that the old order could not last for ever; it 
was no longer possible to ‘build slowly on a foundation of native institutions’
41
 and there was 
a need to actively promote economic development and political reform.
42
 He hoped that ‘men 
of goodwill’ would learn to work together and if the imperial power helped those in the 
colonies manage their own affairs ‘the bonds of friendship so forged will be stronger than any 
between a conquering nation and subject peoples.’
43
 
In practice, of course, the Empire did not evolve as he hoped. Instead of forging ‘bonds of 
friendship’, independence in many former colonies, including India, Malaya, Burma, 
Palestine and South Africa, was achieved after a bitter struggle or followed by dictatorship 
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and civil war rather than peace, prosperity and democracy. In Southern Yemen, where 
Ingrams felt a special affinity with the people after working there from 1934 to 1944, the 
British were forced to leave in 1967 after a violent four year anti-colonial uprising and war of 
independence known, euphemistically, as the ‘Aden Emergency’. 
Ingrams’ ideal view of British democracy based on Christian principles represented, at best, 
a partial view of history, which ignored rotten boroughs and the widespread corruption in 
British politics before the 1832 Reform Act, or the inequalities in British society. In his 
emphasis on the role of the individual and an accompanying distrust of political parties, he 
seemed to hark back to an imagined idyllic rural past, when everyone knew each other and 
the Anglican village parish church was the focus of community life. To quote again from his 
lecture in November 1945 to Control Commission staff: 
the real strength of local government in England, which is very constantly described as the 
home of local government, resides … in the parish; and the strength of the parish was 
originally in that Christian life of collective organisation for mutual help which centred round, 




This was an antiquated, pre-industrial, view of democracy dating back over a hundred years 
to the eighteenth century.  
English public schools placed a strong emphasis on the classic Greek and Roman texts, 
which may explain Ingrams’ belief that the purest form of democracy was similar to that of 
ancient Athens, where citizens spoke for themselves rather than through elected 
representatives. Idealistically, he attempted to preserve these principles in the smaller 
Gemeinden, or parish communities, in Germany: 
Democracy in England is found in an almost pure form in the parish meeting, and in the 
smaller Gemeinden this was the case in Germany. Any Gemeinde which had less than 40 
electors had a Gemeindeversammlung [parish meeting] where each elector spoke and 




He added that German parish meetings were ‘under the complete control of their feudal 
lords,’ unlike the robust self-government of the English parishes.
46
 This was another partial 
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understanding of history. In established churches in rural Britain in the eighteenth century, 
attendance at Sunday service often reflected an authoritarian and hierarchical social order,
47
 
rather than ‘robust self-government’. As Sidney and Beatrice Webb wrote, the most common 
form of parish government in rural districts, before the administrative reforms at the start of 
the nineteenth century, was a ‘parish oligarchy’ in which:  
Official relationships between the parties were inextricably woven into the economic 
relationships that existed between the same individuals in their private capacities. The 
Justice of the Peace was probably the landlord of the whole of the parish officers; the 
officers were the employers of the paupers; and even the clergyman, who was in many 
respects the most independent person in the village, often owed his position to the squire, 
let his glebe to the Churchwarden, bargained with the Overseer as to the rates on his tithes, 




Before his posting to Germany, Ingrams had spent the whole of his working life overseas. 
His idyllic view of a ‘golden age’ of British parish democracy probably owed as much to what 
he had been taught at school or learned from his clergyman father,
49
 as to any genuine 
understanding of past or contemporary British society. 
Ingrams’ imperialist outlook, ‘missionary idealism’ and nostalgic schoolbook view of ‘pure’ 
direct democracy in rural Britain, centred on the established church and unaffected by party 
politics, were inappropriate for the industrialised, largely urban society of Germany in the 
1940s, in which those who claimed they had no interest in ‘politics’ were often former Nazis. 
As Raymond Ebsworth, a former colleague of Ingrams’, explained later, to say you were 
non-political in post-war Germany generally meant that you were either a Nazi, but not willing 
to admit it, or that you had not had the courage of your convictions to declare membership of 
another party, such as the SPD or Communists, when these were banned by the Nazis.
50
 
Not surprisingly, Ingrams found it difficult to translate his aspirations into practical and 
workable policies. 
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4.3   First steps towards political renewal 
 
‘Mil. Gov., in fact, should aim to be regarded as the midwife of German political thought 




In June and July 1945, Montgomery and his senior officers took steps to initiate the process 
of political renewal in the British zone. The creation of a new Directive on Military 
Government, issued on 10 September, was discussed in chapter 2. The Directive covered 
broad principles only and the formulation of detailed policies was undertaken by the Control 
Commission divisions. Ingrams was responsible for its implementation in his area of 
responsibility; local government and administration. Because British policy was to build from 
the bottom up, his responsibilities included the renewal of political life generally, as well as 
the establishment of local and regional councils and preparations for elections. 
The process was remarkably quick. General Philip Balfour, head of the Internal Affairs and 
Communication Division, wrote to his immediate subordinates on 2 August, a few days after 
receiving the first ‘rough draft’ directive, telling them that authority had already been given to 
implement those parts of the directive which related to freedom of assembly, liberty of 
discussion and the formation of political parties. A working party was to be established under 
the chairmanship of Ingrams to ‘prepare clear and concise directions on the subjects 
considered.’
52
 The first meeting of the newly constituted ‘Working Party on Democratic 
Development’ took place the following Monday, 6 August and met daily until its eighth and 
final meeting.
53
 In addition to re-drafting the relevant sections of the Directive on Military 
Government, issued on 10 September,
54
 the group prepared five Military Government 
Ordinances, numbers 8-12,
55
 and a supplementary directive for local commanders on 
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‘Administrative [sic], Local and Regional Government.’
56
 Ingrams was the driving force in 
these meetings, preparing drafts of papers, ordinances, instructions and directives, which 
were generally accepted by the other participants, with only minor amendments.
57
 
To assist the Working Party with their discussions, Ingrams circulated a thirteen page paper 
which outlined the background to their task and the reasons why he believed political reform 
was necessary.
58
 He explained that the paper was concerned with ‘the permanent 
decentralisation of administration in Germany’, and their aim was ‘to give the ordinary 
German man and women [sic] the maximum amount of say in the government of the country 




Ingrams argued that the ban on all forms of political activity, imposed at the start of the 
occupation, must be relaxed before they could change German political culture. Freedom of 
speech was to be permitted and ‘indeed encouraged’ as ‘the German, who is entirely unused 
to such a luxury must gradually be brought to realise that it is not a luxury but a vital 
necessity which he or she must never surrender again.’
60
 Every adult German man and 
woman would be given the right to vote and although, as in England, many would be 
apathetic, ‘the Englishman would certainly resist if his right to vote was taken away from him 
and ideally the German must be taught to think likewise.’
61
 The formation of political parties 
would be allowed, but in the Weimar Republic constituencies had been too large for voters to 
know the individuals they were voting for, and ‘a vote should be cast for a candidate not a 
party.’
62
 If ordinary men and women were given responsibility for government, this ‘should 
also make it impossible for the Germans to say again with any shadow of truth “It wasn’t our 
fault but our leaders.”’
63
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Most of the paper covered the detailed principles to be adopted for the establishment of 
indirect rule through local and regional Nominated Representative Councils.
64
 Ingrams wrote 
with great confidence on the subject, based on his colonial training and experience. British 
policy in Germany, he wrote, was that of indirect rule, which he defined as ‘rule through 
indigenous authorities’ and ‘one of the methods of teaching people to take responsibility in 
governing themselves.’
65
 He provided detailed advice on how to establish nominated 
councils, their recommended size, functions and responsibilities, the role of the chairman 
and the creation of standing orders to govern procedure. British detachment commanders 
were advised to select members to ensure adequate representation of all the ‘party or 
sectional’ interests in an area. This was defined widely, including religious groups, trade 
unions, political parties, farmers and industrialists, or geographically by residential areas.
66
  
The task he envisaged Military Government commanders performing in Germany was 
analogous to that undertaken by District Officers in a British colony or dependent territory. A 
few weeks earlier, on 17 July, he wrote to a former colleague in the Personnel Department of 
the Foreign and Colonial Office in London asking for his help with recruitment, saying he 
expected they would need around 600 officers before long, adding that ‘it does seem to me 
that the jobs are very much what any D.O. [District Officer] or A.D.O. [Assistant District 
Officer] has to cope with especially in indirectly ruled territories….’
67
 Revealing something of 
his personal circumstances, he added that those attracted to the job might include ‘officers in 
the same position as myself, who have about 18 months leave due to them who would like to 
spend a year doing a useful job in a decent [i.e. temperate] climate.’
68
 
The new directive on ‘Administrative, Local and Regional Government’ which resulted from 
the Working Party deliberations incorporated much material from Ingrams’ paper. The 
directive was written in the form of a handbook for Military Government detachment 
commanders and provided guidance on actions to be taken within their own areas. An 
explanatory section started by discussing the ‘Nature of the Problem – The Individual 
German’: 
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The German people have had National Socialism and Nazi doctrine pumped into them for 





Until democratically elected Councils could be established, the directive continued, British 
Military Government had to function as a ‘benevolent despotism’ which should act impartially 
and ensure that the ‘legitimate needs’ of all sections of the population were met ‘as far as is 
proper and reasonable.’
70
 Similar sentiments were expressed at the end of the section on 
‘Political Parties’, which contrasted a constructive and impartial Military Government with 
unscrupulous Nazi ‘gangsters’, and ended with an analogy which embodied the theme of a 
new birth for Germany, aided by the British: 
Finally, it should be emphasised here as elsewhere that the aim of Mil. Gov. is constructive 
rather than repressive. Political parties should be the natural expression of political 
consciousness, in Germany as in England. The German should be made to feel that the 
regulations laid down in the Ordinance are designed to protect him against exploitation by 
unscrupulous careerists and gangsters … Mil. Gov., in fact, should aim to be regarded as 




This passage in the directive echoed similar comments by Robertson, telling his staff in an 
article in the British Zone Review that their task in Germany was not just a matter of physical 
or economic reconstruction, but more like educating a child, as the German nation was 
‘being reborn in the present stage of its history.’
72
 Despite the obvious paternalism and the 
persistence of negative stereotypes of Germans as ignorant and incapable of thinking for 
themselves, the wartime discourse of death and destruction was being superseded by a 
more positive one of new birth and renewal. 
Ingrams was not successful in recruiting 600 former colonial officials to implement the 
directive but, by May 1946, Military Government officials had established Nominated 
Representative Councils in 7,738 of 7,969 Gemeinde, the lowest level of administration, and 
in 189 of 193 urban districts (Stadtkreise). The official in ALG branch who reported the 
figures commented:  
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On the whole it can definitely be said that the meaning of British democracy is beginning to 




It may seem ironic that his comment, on the meaning of democracy, accompanied a 
progress report on the establishment of non-elected bodies, appointed by the British Military 
Government. It indicates that Ingrams and his colleagues did not consider true democracy to 
be unqualified rule by the people or their elected representatives; this was how Hitler had 
come to power. It was rather the responsible exercise of power, by independent, public-
spirited individuals. How they were elected or appointed was the means to the end, not the 
end in itself; what mattered was that the ‘right’ people ended up in charge. 
 
4.4   Electoral Reform: the attempt to impose the British ‘majority’ system  
 
‘The chief argument against proportional representation is that it does not lead to a 




Whereas the establishment of Nominated Representative Councils proceeded smoothly, 
without the British feeling the need to consult the Germans on the issue, Ingrams and his 
colleagues in ALG branch encountered opposition among both British and Germans to their 
proposed changes to the German voting system. The most contentious issue, at this stage, 
was their proposal to replace the German system of proportional representation (in which the 
electorate voted for a party and candidates were selected from a party list in proportion to 
the number of votes each party received), with the British ‘first past the post’ or ‘single 
majority’ system, in which the electorate voted for a person, not a party, and the single 
individual who received the most votes was elected in each constituency. 
Ingrams started work on arranging elections in November 1945, when he was asked to 
convene a ‘British Working Party to supervise a German Working Party on Electoral 
Procedure.’
75
 At the first meeting of the (British) Working Party on 20 November, he reported 
that decisions on the key policy issues, such as the dates of elections and methods of voting, 
had already been taken, but they wished to consult the Germans on matters of detail, such 
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as the size of constituencies, qualifications for inclusion in the electoral roll and the design of 
the ballot boxes.
76
 However, he found it was no longer possible to restrict discussions with 
the Germans to matters of detail or impose changes without consultation, as he had done in 
his earlier directive on local government, issued in September 1945.  
Ingrams introduced the second meeting of the German Working Party, at the end of January 
1946, by making a speech on the benefits of the single majority system. He argued that the 
British system worked well in the Empire, and should therefore also work in Germany: 
Although we still think the single majority system is the best, we would like to consult with 
you again. We do not say the British democracy is the only kind in the world, or the best, 
but we do feel it has proved itself as the most workable. Perhaps because of the character 
of the British people, which is well known. This system has been adopted in other countries 
and in the Empire, and has worked there quite satisfactorily. We feel the German people 




He continued by describing the benefits of the British system in similar fashion to his earlier 
lectures to Control Commission staff: proportional representation did not lead to a 
‘democratic way of life’, it was impersonal and led to ‘one strong man with a weak following’, 
the individual was especially important in local government which was the concern of 
everyone. He illustrated this last point with the example: ‘“Are the streets muddy? We would 
like to know why.” Parties must interest themselves in this sort of thing.’ Some of the German 
delegates were either persuaded by Ingrams’ arguments, or believed that the British system 
would work to their benefit. At the end of the meeting, the delegates voted – eight in favour 
of the British majority system and seven for proportional representation – but, unfortunately 
for Ingrams, this was not the end of the matter.
78
 
It emerged during the meeting that Ingrams had received specific instructions, on a visit to 
London a few days earlier, that if the German delegates rejected the British single majority 
system, he should offer them the alternative vote instead.
79
 This was a more proportional 
system, but preserved the principle of electors voting for an individual, not a party. His 
instructions probably derived from John Hynd, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and 










government minister responsible for Germany.
80
 As a former railway official, Hynd was 
familiar with the alternative vote from its use by the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) in 
their internal elections. He was also sympathetic to the SPD who depended on a strong party 
organisation and therefore had most to gain from proportional representation, though all the 
representatives of political parties on Ingrams’ Working Party opposed the British ‘simple 
majority’ system.
81
 Kenneth Macassey, a Home Office expert delegated to advise Ingrams 
on matters of electoral procedure, told him a few days after the meeting that he had spoken 
with Hynd, who considered that Ingrams was ‘trying to put a quick one over on the German 
political parties’, and Hynd wanted to introduce the NUR system, despite Macassey telling 
him ‘that the Germans weren’t capable of working it…’
82
 
The issue was resolved when Austen Albu arrived in Germany in early February, to take up 
a position in the Political Division of the Control Commission.
83
 Albu was an active socialist, 
personally appointed by Hynd. Robertson raised the question of electoral procedure at his 
first meeting with Albu, telling him that he had decided to go ahead with the simple majority 
system rather than proportional representation and, if Hynd wished to change this, he should 
say so sooner rather than later.
84
 At a divisional meeting a few days later, chaired by 
General Balfour and attended by Ingrams, Albu put forward Hynd’s objections to Ingrams’ 
proposed reforms. Albu told the meeting that Hynd was ‘averse to imposing on the Germans 
a system of which they were not wholly in favour’; the fact that it worked in Britain did not 
necessarily mean it would work in Germany; proportional representation was ‘well 
established in Europe … had considerable support in England’ and ‘could not be lightly 
dismissed’. After a long discussion it was agreed that the best solution would be a 
compromise: proportional representation but without the party list. It was agreed that Albu 
and Ingrams should write a brief for Robertson, who was due to speak to the German 
Working Party at its next meeting on 14 February.
85
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The brief still outlined the advantages of the British majority system, but represented a 
change in tone from Ingrams’ earlier assertions that the British system was the best in the 
world and there was no reason why it should not be adopted in Germany.
86
 In his address, 
Robertson was conciliatory. He re-emphasised that the Working Party should ‘choose a 
system under which the voter declares himself for an individual and not merely a party’ and 
that the existing electoral system in Germany was unsound and had contributed to the 
downfall of democracy in the Weimar Republic. However he concluded, somewhat 
ambiguously, by saying that: 
What is good for England is not necessarily good for Germany. That is why we will not 





The process of democratisation had now become a dialogue, not the forced imposition of 
one particular system by the British on the Germans.  
The Working Party again failed to reach a conclusion. At a meeting in London attended by 
Hynd, Robertson, Albu, and Ingrams, a compromise was agreed which combined the form of 
the British system – electors voting for an individual in their constituency – with the 
substance of the former German proportional representation system.
88
 Results of individual 
ballots were supplemented by the selection of additional candidates from a party list, to 
increase the total elected to reflect the proportion of votes cast for each party.
89
 Albu later 
claimed that the compromise system was his idea, writing that, when studying the papers for 
the meeting, he ‘suddenly remembered’ Jim Middleton, secretary of the Labour Party, telling 
him about a similar system in France.
90
 This system, with some modifications, is used in 
Germany today. Very similar systems have been adopted in Britain, in more recent times, for 
elections to the Scottish, Welsh and London Assemblies.  
The issue of electoral procedure illustrates some of the tensions within the British 
administration and the limited scope Ingrams possessed to impose fundamental structural 
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changes on the German political system, despite having the support of Robertson, the 
Deputy Military Governor. Hynd could not dictate policy from London but, through Albu acting 
as the minister’s representative on the ground, on this occasion he and Albu were able to 
argue the case and over-ride Ingrams, the British official in Germany responsible for the 
issue. Robertson changed his mind and, rather than supporting Ingrams, deferred to his 
political masters. The outcome was a compromise: the introduction of a new hybrid electoral 
procedure, which has stood the test of time remarkably well. 
 
4.5   Civil service reform: the proposed abolition of the Bürgermeister 
 
‘No aspect of the work of ALG branch has been more discussed  




A second, more contentious, dispute with leading German politicians arose over Ingrams’ 
proposed separation of powers between an elected and unpaid ‘Chairman of the Council’ 
and a salaried professional ‘Town Clerk’, following the British model of local government in 
city, county, town and district councils. Previously in Germany, both roles had been 
combined in the position of Bürgermeister, an elected mayor with executive responsibilities. 
The measure was part of a package of reforms designed to establish the principle that senior 
paid civil servants (known as Beamten) should be ‘servants of the people’, not of the state, 
and limit their ability to engage in political activities, such as active membership of a political 
party.
92
 The proposed reforms were strongly criticised by German officials and politicians, 
who saw them as an attempt to impose an alien system that conflicted with long-established 
and effective German administrative traditions.
93
 
Opposition to the reforms generally, and to the proposed change in status of the 
Bürgermeister in particular, first emerged at a consultative body, comprising the German 
leaders of the regional governments in the British Zone.
94
 Michael Thomas, a half-Jewish 
German refugee who fled Germany in 1939 and returned in 1945 as an officer in the British 
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army, acted as the British liaison officer for early meetings of the group.
95
 He reported in 
October 1945 that: 
The main objection the Germans raise against our directive is the transfer of the executive 
functions of the political head of an administration to a paid public servant. They argue that 
such a system might work well in England, but in present day Germany there would not be 
anybody who could afford to hold the political office without pay. To pay him although he 
has no executive functions would defeat the object of the scheme, quite apart from the 




The next meeting of the group was attended by General Templer,
97
 who defended the 
reforms in a speech based largely on a brief prepared by J.M. Cobban, a close colleague of 
Ingrams, using the usual arguments that: 
We have no intention of imposing a purely British conception of democracy on Germany. As 
a matter of fact, the Military Government Directive on Local Government is not a purely 
British thing, but is common form throughout the whole democratic world. It is no use saying 
the Germany already had an excellent democratic system in the past. That system was not 




The German politicians were not impressed. Thomas reported that: 
Feeling is very strong on this subject. During the conference I was approached again and 
again about it. British writers were quoted as considering the German local government 




Thomas did not elaborate further on which British writers they were referring to but, 
according to Reusch, the German Civil Service was regarded favourably in British and US 
local government studies written before 1945, admired for its independence, professionalism 
and lack of corruption.
100 
Harold Laski, writing in 1917, contrasted the German tradition of 
self-government favourably with ‘an over-centralized unitary sovereign state’ in Britain, 
claiming that ‘there was in normal times a far more vigorous and autonomous culture of local 
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and civic self-government in Germany than in Britain, where local authorities were merely an 
“anaemic reflex of the central power.”’
101
  
The issue of civil service reform illustrated some of the difficulties Ingrams and his 
colleagues faced when they attempted to apply the principle of a politically neutral civil 
service to Germany. Despite its reputation for independence and  integrity, the great majority 
of German professional administrators still in post at the end of the war, if not themselves 
party members, had survived the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 and had supported the 
government throughout the war. Those who had been members of the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD), on the other hand, had been banned by the Nazis, some had been forced into 
exile or imprisoned and only a few older members possessed any practical experience of 
administration. In 1946, many of the SPD’s leading figures had been appointed to positions 
of responsibility by the British and were financially dependent on salaries from executive 
positions in local or regional government.
102
 Their ideal solution would have been to keep the 
system unchanged but to replace the former administrators, tainted with Nazism, with their 
own supporters. The British, on the other hand, were reluctant to endorse what appeared to 
them to be blatant partisanship, and wary of replacing proven administrators with others who 
had little or no experience.
103
 
Ingrams’ proposals were condemned by German politicians on both sides of the political 
spectrum. SPD members, in exile in London or recently returned to Germany, wrote to Hynd 
complaining about the proposals.
104
 Thomas reported that Robert Lehr, a Christian 
Democrat and former Bürgermeister of Düsseldorf,
105
 said that ‘he would resign altogether if 
the question which of the two jobs he would choose was put to him’.
106
 It was not only 
German politicians who disagreed with Ingrams’ reforms. Wolfgang Friedmann, a legal 
expert who fled from Nazi Germany in 1934 and worked for the British Control Commission 
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 was highly critical of the British attempt to reform local government. 
Referring specifically to the proposal to abolish the position of Bürgermeister, he wrote that: 
By this administrative reform the British Control Commission created a vital divergence 
between local government in its own zone and that of the other three zones. From the 
beginning it aroused violent opposition amongst the vast majority of German parties and 
organisations. Opposition was directed mainly against the alien character of the reform, the 




Friedmann was not impressed by the colonial mentality of some of his British colleagues and 
he may have had Ingrams in mind when he wrote that: 
Another type of British administrator suffers from the colonial mind. Many came to Germany 
with the idea that Germany could be administered on the pattern of an undeveloped British 
Colony. The British experience of colonial government may be more of a handicap than a 




Faced with determined German opposition, Ingrams did not succeed in his proposal to 
abolish the position of Bürgermeister and enforce a separation of function between an 
elected ‘Chairman of the Council’ and paid ‘Town Clerk’. He left Germany in August 1946, 
after completing a year’s secondment from the Colonial Office, disappointed at what he 
considered to be lack of support from the government in London and a refusal by the 
Treasury to increase his pay following his promotion the previous December to head of 
branch.
110
 In November 1946, Military Government Ordinance no. 57 transferred 
responsibility for local government and elections from the British to the German 
authorities.
111
 Ingrams’ plans for far-reaching reforms to the German Civil Service were 
shelved and apparently forgotten.
112
 Rather than attempting structural changes to the 
German system, his colleagues in the Administration and Local Government Branch adopted 
an advisory role, running training courses and setting up a local government school of 
administration where invited British lecturers and German participants exchanged views and 
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 Most of the British local government reforms implemented 
previously were rolled back in later years.  
Shortly before he left Germany, in July 1946, Ingrams complained in a personal memo, 
apparently written to his immediate superior, about the lack of support he received from his 
British colleagues. He wrote that he retained his sense of mission as ‘one that needs to be 
carried through in the interests of humanity and our nation’, but was increasingly 
discouraged by difficulties placed in his way internally by the British Control Commission. He 
was disappointed at the failure to authorise increases in staff, to advance the status of his 
branch to that of a division and at the lack of support from the government in London. He no 
longer wished to remain in Germany and had asked the Colonial Office to find him another 
post, adding ‘They know well that my main experience and interests lie in the Middle East.’
114
 
Soon after, he left Germany for a period of leave in England, before being offered a post, not 
in the Middle East, but in Africa. In an article in the April 1947 issue of the Quarterly Review, 
however, summarising his work and achievements in Germany, he concluded more 
positively that: ‘contact and cooperation’ with the Germans were ‘necessary to bring the task 




4.6   Conclusion 
The limited nature of Ingrams’ electoral and administrative reforms was in stark contrast to 
the scale of his ambition to reform Weimar democracy. Even so, he met significant 
resistance and the British authorities were unwilling to impose fundamental structural 
reforms without the support of a clear majority of leading German politicians.  
Ingrams’ arguments in favour of specific reforms, including the replacement of proportional 
representation with the British ‘first past the post’ electoral system and the abolition of the 
position of Bürgermeister, were not compelling. Germans were not convinced that because 
something worked in Britain it would work in Germany, or that because it had been 
successfully introduced in the British Empire, it could and should be applied to Germany. 
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They dismissed or ignored his nostalgic view of British ‘parish pump’ democracy, centred 
round the church, and his belief in the ability of ‘men of goodwill’ to meet together and 
resolve their problems, without resorting to mass organisation and political parties. After 
twelve years of Nazi rule, when ‘men of goodwill’ had failed to prevent a disastrous war and 
previously unimaginable atrocities, it is not surprising that his views appeared both outdated 
and inappropriate. He and his colleagues did not appreciate the strengths of the pre-1933 
German local government system, such as its respect for local traditions and high standards 
of professionalism, as well as the weaknesses. On a more practical level, it seemed 
perverse that the proposed reforms should disadvantage a political party, the SPD, that had 
been the most determined of all German parties in its opposition to the Nazis and which was 
heavily dependent on mass organisation, voting by party lists, and providing financial 
security for its leading members through salaried posts in public service. 
Despite disagreement over the means, there was substantial agreement between the British 
reformers and the German politicians and administrators they worked with about the ends to 
be achieved, and what both considered to be democratic values. German politicians agreed 
that the electoral system should promote stable government with an effective but loyal 
opposition and that it should discourage extreme or ‘freak’ parties, as Ingrams called 
them.
116
 They agreed on the need to protect individual rights and safeguard the individual 
against excessive demands from an authoritarian government.
117
 They were sympathetic to 
the principles of decentralisation and the development of local responsibility. Those 
attending British-run local government schools pointed out inconsistencies between the 
principles they were taught and increased centralisation in Britain, such as the 
nationalisation of locally managed hospitals within the newly created NHS. As Ebsworth later 
related, such inconsistencies ‘genuinely shocked the German audience.’
118
  
Ingrams, like many of his contemporaries, displayed an arrogant belief in the superiority of 
the British character and way of life due, in his view, to nurture rather than nature and the 
favourable physical environment of ‘Island Britain’, contrasted with ‘the plains of 
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 But he did not have sufficient authority within the British administration to 
impose his views. When he encountered opposition among German politicians, the British 
authorities backed down, arguing, as Hynd did in July 1946, that it ‘would be wrong to 
impose a British system arbitrarily on the Germans.’
120
 Ingrams treated Germans as ignorant 
natives, doubting their ability to ‘think for themselves’ or understand complex issues such as 
proportional systems of voting in democratic elections. At the same time he possessed a 
sincere belief that his actions were in the Germans’ best interests. The British, he wrote, had 
‘a great record in helping other nations and races along the path to true democracy’ and the 
best British administrators were ‘guided by the three principles of honesty of purpose, just 
dealing and humanity’.
121
 Such views could appear plausible in the 1940s, before 
decolonisation resulted, in many newly independent countries, in bitter conflict and 
government by dictatorship, rather than liberal democracy.  
Historians have generally considered the early British attempts to introduce democracy in 
post-war Germany to be a failure.
122
 Some of the features which Ingrams considered to be 
fundamental to the British democratic ‘way of life’, such as the need to vote for an individual 
rather than a party and the strict separation between an elected and unpaid ‘Leader of the 
Council’ and a professional salaried ‘Town Clerk’, no longer apply in Britain, let alone in 
Germany. Local government has lost much of its power to act independently of central 
government, in areas such as health, education and housing. Elected mayors in London and 
other cities now combine an elected role with paid executive responsibilities, (as has long 
been the case in the US), and the increasing use of special advisers appointed directly by 
government ministers has started to erode the long-standing British principle of an 
independent, non-political, civil service.  
Many of Ingams’ proposals, such as changes to electoral procedure and the abolition of the 
position of Bürgermeister, were heavily criticised by contemporaries and never fully 
implemented, but this does not imply that his attempt to reform local government in Germany 
should be ignored. Perhaps the most important contribution of the British during the 
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occupation, in this as in other fields, was not that they succeeded or failed in imposing their 
particular conception of democracy, but that they proposed an alternative model for the 
future that was different from both the former Nazi and Weimar models. They argued and 
debated with leading German politicians what kind of system was most appropriate, initially 
at local and regional level and then for the Federal Republic, and in so doing discovered 
shared values as well as differences. When viewed in this way, the occupation was not a 
time of ‘forced re-orientation’ dictated by the Allies, as proposed by some historians,
123
 but a 
period of dialogue and debate and the start of a successful and productive learning process, 
which as Ulrich Herbert and others have shown,
124
 continued through the following decades 
with the liberalisation of West German society in the 1960s and the fall of communism in the 
East in the 1980s and 1990s, to the present. 
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5  Austen Albu and Allan Flanders: International socialist visions of 
political renewal: February 1946 - December 1947 
 
‘The Berlin battle must be won –  




‘We may all agree that the hope of realising the Just State in our time is a receding dream. 
Its achievement will be the responsibility of those who follow us. 




Austen Albu and Allan Flanders were appointed to positions in the Political Division of the 
Control Commission by John Hynd, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and minister 
responsible for Germany.
3
 All three had been active in socialist organisations before and 
during the war, in the Fabian Society, the Labour Party, and various fringe groups that 
attempted to influence Labour Party policy.
4
 They were also closely associated with German 
socialist refugees who fled to Britain from Nazi Germany. According to a former official at his 
department, Hynd owed his appointment to his contacts with German exiles.
5
 Albu had close 
links with a small but influential socialist splinter group, Neu Beginnen, and Flanders was the 
leading member of the Socialist Vanguard Group, the British arm of a group founded in 
Germany with international pretensions, the Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund, 
translated into English as Militant Socialist International, but usually referred to by its initials, 
ISK. 
                                                     
1
 Churchill College Archives (henceforward CAC), Albu papers (henceforward AP) 12/3, Germany, correspondence 
1946, letter from Austen Albu to his wife, Rose, 16 Feb. 1946  
2
 Modern Records Centre, Warwick University (henceforward MRC), Socialist Vanguard Group papers 
(henceforward SVG), MSS.173/3/4, Minutes Agendas of Exec: 1943-48, personal message to members of the 
Socialist Vanguard Group 
3
 For Albu’s appointment by Hynd see Austen Albu, Back Bench Technocrat, unpublished autobiography, in CAC, 
AP15, pII/33. For Flanders’ appointment by Hynd see Mary Saran, Never Give Up (London: Oswald Wolff, 1976), 
p95 and MRC SVG MSS.173/3/4, report of SVG executive meeting on 18 Dec. 1945.  
John Kelly, Ethical Socialism and the Trade Unions: Allan Flanders and the British Industrial Relations Reform, 
(New York & Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), p44 and Denis Healey, The Time of my Life (London: Michael Joseph, 
1989), p88, appear to be incorrect in stating that Flanders was appointed by Ernest Bevin. 
4
 Hynd and Flanders were both active in the Fabian Society in Sheffield during the war. Hynd was also associated 
with the Socialist Clarity Group, founded by Albu and Patrick Gordon-Walker after the Socialist League, led by 
Stafford Cripps, was disaffiliated from the Labour Party. See AP 7/2, letters from Hynd to Albu, 5 and 29 Jan. 1940. 
5
 Reusch, Deutsches Berufsbeamtentum p101, p259. Hynd was a self-taught railway official who spoke several 
languages fluently, including German. He was elected MP for Sheffield Attercliffe in a by-election in 1944. Apart 
from his contacts with German exiles, he had no experience which would have made him a suitable candidate as 
Minister for Germany. For his contacts with German exiles see Churchill College Archives, Hynd  papers, 3/4, 
‘Personal correspondence about Germany or with Germans 1944-70’; Ulrich Reusch, ‘Das Porträt: John Burns 
Hynd (1902-1971)’, Geschichte im Westen, Vol.1 No.1 (1986); Ludwig Eiber, Die Sozialdemokratie in der 
Emigration (Bonn: J H W Dietz Nachfolger, 1998), pXLV, pCXV, p655, p745, p840; Mark Minion, ‘Left, Right or 
European? Labour and Europe in the 1940s: The case of the Socialist Vanguard Group’ European Review of 




Albu and Flanders’ socialist views and contacts with comrades from different national, social 
and cultural backgrounds gave them a different perspective from the high ranking soldiers 
and administrators considered previously. They wanted to change the world for the better, 
not preserve the established social order and their own privileged position within it. They had 
an international outlook and believed that inequalities in society, between rich and poor, 




There were not many active socialists in senior positions in the British Military Government 
and Control Commission for Germany, so Albu and Flanders were not typical of the British 
governing elite in occupied Germany, but their experience is interesting for two reasons: they 
were personal appointees of John Hynd, the government minister responsible for Germany, 
and they had strong links with German socialists. A discussion of the difficulties they 
encountered can help answer a question which has intrigued historians of the occupation: 
why did a Labour Government in Britain not implement a more overtly socialist policy in 
Germany?
7
 German socialists, especially those in exile, expected to take power after the 
Nazi State had been defeated and believed that a Labour government in Britain would help 
them to achieve this.
8
 Albu and Flanders tried to support their German socialist comrades 
but found they had limited scope to implement policies they considered necessary to achieve 
constructive change. They returned to Britain at the end of 1947 disappointed with their 
achievements and with a pessimistic outlook for the future.  
This chapter examines, firstly, their personal backgrounds and experience, political activities 
before and during the war and the nature of their links with German socialists. It then 
discusses what they and the groups they were associated with aimed to achieve in post-war 
Germany. The outcome of their work is examined, with a view to assessing their contribution 
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to the process of political renewal and the limitations on their scope for action as members of 
the occupation authority.  
 
5.1   Personal background, political activities and links with German socialists 
Austen Albu and Neu Beginnen 
 
‘From these highly intelligent people I not only learnt a great deal  
about the history and events leading to the Nazi victory but also  





      Austen Albu, by Bassano, 1950 © National Portrait Gallery 
 
Austen Albu was appointed in February 1946 on a temporary contract as head of the 
‘German Political Department’ in the Political Division of the Control Commission. Three 
months later he was promoted to the influential position of Deputy Chairman of the newly 
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formed ‘Governmental Sub-Commission’ and remained in post until he returned to Britain in 
November 1947.  
He was born in 1903 into a moderately prosperous British Jewish family. His paternal 
grandfather immigrated to Britain from Berlin and his mother’s family had lived in the West of 
England since the eighteenth century. He went to school at Tonbridge,
10
 but was not very 
successful academically. After training as an engineer at the City and Guilds College,
11
 he 
moved to Newcastle where he met his future wife and became a socialist, appalled at the 
living conditions in some of the Tyneside boroughs and ‘dissatisfied with the hypocrisy of the 
middle-class ethos in which I had been brought up and with the military nationalism which 
had inevitably accompanied the [first world] war.’
12
 After a brief flirtation with the theatre, he 
settled down, married and obtained a well-paid job as works manager for Aladdin Lamps, 
who were planning to build a factory in West London. He spent a year in the United States to 
learn the business, returned to London and opened the factory in 1931. He continued with 
his political activities, joining the Socialist League when it was formed in 1932. He was also 
active in the Fabian Society and in 1933 was elected chairman of his local constituency 
Labour Party in Uxbridge.
13
  
Albu was close to a small but influential group of German socialist exiles, Neu Beginnen.
14
 
The group had been founded in Germany as an elite cadre of revolutionary socialists, the 
‘Org.’ which recruited members from both the socialist SPD and communist KPD. Internal 
differences over the best strategy to pursue after Hitler’s accession to power in 1933, when 
all socialist parties were banned, led to some members going into exile, whereas others 
decided to continue to oppose the Nazis from within Germany. At first they avoided 
detection, but in 1935-36 a resistance ‘cell’ was discovered by the Gestapo and its members 
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tried and sentenced to prison for up to five years. In 1939 after the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, the group’s ‘foreign office’ (Auslandsbüro) moved from Prague to London. 
Some members emigrated again to the United States after the fall of France, some stayed in 
Germany, and around twenty spent the war in in Britain, where they formed a loose group of 
intellectuals, well connected with parts of British academia and the media.  
Albu first met representatives of the group in London in the 1930s. He and his wife, Rose, 
visited Neu Beginnen members in Prague and later in Paris.
15
 In 1935 they went to Berlin 
where Rose, apparently without the knowledge of her husband, met the lawyer acting for a 
member who had been captured and was on trial.
16
 Neu Beginnen members stayed at Albu’s 
house in London after arriving in Britain as refugees. The historian Francis Carsten, for 
example, related how he stayed with them after leaving Amsterdam in 1939, before being 
offered a fellowship at Wadham College, Oxford.
17
  
Patrick Gordon-Walker, a friend of the Albus and a don at Oxford, had made contact with 
Neu Beginnen on his visits to Germany in the early 1930s.
18
 In 1937, he and Albu founded a 
new organisation, the Socialist Clarity Group, with, as Albu wrote in his memoirs, ‘two or 
three of our German and Austrian comrades’
19
 now in exile in London. British members of 
the group included William Warbey, later a left-wing Labour MP, Michael Chance, an 
ethologist who inter alia attempted to explain the rise of Nazism in terms of social 
pathology
20
 and Jon Kimche, a journalist and co-author with his brother David of Secret 
Roads, a history of Jewish migration to Palestine.
21
 
Both Neu Beginnen and the ISK faced persecution and operated underground in Germany 
after Hitler’s seizure of power. The Socialist Clarity Group made plans to do the same if 
Hitler invaded Britain. As a Jew, Albu was at particular risk and concerned for his safety and 
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that of his family, which made his struggle against the Nazis personal as well as political.
22
 
During the war, he made tentative arrangements to leave for the United States if necessary 
and ‘organise resistance from there.'
23
 His wife and family had already moved to the US.
24
 
He referred to his feelings about going as a Jew to Germany immediately after the war only 
occasionally in his letters, diaries and subsequent memoirs.
25
 In June 1946 he visited a 
distant relation of his in Berlin, Käthe Schmidt, born Albu. He wrote to his wife that her 
reaction on meeting him ‘only increased my ambivalence towards this extraordinary nation. 
How these people are still alive & (nearly) sane is beyond me.’
26
 In his memoirs, he added 
after describing meeting another relative: ‘Only those who lived during those appalling years 
while the Nazis ruled Germany can appreciate my astonishment and emotion at first 
discovering these two relatives alive.’
27
 
Albu wrote in his memoirs that his links with Neu Beginnen contributed to the development of 
his political thinking. His political education, which had started under the influence of Wells 
and Shaw, R.H. Tawney, the Clarion Dramatic Society and the Independent Labour Party, 
progressed through discussions with his friends in Neu Beginnen to a better appreciation of 
‘the brutality of fascism’ and an interest in the psychology of human behaviour. It led him to 
adopt ‘a more pragmatic and sceptical view of the possibilities of rapid political change’, 
confirmed his ‘dislike of Communist methods’ and reinforced his belief that ‘in Britain 
significant change would only be achieved by a reinvigorated Labour Party.’
28
 His political 
development eventually resulted in a firm commitment to technocratic democratic socialism. 
As Labour MPs in the 1950s and 1960s, both Albu and Gordon-Walker were strong 
supporters of the revisionist, right-wing of the party. 
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Allan Flanders and the Internationaler Sozialisticher Kampfbund (ISK) 
 
‘After a fight against my love for my parents, especially my mother,  
my ideals in scientific research, and the fear of being stranded afterwards  
without trade or profession, I decided to give up any results my scholarships  





Allan Flanders, date unknown, probably 1940s
30
 
Allan Flanders succeeded Albu as head of the ‘German Political Department’ in the Control 
Commission’s Political Division, from May 1946 until the end of 1947. He had previously 
been shortlisted by Hynd for the more senior position of Regional Commissioner, but 
rejected by Attlee for not possessing the necessary experience.
31
 Flanders had close links 
with the German socialist organisation, the Internationaler Sozialistischer Kampfbund, (ISK) 
and was the leading figure in its British arm, the Socialist Vanguard Group.
32
 The ISK was 
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unusual among socialist groups in taking its ideology not from Marxist economics, but from 
the ethical principles of Kant, as interpreted by the founder of the group, Leonard Nelson, a 
professor of philosophy at Göttingen University. In keeping with Kant’s ‘categorical 
imperative’, their brand of ethical socialism included a belief in the equal moral value of all 
men and women, the need for individuals to act not in their own selfish interest but in 
accordance with rationally derived universal principles, and opposition to exploitation of all 
kinds: of peasants by landowners, of workers by capitalists, of the poor by the rich, or more 
generally of the weak by the powerful. ISK members placed an exceptionally high value on 
independent thought, believing that all problems were capable of resolution by open and 
rational discussion among suitably qualified and trained individuals. They were opposed to 
all forms of dependency which limited the ability of people to think for themselves, including 
belief in any form of revealed religion. This extended to the dependence of children on their 
parents, which, they believed, had to be counteracted by educating children from an early 
age at an institution in which they would learn to think for themselves, in accordance with 
suitable ethical principles.
33
        
The organisation was openly elitist and anti-democratic. They believed that social behaviour 
was governed by universal laws, in the same way as the physical universe was governed by 
the laws of mathematics. In their view, the best way for a group of people to make a decision 
that affected them all, was not to leave this to chance through the process of voting, but to 
entrust the decision to an elite leader or group of leaders, whose rigorous ethical training 
enabled them to act fairly and take the interests of all into account. The resulting tendency 
towards authoritarianism was tempered by a culture of open discussion, with the leaders 
consulting each other and encouraging constructive criticism.
34
 The ISK was an unusual 
organisation that can perhaps be best understood as a combination of a well-run business, 
progressive educational institution and fundamentalist religious sect, together with the 
utopian (or dystopian) elitism of the rulers of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. 
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Allan Flanders was recruited to the ISK in 1928, when he was 18 years old and still at 
school, after a chance meeting with an ISK member who was visiting Britain to recruit new 
members.
35
 After its founder, Leonard Nelson, died in 1927, the ISK’s political activities were 
led by his former assistant, Willi Eichler, while the educational side of the organisation was 
run by Minna Specht, who, with Nelson, had founded their educational establishment, the 
Walkemühle in 1924.
36
 Flanders decided to leave Britain to attend a three year course at the 
Walkemühle, in preference to attending university and pursuing a career in scientific 
research. The school was small, taking no more than six students at one time on a three 
year course for young adults aged 17-20. In addition to academic study, the curriculum 
included practical subjects, such as woodwork and metalwork, and political education in the 
form of attending local Nazi rallies and speaking out in opposition.
37
  
After a year at the school, Flanders formally applied to join the ISK. His application has 
survived in the archives and reveals the level of commitment the organisation expected of its 
members. In answer to the questions: ‘why I wish to enter the ISK’ and ‘why I am a socialist’, 
he wrote that: 
 
I am convinced it is my duty to fight against the injustice that I know to exist in the world. I 
know I can only do this by supporting the political struggle and the establishment of a just 
state … I have convinced myself that I am prepared and able to give up all claims on a 
private life and always follow the decisions of the ISK.
 38 
 
He had to be sponsored by two members, declare that he was not a member of any religious 
organisation and certify not only that he was a vegetarian, but that he had visited a 
slaughterhouse and so understood, from his personal experience of the animals’ interest in 
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life in the face of death, that it was wrong for people to exploit animals for food, when they 
could survive perfectly well without doing so.
39
 
Flanders returned to Britain in 1932, shortly before the Walkemühle was closed by the Nazis. 
Over the next ten years he worked as a door-to-door salesman and technical draughtsman 
in Sheffield and London, while living in communal houses with other members and helping to 
organise the tiny English branch of the ISK, which never comprised more than 26 
members,
40
 including three of his English comrades who had attended the Walkemühle and 
a few German ISK members who had escaped from Germany and obtained permits to enter 
Britain. Marriage and sexual relations were discouraged, as a distraction from their more 
important political work.
41
 At first, the English group referred to themselves as a branch of 
‘Militant Socialist International’ and sold copies of the (German) ISK journal translated into 
English. After the ISK was banned by the Nazis they published their own paper, The 
Vanguard, renamed Socialist Vanguard from 1936, re-launched in September 1940 as 
Commentary, and renamed from 1941 until it closed in 1979, Socialist Commentary.
42
  
In 1943, the ISK leadership, then in exile in London, decided that the English branch should 
operate independently.
43
 Though still affiliated to ISK, they adopted the name Socialist 
Vanguard Group. Ironically, given its origins, Socialist Commentary has been regarded by at 
least one historian as the ‘house-journal of Labour Party revisionists’
44
 and ‘the right wing’s 
answer to Tribune’
45
 This is perhaps overstating the case, but it is remarkable that a group 
whose origins lay in German revolutionary socialism became part of the British Labour Party 
establishment, and the journal’s editor from 1946 to 1979, Rita Hinden, was included with 
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After he left Germany at the end of 1947, Flanders spent a year in the United States, and 
then built a successful career in academia as one of the UK’s most highly respected experts 
on industrial relations. He continued to act as chair of the editorial board of Socialist 
Commentary until he died in 1973, aged 63.
47
 
Albu and Flanders had much in common and shared similar views. Flanders stayed with 
Albu in Berlin when he moved there in August 1945. Albu commented in a letter to his wife 
that ‘Allan is staying with me & we get on quite well – he is not a bit narrow-minded!’
48
 As 
Albu was the more senior and influential of the two and there is considerably more material 
relating to him in the archives, the following sections discuss his work to a greater extent 
than that of Flanders. The conclusions drawn from the material, however, relate to both as 
committed international socialists. Differences between them are discussed in the text. 
 
5.2   Democratic socialist visions for post-war Germany 
 
‘A federation of free, democratic Socialist states of Europe is the only peace settlement 




The Socialist Clarity Group 
Shortly after the outbreak of war, Albu prepared a draft ‘manifesto’ for his comrades in the 
Socialist Clarity Group. His views reflected those of his German friends in Neu Beginnen and 
many others on the political left in Britain and Germany. They argued that the war had been 
caused by the ‘ruling classes’ of all countries. In Germany, the industrialists, the ‘militarists’ 
in the army and the landowning Prussian Junkers were to blame, not the workers who, they 
believed, opposed the war and would eventually understand that their true interests lay in 
supporting a socialist revolution. The logical consequence of these views was that an Allied 
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victory would not in itself prevent a third world war, as competition among the ruling classes 
of different nationalities would continue unchecked. The only way to achieve a lasting peace 
was through the creation of a new socialist world order.
50
  
Similar views continued to be expressed during the first three years of the war in the 
Socialist Clarity Group’s journal Labour Discussion Notes. Albu and Gordon-Walker were 
two of the four members of the publications committee, so, although most articles were 
unsigned and cannot be directly attributed to any one individual, they can be taken as 
indicative of Albu’s thinking at the time. In May 1941 the journal published an article 
‘prepared following discussions with German socialists’ in response to Vansittart’s Black 
Record.
51
 Vansittart was a former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office who 
gave a series of radio talks in December 1940, arguing that all Germans were aggressive, 
militaristic, and could not be trusted. Edited extracts were published in the Sunday Times 




To counter Vansittart’s claim that all Germans were to blame for the war, not just the Nazis, 
the Labour Discussion Notes article argued that Germans were not inevitably aggressive as, 
for the greater part of its history, Germany had been ‘the battleground for other nations’ wars 
rather than themselves invaders.’ The causes of the undoubted aggression of the previous 
75 years, the article continued, lay not in the German character, but in the political and social 
structures of the German Reich created by Bismarck in 1871: the excessive power of the 
landowning Junkers, the army and the big industrialists, the ‘failure of the German middle 
classes’ and of social democracy in 1918-20, and divisions in the working class movement. 
The article concluded by claiming that the working class was the only democratic force left in 
Germany and a peaceful Europe could only be achieved by ‘a thorough and completed 
democratic revolution in Germany.’ After the end of the war and the defeat of the Nazis, the 
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From the end of 1942 there were no further articles on Germany in Labour Discussion Notes. 
Perhaps the Socialist Clarity Group felt constrained by the withdrawal of official support for 
SPD exiles by the Labour Party, following criticism in the press of German exiles living in 
Britain.
54
 There is also evidence that the views of some Neu Beginnen members were 
starting to change, and they no longer believed as firmly as they once had in the opposition 
of the working class to Hitler and the prospects for a revolution in Germany. When German 
prisoners of war were captured in large numbers in North Africa and Europe from 1943, Neu 
Beginnen members and other German exiles were involved in their interrogation and 
subsequently with re-education activities in POW camps. They realised that the great 
majority of ordinary German soldiers still believed in the ultimate victory of Nazism and that, 
as long as Hitler remained in power, the prospects for effective opposition, let alone a 
revolution within Germany, were minimal.
55
  
There is no evidence that Albu had any particular interest in post-war planning for Germany 
after the end of 1942. He was more concerned with Britain. He was interested in industrial 
psychology and production planning and control. He wrote a Fabian pamphlet on 
management and was active in the Society, joining the executive committee in 1943.
56
 He 
tried to further his political ambitions through being adopted as a Labour Party prospective 
parliamentary candidate. He was shortlisted for two constituencies but not selected.
57
 He 
wrote in his memoirs that, though excited by the Labour victory in 1945, he was disappointed 
to have played no part in it. He ‘hoped and half expected’ that the new Labour government 
would find some use for his services but, when Hynd telephoned him in early 1946 
suggesting he should go to Germany, ‘the idea of taking part in what seemed the impossible 
task of restoring democracy to Germany and deciding its future was not one I would have 
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chosen myself.’ Nevertheless, he accepted the position on a temporary contract for three 
months, with no clear brief from Hynd as to what the job entailed.
58
 
The contrast between his strong commitment to international socialism before the war, 
connections with Neu Beginnen, active political engagement with the Socialist Clarity Group 
and the Fabian Society, and his uncertainty about what to do in 1945 is striking. He wished 
to contribute to the post-war reconstruction of Britain, ideally as a Member of Parliament or 
through being offered a position by the Labour government, but was not given the 
opportunity to do so. He had strong socialist principles, but the international situation was 
very different in 1945 from the 1930s, and he was hesitant about accepting a position in 
Germany.  
The ISK, the Socialist Vanguard Group and Socialist Commentary  
The ISK had a different vision for the post-war future of Germany from Neu Beginnen. They 
were equally committed to the defeat of fascism, but did not share Neu Beginnen’s belief in 
the opposition of the working class to Hitler, or the prospects for a socialist revolution. The 
ISK worked by trying to influence organisations from within. They possessed strong 
principles, which they defined as the achievement of the ‘just state’, but were prepared to 
compromise if necessary and act pragmatically in accordance with a principle they described 
as ‘ethical realism.’
59
   
The ethical principles Flanders learnt from the ISK and at the Walkemühle were an 
undoubted influence for the rest of his life. Mary Saran, who had known and worked with him 
since his time at the school, and after emigrating to Britain in 1933 lived with him and other 
ISK members in the 1930s and 1940s in a communal house in London,
60
 wrote that ‘The 
most important influence in shaping Allan’s personality was … the Walkemühle. This is true 
of the development of his ideas, his sense of public responsibility and his method of 
teaching.’
61
 He was opposed to ‘power politics’ and the division of Europe into spheres of 
influence, calling for a socialist-led Britain to play a lead in a European federation.
62
 Until 
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1945, however, he did not show any particular interest in post-war policy for Germany and 
does not appear to have been involved in discussions with the ISK leadership on the subject. 
He joined the local Sheffield Fabian Society and in 1942 became branch secretary.
63
 In 1941 
he wrote a pamphlet, Wage Policy in Wartime, which helped him succeed in his application 
as one of three Research Assistants at the TUC, from 310 applicants.
64
 His biographer, John 
Kelly, argued that his thinking evolved over this period, 1941-45, towards abandoning 
revolutionary socialism in favour of the transformation of the economy through state 
planning. In keeping with his ISK principles, he considered that monopoly and vested 
interests were the problem, not private ownership of the means of production, and he came 
to see nationalisation as a means to achieve control of the economy, not as an end in itself.
65
 
By the end of 1945, Flanders was uncertain whether to continue at the TUC, as he 
considered the job had ‘lost most of its political importance’, but he had no alternative 
position in mind.
66
 The executive officials of the Socialist Vanguard Group discussed whether 
he should apply for the position of secretary of the Fabian Society, but were concerned that 
much of his time would be wasted in internal politics and agreed the position was not ideal.
67
 
A month later the executive met again to discuss his decision to accept a position in 
Germany. The minutes listed nine reasons for accepting, including the influence he could 
have on British policy, the influence on colleagues he would be working with, valuable new 
contacts, raising the status of the group through one of their members having such a 
responsible position and, from a personal point of view, the educational value of his working 
in a challenging position that would place high demands upon him.
68
 There was no reference 
to any specific results they hoped he could achieve. Perhaps in such a tightly knit group, this 
was taken for granted and not considered worth recording. Rather than promoting specific 
policies, they aimed to further the influence of the group through their educational activities 
and the everyday life and work of their members. 
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5.3   Promoting political renewal and a positive socialist policy 
 
‘The only real hope of a defence against authoritarianism whether of the extreme right  





In early 1946, when they left Britain to take up their positions in Germany, Albu and Flanders 
could look back to at least fifteen years of their lives dominated by the struggle against 
fascism, together with the belief that once victory had been secured it would be possible to 
create a better socialist order that would make any future war impossible. However the 
actual situation appeared uncertain and precarious, despite the Labour Party election victory 
in 1945. They neither expected nor chose to go to Germany, but both accepted the 
opportunity to do so when asked by their former political colleague and ally, John Hynd. 
They were familiar with the country through their close links with German socialist exiles in 
London, but had no clear plan for what should be done, apart from a perceived need to 
follow a ‘positive policy of social change’
70
 which, so they believed, would encourage 
democratic forces in Germany, prevent the return of National Socialism and create better 
living conditions for the great majority of the population.  
The appointment of Albu and Flanders by Hynd to influential positions in Germany, together 
with other evidence collected for this study, runs counter to the widely held view that German 
socialists in exile in London had very little influence on British policy.
71
 This was undoubtedly 
true for the duration of the war and the three month period leading to the Potsdam 
Agreement in August 1945, but not subsequently.
72
 The Labour Party, which had invited the 
SPD leadership in exile to move to London from Paris in 1940, after the defeat of France, 
ceased all official contacts and withdrew their political and financial support in 1942, in an 
acrimonious internal dispute within the Party which has been termed ‘The victory of socialist 
                                                     
69




 E.g. Charles Wheeler, Foreword to Germany 1944: The British Soldier’s Pocketbook (Kew, Richmond, Surrey: 
The National Archives, 2006), pvi 
72
 In the course of my research I have found many examples of German exiles working in various positions for 
Military Government or the Control Commission, and subsequently in influential positions in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. This study supports Reusch’s claim, made in 1980 and still valid today, that the ‘widespread view’ that the 
British made little use of the knowledge of German émigrés needed to be ‘heavily qualified’. Reusch wrote that, 
during his research on the organisational structure of the occupation, he found many examples of German exiles 
working during and after the war in Foreign Office research and intelligence departments, as legal advisors, in 
SHAEF, in the Control Commission press and other departments and in the Bizonal control office in Frankfurt. See 
Ulrich Reusch, ‘Die Londoner Institutionen der britischen Deutschlandpolitik 1943-48. Eine behördengeschichtliche 






 referring to Labour Party members who supported views expressed by the 
former Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary, Robert Vansittart.
74
 In late 1945 and 
1946, however, the position was reversed and the new Labour government showed a 
cautious but clear preference for the socialist SPD over other parties in Germany. In addition 
to John Hynd’s appointment as minister for Germany, two other Labour Party members who 
had supported the German SPD leadership in exile during the war and argued against the 
‘Vansittartists’, Philip Noel-Baker and Patrick Gordon-Walker, were given junior positions in 
the government. The ‘Fight for Freedom Publishing Company’, the organisation which had 
championed the ‘Vansittartist’ position became defunct
75
 and one of its leading supporters, 
William Gillies, was replaced as secretary of the Labour Party International Subcommittee by 
Denis Healey, who was more sympathetic to the German socialists.
76
  
Albu and Flanders therefore had some grounds for optimism in early 1946 when they took up 
their positions as members of the British Military Government. They could hope for support 
for an active socialist policy in Germany from at least some members of the government in 
London.
77
 Their friends among the German socialists in exile in London had overcome 
earlier divisions and by the end of 1945 had re-established contact with the re-formed SPD 
in Germany.
78
 Unfortunately, these early hopes were not fulfilled. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Albu and Hynd were able to secure modifications to Ingrams’ proposals for 
reform in one area, electoral procedure, which they were concerned would disadvantage the 
SPD.
79
 This section discusses Albu’s and Flanders’ relations with their British colleagues and 
the influence Albu exerted on British policy in two further areas, the campaign to prevent the 
‘Fusion’ of the socialist SPD with the communist KPD, and the devolution of power from 
British Military Government to German regional and local authorities. It concludes by 
exploring the reasons for their growing disillusionment and pessimistic outlook for the future 
political development of Germany.  
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Relations with colleagues 
Hynd, Albu and Flanders came from different social backgrounds and possessed different 
political views from the military generals and Foreign Office diplomats, so it is not surprising 
that there were differences of opinion. Montgomery wrote on the cover of one document in 
his personal papers that Hynd was ‘utterly useless.’
80
 Albu did not think highly of 
Montgomery’s political judgement either, referring to his February 1946 memorandum on 
their task in Germany as ‘a policy statement of boy scout naivete’.
81
  
The generals were not generally sympathetic towards a policy of supporting one political 
party over another. General Richards, the Commander of 8 Corps, responsible for the 
administration of Schleswig Holstein, wrote to Robertson in April 1946 complaining about 
what he considered to be political bias and interference in the work of his officers: 
I think the trouble is this. The Political Division – and it is not for me to say whether they are 
right or wrong – appear determined to put SPD members wherever they can into positions 
of authority and to eject everything to the Right of this …. The means adopted to achieve 
this tend to be underhand and consist in proving that every Right-wing person is 





Robertson’s reply was sympathetic. He confirmed that the Labour government in London 
supported the SPD and wished to see them appointed to positions of authority in Germany, 
but suggested there was a ‘conflict between this policy and that of placing in authority 
persons having the backing of the majority of the population.’
83
 Albu, in turn, considered 
Richards’ predecessor, Evelyn Barker, a ‘bloody reactionary’ who ‘practically lived with the 
Bismarck family’ and ‘got on very well with the captured German generals.’ He was appalled 
when Barker was sent to command British troops in Palestine.
84
 
It would, however, be wrong to over-emphasise the differences. Flanders objected to ‘the 
political outlook of many officers in Military Government (military and civilian)’
85
 but claimed 
to have successfully influenced the views of his immediate superiors in Political Division, 
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both of whom were traditionally minded Foreign Office diplomats.
86
 Albu’s personal diaries 
for his first four months in Germany, together with his letters to his wife over the same 
period, show that his attitude to his British colleagues was ambivalent. He had little time for 
Ingrams, whom he considered well-intentioned, but over-mechanical in his approach, 
inflexible in his ideas and ‘such a waffler’.
87
 He had more respect for the senior generals, 
some of whom appeared surprisingly receptive to his ideas. He wrote to his wife that: 
Whatever we are doing to the Germans the job of political education we are doing on the 
British army & its brighter officers is terrific. They seem to like it. The sincerity & as 




He told her that he had discussed the need for a ‘positive socialist policy’ with Generals 
Robertson, Templer and Balfour.
89
 He attempted to explain to them that socialists were 
suspicious of big business men and supposedly politically neutral administrators, who 
needed to be removed from power as much as the Nazis. In a social revolution, he 
continued, the ruling classes would have been purged, but this had not happened in 




Albu found Robertson impressive at their first meeting and they appeared to develop an 
excellent working relationship, despite differences in their background and political outlook. 
This may have been helped by a sense of mutual respect, both having trained as engineers 
and having managed sizable factories, Robertson for Dunlop in South Africa and Albu for 
Aladdin in West London. Initially, Robertson appeared to have been suspicious of Albu, 
concerned at his direct line to Hynd.
91
 However, in March he offered him a senior post in the 
administration. According to Albu, Robertson told him that they ‘needed someone like me’ 
and ‘although I wasn’t indispensable, he’d rather have me than a new man … I rather think 
that from R[obertson] it was a pretty high compliment.’
92
 The post on offer was that of 
‘Deputy Chairman of the Governmental Sub-Commission’, one of two sub-commissions that, 
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according to Robertson, would determine policy and ‘really rule the country.’
93
 The salary, at 
£2,000 plus allowances, was generous, equivalent to that of a Major General.
94
 Albu decided 
to accept and in April moved into a ‘palatial office’ in the generals’ suite in the rather grandly 
named Lancaster House, the British headquarters building in Berlin.
95
   
Yet, despite his senior position within the administration, Albu considered that his influence 
declined. To some extent this may have been due to his political isolation. He wrote to his 
wife that he felt lonely sometimes and had no friends. He told her that he got on well with his 
immediate superior, General Erskine, the Chairman of the Sub-Commission, who accepted 
his ideas and put his authority behind them, but his effectiveness was limited by the lack of 
firm policy direction from London.
96
 He wrote around the same time that he felt increasingly 
isolated: 
what with reactionary officers and utterly reactionary F.O. [Foreign Office] boys. T G 
Erskine seems both intelligent and politically reasonable. And there are many good 
soldiers. But good tho’ they are at their jobs – so many have this militarism (almost 
Prussian) repressed emotionalism [sic] which makes them give vent to the most 





His position in the administration seemed to be strengthened when he replaced Ingrams as 
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Governmental and Administrative Structure 
(SCOGAS) which, he told his wife, was the committee that would ‘do the real policy stuff on 
the future constitution of this country’,
98
 but his ability to implement policy was still limited by 
Hynd’s lack of influence in the government at home and his own lack of executive authority.  
The Fusion Campaign in Berlin 
The ‘Fusion’ campaign in Berlin in early 1946, for and against the proposed merger of the 
socialist SPD with the communist KPD, was the first time after the war that the British 
authorities in Germany openly collaborated politically with Germans, their former enemy, in 
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opposition to the declared policy of the Soviet Union, their former wartime ally.
99
 As such it 
can be considered a precursor, or the first manifestation, of the Cold War within Germany, 
and an illustration of the processes by which many democratic socialists in both Britain and 
Germany, including Albu and Flanders, started to transfer their allegiance from support for a 
wartime ‘popular front’ with the communists against fascism, to an anti-communist alliance 
with conservative political parties in Britain, the US and Western Europe, to oppose what 
they perceived as Communist Party ‘totalitarianism’.  
Fusion of the SPD and KPD was promoted by the Soviet Union, as a way of securing an 
electoral majority for a merged party that could not be achieved by the communists alone. 
The origins of the issue lay in the view, widely held among members of both parties, that had 
they worked together more effectively in the 1930s, they could have prevented Hitler and the 
Nazis seizing power. In December 1945, the two parties agreed to work together on a 
common electoral programme.
100
 In January 1946, the Central Committee of the SPD in 
Berlin, under pressure from the Soviet occupation authorities, decided in favour of the 
merger, but a significant number of SPD members remained opposed, unwilling to trust the 
KPD, fearing domination from Moscow, and recalling the disputes of the early 1930s, when 
the communists had labelled the SPD ‘social fascists’.
101
 On 1 March 1946 a meeting of SPD 
Berlin officials decided to hold a referendum on the issue, among members in the city.
102
  
Some of the British staff in the political and intelligence divisions of the Control Commission 
in Berlin had been watching developments with concern as, if the merger between the two 
parties were to go ahead, it would be possible for the Russians to control the whole city 
through an elected German administration.
103
 Furthermore, if the merger were subsequently 
approved across all four zones, Russian influence, acting through a strong combined 
German communist and socialist party, would extend to the western zones, arousing long-
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standing fears of a German-Russian alliance
104
 that could promote social revolution across 
the whole of Europe, as the Comintern had attempted to do in the 1920s.  Official British 
policy, however, was to remain neutral and not favour any one political party in Germany.
105
 
A key role in the internal German opposition to Fusion was played by around 20-30 former 
Neu Beginnen members who had remained in Germany and re-formed as a group in Berlin 
after the end of the war.
106
 Although Neu Beginnen had supported cooperation with Russia 
against Nazi Germany, the group’s members remained deeply suspicious of Communist 
Party tactics. Similar views were shared by the great majority of socialists in exile in London, 
who had resisted all attempts during the war to form a united front with the communists.
107
 
Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the SPD in the British Zone, was also firmly opposed to any 
form of cooperation with the Communist Party.  
To some extent, therefore, the Fusion campaign was a battle for control of the SPD. The 
Berlin central committee, pressurised by the Soviet Union, declared in favour of Fusion, 
while the groups which opposed a merger with the Communists, including the newly formed 
party in the British Zone and the London exiles, were supported by the Western Allies. The 
stakes were high, as it was assumed that with the Nazis discredited and officially banned in 
all zones, the SPD would win any election for a future German administration and whoever 
controlled the SPD would control Germany. 
At first, Albu took no part in these developments. Though fully aware of the situation, he 
appeared uncertain what to do. Two days after his arrival, on 3 February 1946, he joined a 
meeting arranged by Christopher Steel, the chief of the Political Division, with Otto 
Grotewohl and Gustav Dahrendorf, the leaders of the Berlin SPD central committee, who 
appeared to be looking for British support to resist Soviet pressure for Fusion, even though 
they had already declared in favour of the merger. The meeting was not productive.
108
 Albu 
asked if an official statement from the Labour Party, opposing Fusion, would be helpful, but 
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they doubted if this would make any difference.
109
 Two weeks later Albu met Kurt Schmidt, 
the leader of the Neu Beginnen group in Berlin and put him in touch with Schumacher, whom 
his British colleagues had invited to Berlin to support those opposed to Fusion.
110
  
In early March, after the decision was taken at a meeting of Berlin SPD officials to hold a 
referendum in the city on the issue, Albu finally decided that he needed to become involved 
in the campaign. Using language that demonstrated the strength of his feelings, he noted in 
his diary that he had decided to stay in Berlin until the referendum on 31 March ‘to try to 
organise the majority which was being raped by the Russ[ians] & the KPD.’
111
 He wrote later 
that he was ‘risking his reputation’ as the official British policy at this time was not to engage 
in internal German political disputes. The precariousness of his position was illustrated when 
a small group of left wing Labour MPs in London took the opposite line to his, and sent a 
message to the Berlin SPD central committee in support of Fusion. Albu and his colleagues 
felt they had to counter this by holding a press conference to state that the message 
reflected the views of only a small part of a very much larger Parliamentary Labour Party.
112
 
The campaign for and against Fusion became intense on both sides. The Russians, fearful 
of the result, banned the referendum in their sector of Berlin, but it took place with US, 
French and British support in the western sectors of the city. Albu still felt unable to declare 
British opposition to Fusion openly, but on the day of the referendum he wrote an article in 
the British licensed newspaper in Berlin urging SPD members to vote.
113
 This amounted to 
the same thing, as newspapers in the Soviet sector had announced there was no need for a 
referendum, as seven out of the eight SPD districts in their sector had already decided in 
favour of a united party.
114
 The result of the referendum was a decisive majority against 
Fusion, though voters also endorsed a second question, by a smaller majority, which 
supported collaboration with the communists but not a merger of the parties.
115
 As a result, 
the SPD survived as an independent party in the western sectors of Berlin, whereas those 
SPD members who supported Fusion went ahead and merged with the KPD to form the 
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Socialist Unity Party (SED), the governing party in the Soviet Zone and subsequently in East 
Germany, until reunification in 1990.
116
  
The result could be seen as a success for Albu, in securing victory for his Neu Beginnen 
friends and the independence of the SPD in Berlin and the British Zone, but it was also a 
failure, as the SPD remained divided and he was unable to prevent its merger with the 
Communists in the Soviet Zone. The issue demonstrated how little scope he had for positive 
action. British support for the opponents of Fusion was organised mainly through Intelligence 
staff working for the Control Commission’s political division in Berlin and subject to approval 
by Foreign Office officials in London.
117
 In this as in many other issues, British influence was 
limited to creating space for the Germans to make their own decisions. It did not extend to 
determining the result. 
 
Ordinance no. 57: The devolution of power to the German Länder  
 
‘Some of you may think we are going a little too far in putting so much on the 




Before leaving Germany in 1947, Albu oversaw the implementation of a number of 
governmental reforms, which came under his area of responsibility.
119
 These included the 
reorganisation of the Länder in the British zone and the promulgation in December 1946 of 
Military Government Ordinance no. 57, which provided for the devolution of powers to local 
German administrations on a wide range of subjects, including education, local government 
and health. Ulrich Reusch has argued that Ordinance 57 represented a turning point in 
British policy,
120
 and could be considered the ‘Occupation Statute for the British Zone’ as it 
defined the powers of the German regional Land governments and legally regulated their 
relationship with the British occupation authorities.
121
 According to Reusch, the policy of 
devolution of power was initiated by the Foreign Office,
122
 but this study tends to support 
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Albu’s claim in his memoirs
123
 that British policy on the issue of the devolution of power and 
future federal structure of Germany was largely based on his and his colleagues’ work in 
Germany, referring in particular to the view, outlined by Bevin in his speech in Parliament on 
22 October 1946, that Germany should ‘avoid the two extremes of a loose confederation of 
autonomous states and a unitary centralised state.’
124
 
The origins of Ordinance 57 and a policy of devolution can be traced to a memorandum 
Robertson wrote a year earlier, in September 1945, on ‘The Evolution of Control of 
Government in the British Zone’ from the military Corps Commanders to civilian regional 
Commissioners.
125
 Following comments from Control Commission staff, Montgomery issued 
two instructions, in December 1945 and March 1946. At the end of the first, he stated clearly 
that devolution of power to Germans was an essential part of the transfer from military to 
civilian rule: 
The real essence of the change … is that under Military Government we govern our zone 
through the Germans … Civil control, on the other hand, means that the Germans govern 




His second instruction, in March 1946, made a similar point more forcibly: ‘the best people to 
deal with the many difficulties which beset GERMANY today are the Germans’, and there 
was a need to ‘build up German administrations in our zone.’
127
 
The Foreign Office, at this stage, was reluctant to intervene directly, preferring to observe 
and comment from the sidelines. An official minuted that Montgomery’s March memo was a 
‘valuable piece of stocktaking’ and the views expressed looked ‘as if they owe a lot to 
General Robertson’.
128
 Another official commented that it was an ‘impressive document’, 
though Troutbeck, head of the German Political Department, added a cautionary note 
against proceeding too quickly: 
Yes, but one wishes that we might be handing over a going concern to these new German 
administrators. They will be weak and untried organisations, hardly capable of coping with 
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It was not until June 1946, following the failure of the Allies at the Paris Council of Foreign 
Ministers to agree a joint policy towards Germany, that Foreign Office officials decided to 
take a more active role.
130
 In order to minimise the risk of over-strengthening the powers of 
any future central German government, Patrick Dean, who had replaced Troutbeck as head 
of the Foreign Office German Political Department, laid down three principles from which all 
policy should derive: maximum decentralisation of power from the centre to the regions and 
localities; maximum devolution of power and responsibility to the Germans; and, subject to 
the above, maximum acceptability to the Germans of future constitutional arrangements, to 




In parallel with these developments, Albu, in his capacity as Deputy-President of the 
Governmental Sub-Commission, had been working on the issue of the future governmental 
structure of Germany. In June, he circulated a paper, ‘Germany: The nature of Federal 
Government’, which showed he was thinking along similar lines to Dean in emphasising 
decentralisation, devolution of power and acceptability to the Germans, except that in 
accordance with his socialist principles, Albu placed a greater emphasis on the need for 




The key point Albu made in the paper was consistent with Foreign Office thinking, that the 
failure by the Allies to agree on central administrations for Germany as a whole (at the Paris 
Council of Foreign Ministers which was then in session) made it necessary to reorganise the 
structure of government in the British Zone. After referring to federal arrangements in the 
United States, Australia, Canada and Switzerland as possible models, he concluded that: ‘if 
it is desired to weaken the future power of Germany to make war, as great a degree of 
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decentralisation should be imposed as possible.’ However, he qualified this by adding that if 
the central government did not have sufficient power to ensure stable social and economic 
conditions, there would be ‘violent pressure’ towards centralisation which could not be 
resisted. He envisaged a gradual development, delegating powers to the Länder immediately 
but requiring all German decisions at central or at regional level to be subject to Allied veto: 
In this way a radical change in the structure of the German state could be brought about 
immediately and for an adequate time would remain under supervision until there was a 




Dean travelled to Berlin in August for a series of high level meetings with Robertson, Albu, 
Flanders and William Strang, the political adviser to the Military Governor and the principal 
Foreign Office contact within the Control Commission. Dean reported on his return to London 
that their views were closer than he had expected.
134
 With the approval of the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign Office by-passed Hynd, who was on holiday in France, and invited 
Robertson and Strang to a meeting with Bevin in Paris to discuss a new draft directive, 
subsequently approved by the Prime Minister and Cabinet on 9 September 1946, instructing 
the Military Governor to accelerate ‘the process of decentralisation territorially and devolution 
of powers to the Germans in the British Zone.’
135
 
Before going to Berlin in August, Dean had prepared an extensive brief, outlining the 
reasons for a policy of decentralisation.
136
 During the visit, marginal notes were added to the 
brief by Strang, including a comment that the Germans would not be attracted by a 
‘Staatenbund’, a loose federation of independent states, but would accept a ‘Bundestaat’, a 
federal state. In a letter to his wife on 14 August, two days before Dean’s visit, Albu used 
similar language to describe the current, de-centralised, political structure in the US Zone, as 
either a body of three dictators, one in each of the Länder in the zone, or ‘a Staatenbund – 
that most inefficient of governments’ and widely disliked within the Control Commission.
137
 
These terms had not been used previously in Foreign Office documents. This tends to 
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confirm Albu’s claim that the formulation of policy as a compromise between the two options 
of a Staatenbund and Bundestaat originated within the Control Commission in Germany, and 
was subsequently adopted by the Foreign Office and by Bevin in his speech on 22 October. 
Whereas the Foreign Office were advocating the maximum degree of decentralisation, the 
Control Commission, advised by Albu, fought a determined and largely successful rearguard 
action, not so much, as claimed by Reusch, to preserve their ability to impose a British 
model of government,
138
 but to maintain sufficient powers within central government to 
enable centralised social and economic planning. The Control Commission’s response to the 
Foreign Office September 1946 directive, for example, stated that an adequate standard of 
living ‘would be unattainable without a considerable degree of central economic planning’, 
the SPD, ‘left-wing parties’ and Trade Unions were opposed to an ‘excessive degree of 
decentralisation’ and their own proposals were a reasonable compromise between maximum 
de-centralisation and ‘the necessity for ensuring economic control at the centre.’
139
 Rather 
than the Labour Government taking the lead in implementing a socialist policy in Germany, it 
appears that Albu and his colleagues in the Control Commission were resisting Foreign 
Office pressure for ‘maximum’ de-centralisation, so that a future SPD central government in 
Germany could operate a planned economy on socialist principles. 
Ordinance 57, which gave practical effect to the policy of devolution, came into effect from 1
 
December 1946.
140 It was not well received by German politicians who objected to it on the 
basis that too much authority was reserved to the Military Government. Albu responded to 
these criticisms in a talk to the German press in February 1947, in which he referred again to 
the need to preserve adequate central government powers:  
The powers which have been reserved to the centre are those powers which are necessary 
to ensure the economic revival of Germany and to enable a reasonable degree of economic 
planning and of the distribution of very scarce raw materials … I must again emphasise that 
until there is a Central Government for Germany there is no other way than the exercising 
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Albu placed a greater emphasis than the Foreign Office on those powers which, to quote the 
British Zone Review, Military Government had ‘reserved to itself in trust for a Government of 
Germany to be established at an unforeseeable date.’
142
 However, it became clear over the 
following year that the reserved powers were unlikely to be exercised by a future German 
government in the way he had hoped, due to increased US influence over economic issues 
in the combined British and US ‘Bizone’, established on 1 January 1947. Furthermore, in a 
divided Germany of three western zones, the SPD was unlikely to obtain a sufficient majority 
to implement socialist policies. Albu grew increasingly pessimistic as to the prospects for a 
socialist Germany and his ability to make a positive contribution to the British occupation.    
By the time he left Germany in November 1947, Albu believed there was little more he and 
his colleagues could achieve. He was no longer especially concerned about security, writing 
that ‘this time we really have destroyed the German army, both its personnel and its physical 
assets.’
143
 Nor was he unduly concerned, as he had been at the time of the Fusion 
campaign, that a united Germany might be dominated by the communists, now ascribing this 
view to the Foreign Office.
144
 In a British Forces Network broadcast in March 1947, he said 
that, now the Land governments had taken office, ‘the giving of orders no longer rests with 
Military Government officers.’ German administrations needed to be monitored and 
controlled, and the British had to act as ‘guides, philosophers and friends’ of the German 
politicians.
145
 Flanders used the same words to describe the ‘most important sphere of his 
work’ in his notes to his comrades on leaving Germany.
146
  
In September 1947 Albu recommended that the size of the British Control Commission 
should be reduced to 2,178, roughly a tenth of its current size.
147
 Reductions of this 
magnitude were not achieved until after 1950,
148
 but the overall direction was clear. Apart 
from exercising the power of veto, there was little the British could do, as an occupying 
power, to promote either democratic renewal or a positive socialist policy. Those who 
remained would have to depend on their personal relationships with their German colleagues 
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and friends to promote what they considered positive reforms. Albu and Flanders decided 
they had done what they could in Germany and it was time to return to Britain. 
Disengagement from Germany and return to Britain 
Albu’s achievements in the area of governmental reorganisation did not change his 
pessimistic outlook on the economic and political situation, which dated back to his 
perception acquired during the Fusion campaign soon after his arrival in Germany, that 
Russian tactics were similar to those of the Nazis and economic conditions would favour the 
communists rather than democratic socialists. He wrote in his diary on March 25 1946, after 
posters supporting Einheit (a united party) appeared in Berlin: 
Fresh Einheit [Unity] posters every day, all over the town. Demagogic & nationalistic 




The posters actually said ‘Ein Ziel, Ein Weg, Einheit’ (one aim, one path, unity) which was 
uncomfortably close to the Nazi slogan ‘Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer’.
150
 Albu set out his 
conclusions in a memorandum written during the campaign. There was a ‘growing 
realization’, he wrote, that Fusion would be ‘but another step in the squeezing out of the 
other Allies from Berlin.’ He believed that the SPD was the only party which could gain the 
support of the working class, resist Communist pressure and remain democratic. It would, 
however, ‘lose all influence in the eyes of the Germans if it appears as a puppet of the 
Western powers.’ Hence any scope for direct action by the Allies to promote political reform 
was limited. Rather than looking to the British to implement a policy of social change, he 
recommended that the best way to counter communist influence was for German advisory 




Three months later, after a visit to the Ruhr that left him deeply depressed by the economic 
conditions he encountered there, he wrote to his wife: 
I don’t know if I can stick it. This is the worst area, of course. The people are on the verge of 
starvation, their industries are running out of raw material, pits & factories are closing down, 
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there’s no material for re-building…. It seems a nonsense to be talking politics under the 




Back in Berlin, he wrote a memo to Robertson, stating that their political activities were 
meaningless in the current economic situation. ‘The only voice that will be listened to is that 
of a hysterical nationalist demagogy’, now provided by the Communist Party, which was 
attracting former officers and Nazis into its ranks, just as the Nazi party in the 1920s had 
recruited former soldiers from the Freikorps. Echoing Montgomery’s memo of 1 May, he 
wrote that the new nationalists would ‘see the opportunity to rebuild Germany from the East’: 
We are, in fact, in danger of creating a condition of chaos in our Zone in which the work of 
the Control Commission, as such, will become futile. All that will be possible will be military 
occupation to prevent the chaos spreading beyond the boundaries of Germany and, 





In March 1947, after a year in post, he wrote to Hynd that ‘on some quite crucial matters the 
Foreign Office have departed from the principles which I think both you and I felt were 
essential here.’ He was concerned that economic conditions, aggravated by the influx of 
millions of refugees, would ‘create a demographic and economic position in Germany which 
was just impossible.’ He was also ‘intensely pessimistic’ about the Bizonal agreement 
recently concluded with the Americans and feared that the continued policy of reparations 
would make it increasingly difficult to secure cooperation with local German administrations. 
Finally, if the Russians continued their current policy of taking reparations from current 
production, there would be no alternative to ‘bringing the iron curtain down.’
154
 
In April 1947 Hynd was replaced as Minister for Germany by Frank Pakenham, Lord 
Longford, and responsibility for the British administration of Germany was transferred to the 
Foreign Office from the Control Office for Germany and Austria (COGA), which until then had 
functioned as separate ministry. Albu stayed until October to complete his work of 
governmental reorganisation, before returning home to find another job and pursue his 
ambition of entering Parliament.  
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Allan Flanders left Germany shortly after Albu, equally disillusioned. An article in Socialist 
Commentary, published in November 1946 while he was still in Germany,
155
 endorsed British 
government policy of promoting economic recovery and making Germany, or at least the 
British Zone, self-supporting, but criticised the failure to implement a positive socialist policy. 
A decision to take the coal and heavy industries into public ownership had not been 
implemented. No progress had been made on land reform. Currency reform was ‘long 
overdue’ and, in the meantime, the black market flourished, preventing sound economic 
development. The government in London had failed to provide clear guidance or a coherent 
plan for the economy. Many military government officers regarded any plan as ‘too 
socialistic’ and spoke contemptuously of the Labour government in their officers’ messes. 
Within Germany there was a shortage of suitably qualified socialists able to take over 




In a report to his friends in the Socialist Vanguard Group in October 1947, shortly before he 
returned to England,
157
 Flanders emphasised the personal benefits of his going to Germany, 
but could point to few concrete achievements. The work had been an invaluable personal 
experience and had given him an insight into the workings of the Foreign Office. His 
department had been responsible for a few ‘restrictive measures’, banning those who made 
overtly nationalist speeches from political activities. He claimed to have influenced British 
policy on dismantling and socialisation (ie public ownership) of industry, but although his 
views were adopted by the head of the Political Division, neither were ultimately successful – 
he was not able to prevent dismantling and socialisation of industry was never implemented. 
Perhaps surprisingly, given his earlier position at the TUC and his later role as an expert on 
industrial relations in Britain, he made no mention of any engagement with German trade 
unions. He was able to help his ‘own comrades’ in the ISK in a few minor ways, such as 
approving the licensing of a new journal Geist und Tat (Spirit and Deed), edited by Willi 
Eichler, the leader of the ISK who had now returned to Germany. In general, however, he 
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wrote that the main purpose of his work appeared to be negative, that of ‘stopping worse 
things happening.’
158
 The one ‘hopeful factor’ he could point to was the strength of the 
German Social Democratic Party  (SPD), his ability to assist in its development, and the 




The ISK had been dissolved at the end of 1945. Most of its members joined the SPD and 
returned to Germany. Some played an influential role in the post-war history of the Federal 
Republic, including former leader, Willi Eichler, who led the reform programme that 
culminated at Bad Godesberg with the SPD discarding its former Marxist ideology and 
adopting a democratic socialist model.
160
 The Socialist Vanguard Group survived a few more 
years, but by 1950 there seemed little purpose in continuing with the organisation in its 
current form and the executive decided to dissolve it, to be replaced by a looser and less 
formal organisation, the Socialist Union.
161
  
Neu Beginnen also ceased to operate as a separate group in 1945. Some of its former 
members remained in Britain, some returned to Germany and joined the SPD,
162
 and some 
spent long periods working in both countries. The reason for the group’s existence had been 
their opposition to fascism. Once Hitler was defeated, not by opposition from within 
Germany, but by the Allies, there was little reason for Neu Beginnen to continue as a 
separate organisation.  
 
5.4   Conclusion 
In the final paragraph of his unpublished memoirs, Albu wrote that: 
At the end of a life of so many disappointments I must continue to believe in man as a 
thinking as well as a feeling animal; in the possibility of rational enquiry and argument and 
to keep the hope that progress in the quality of his life is still possible. The steps by which 
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these hopes and beliefs are to be achieved will not, however, be taken by my generation; 




These words encapsulated both his and Flanders’ transition from early idealism, through the 
desperate struggle against fascism, to post-war pragmatic democratic socialism. Soon after 
his return from Germany, Albu was selected as parliamentary candidate for Edmonton, 
following the death of Evan Durbin. He recalled the election campaign ‘with something 
approaching horror’, having to bear the brunt of the mid-term unpopularity of the Labour 
Government.
164
 He was elected with a greatly reduced majority, but recovered in subsequent 
elections and continued to represent the constituency until he retired in 1974. Apart from a 
brief period as a junior minister from 1965-6, he remained on the back benches. He had little 
involvement in foreign affairs or matters concerning Germany, but was an early supporter of 
Britain’s entry to the Common Market. Perhaps his earlier belief in a ‘federation of free, 
democratic Socialist states of Europe’ played a part in this, though it was to be a capitalist, 
not a socialist community of nations that helped to make another war in (Western) Europe 
impossible.  
Albu and Flanders were in a difficult position and had limited scope for positive action. As 
outsiders in what was effectively a military government, they had neither the authority that 
Montgomery and his generals possessed as military commanders, nor the control of the 
bureaucratic apparatus of the Control Commission exercised by Robertson. Working for 
policy-making divisions at headquarters, they had no opportunity to exercise direct authority 
on the ground. Furthermore, their opportunities for indirect influence, through informal links 
and discussions with like-minded colleagues, were limited. Flanders was able to offer a 
degree of support to his German socialist colleagues through powers of licencing over 
political parties, the media and appointments, though, as he admitted in his notes on leaving 
Germany, this was more a negative achievement in preventing worse things happening than 
the positive influence he desired. Albu’s genuine achievements in helping to create a federal 
structure in the British Zone were overshadowed by his pessimism regarding economic 
prospects, democratic development, and the lack of any fundamental social and political 
change. 
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There were, of course, many reasons why the Federal Republic of Germany did not embark 
on a socialist course when it was founded in 1949, and why its first government was led by 
the CDU, under Adenauer, rather than the SPD, under Schumacher. These included the 
continued strength and influence of traditional German elites in the bureaucracy and industry 
and their ability to adjust to changed circumstances, US opposition to a planned economy 
and the socialisation of industry, and the preferences of the electorate as demonstrated in 
the first federal election in August 1949, which resulted in a narrow victory for the CDU over 
the SPD. However, a further contributory factor was that, despite the victory of the Labour 
Party in Britain in 1945 and the British government’s cautious support for German socialists, 
the British Military Government was run by members of a conservative British professional 
establishment, comprising military generals, diplomats and professional administrators, who 
had no interest in promoting socialism, and did not share Albu’s and Flanders’ beliefs that 
the working class was the only democratic force left in Germany in 1945, or that the only way 
to prevent a resurgence of fascism was through actively promoting socialist policies. 
On Albu’s resignation from the Control Commission, General Robertson sent him a letter of 
appreciation of the work he had done, which reflected the nature of their relationship and the 
difference in approach between them. Albu was disappointed because his concrete 
achievements did not match up to his original hopes and expectations. Robertson replied 
with his understanding of their task in Germany: 
You say that you wonder what you have achieved. Each of us makes a contribution, no 
man more than that, to the British effort in Germany. I believe very firmly that history will 
justify the British effort. Your contribution has been to bring to bear on our problems the 
influence of your liberal and well-trained mind. That is a very worth-while contribution, and 




The contribution Austen Albu and Allan Flanders made to political renewal in Germany was 
not to impose their own vision, but to recognise the limits of what could be achieved by the 
British Military Government, to step back and allow the German authorities to take 
responsibility for their own actions. Their personal histories reflect a transition from pre-war 
idealistic international socialism, through the desperate struggle against fascism and the 
Nazi state and the experience of the Holocaust, to post-war pragmatic and national, rather 
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than international, social democracies. Many of their colleagues in Neu Beginnen and the 
ISK, in both Britain and Germany, followed similar trajectories, from radical, occasionally 
revolutionary, socialism, to social democracy, opposition to communist totalitarianism, and 
the reluctant acceptance of a market economy. 
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6  Henry Vaughan Berry: civilian regional commissioner for 
Hamburg: May 1946 – May 1949  
 
‘I suppose it’s absolute heresy to say so but my belief was that the British  
government during the war, Churchill and Roosevelt themselves, had no policy beyond  
unconditional surrender. What they were to do with the unconditional surrender  









In May 1946, in an attempt to ‘civilianise’ the British administration of Germany, four 
Regional Commissioners were appointed to replace the military Corps Commanders. The 
commissioners were nominated by John Hynd, the government minister for Germany and 
approved by the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee and the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin.
3
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Three of the commissioners were civilians and active Labour Party supporters, the fourth an 
army general. Those appointed in addition to Berry were William Asbury, a former leader of 
Sheffield City Council and Hugh de Crespigny, a former Air Vice-Marshal who had resigned 
his position in 1944 to stand, unsuccessfully, for Parliament as a Labour Party candidate.
4
 
The fourth commissioner, General Gordon Macready, had been chief of staff in Washington 
during the war.
5
 The appointment of Regional Commissioners was a key element of the 
policy to decentralise government of the British Zone, devolve power to the Länder and 
govern by indirect rather than direct control. 
Henry Vaughan Berry was appointed regional commissioner for Hamburg where he worked 
closely with the city’s social democratic (SPD) administration. Unlike Austen Albu and Allan 
Flanders, he had no links with German socialist groups in exile in London. His main 
qualifications for the position appear to have been his experience as a young man on the 
staff of the Inter-Allied High Commission for the occupation of the Rhineland after the First 
World War and his personal connections with leading members of the Labour Party including 
Herbert Morrison and Hugh Dalton.
6
 Unusually for a Labour Party activist, Berry worked 
between the wars in a senior position in the City of London, as assistant manager of the 
Union Discount Company.
7
 Concerned at what he perceived to be a lack of understanding of 
financial matters among the Labour leadership in the 1930s, he founded an influential 
pressure group of Labour sympathisers in the City, the XYZ Club.
8
 Yet despite his financial 
background, he was not involved in discussions regarding economic policy for the British 
Zone, or the proposed currency reform implemented in June 1948. 
Berry’s region of Hamburg could be considered the most favourable of all the Länder in the 
zone for effective cooperation between British and Germans. The city had a long tradition of 
self-government and well established trading connections with Britain and the United States. 
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Economic revival after the war was adversely affected by Allied restrictions on foreign trade, 
the destruction of the German merchant marine and dismantling of the shipbuilding industry, 
but Hamburg still had great strategic importance as the largest city in the Zone and the main 
port of entry for goods and supplies.
9
 Though badly destroyed in the firestorms of 1943, 
conditions were not as bad as had been feared. Although half the living accommodation was 
destroyed and 100,000 inhabitants lost their lives during the war, the city was not damaged 
in the land-based campaigns in April and May 1945, surrendering without a shot being fired. 
Telephone connections, electricity and water supplies continued uninterrupted.
10
  
Berry’s tenure as Regional Commissioner was considered at the time to have been highly 
successful by both British and Germans. He received glowing tributes from the German 
press when he left Hamburg,
11
 and was awarded a knighthood on his return to Britain. 
Recent historians have been more critical of British occupation policy, while acknowledging 
that Anglo-German relations were generally better in Hamburg than elsewhere. This chapter 
discusses Berry’s aims and intentions and some of the successes and failures of British 
occupation policy in Hamburg. It concludes by considering whether his experience in 
Hamburg, though not necessarily typical of the zone as a whole, was an example of a 
successful ‘benevolent occupation’ under relatively favourable conditions. 
 
6.1   A meritocratic socialist who served in the Rhineland occupation 
 
‘The excellence of the political system depends not on its conformity to some ideal 
standards, but whether it is able to secure the services of the ablest of its citizens,  




Henry Vaughan Berry was born in 1891 and was therefore closer in age to Harold Ingrams 
and the generals considered in the first part of this thesis, than to his fellow socialists Austen 
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Albu and Allan Flanders.
13
 He said later that he became a socialist after the First World War, 
influenced by events in Germany,
14
 though it seems likely that his political beliefs were 
strongly influenced by his childhood and education. His father moved from the small 
Wiltshire town of Melksham to London and then to Madras in India, where he set up a 
stockbroking business, lived in a grand house and appeared very wealthy. Berry and his two 
sisters were born in Madras. They returned to England with their mother for what they 
believed would be a short holiday, but received a telegram telling them that their father had 
died of pneumonia. His fortune disappeared and the family was left with a ‘few hundred 
pounds’, generating an annual income of £40, not enough to live on. Berry was just four 
years old at the time and spent the rest of his childhood in genteel poverty. His mother had 
to leave home to work as a governess and he and his two sisters moved to Bath, where they 
lived with two maiden aunts, who had depended on his father for their livelihood.
15
  
Berry’s early life was a struggle to obtain an education that matched his ability. With help 
from his godfather, he left home aged seven, to attend a boarding school, the ‘Royal Asylum 
of St Anne’s’, at Redhill in Surrey. He described it later as a ‘charity school’ for ‘those who 
had come down in the world’,
16
 quite different from the public and preparatory schools 
attended by the middle and upper classes, adding that it was an ‘amoral and stupid system 
… to educate the rich separately.’
17
 Berry did well at the school, becoming head boy. He 
obtained a scholarship to the City of London School to continue his education, but this did 
not improve the family’s finances, as the scholarship covered only one third of the fees. He 
won another scholarship to Cambridge University, but again, this did not fully cover his costs, 
and he could only accept the place after being offered financial assistance from an education 
trust established by a Scottish peer.
18
 
His later socialism was meritocratic, placing greater emphasis on equality of opportunity, 
‘from each according to his abilities’, than the redistribution of wealth and alleviation of 
poverty, ‘to each according to his needs.’ He was opposed to unearned wealth and privilege, 
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but remained elitist rather than egalitarian, believing that those with ability should have the 
opportunity to progress to positions of responsibility in society. At the same time, he 
possessed a great sense of duty to others, probably arising from the knowledge that his 
mother, aunts and sisters had sacrificed their own welfare, so that he could obtain his 
education. He believed in the value of education, the aim of which he considered was to 
learn to think clearly and rationally. He wrote in later life that ‘if your thinking is muddled I do 
not see how you can make a success of anything, except by chance.’
19
 
He studied French and German at university and spoke both languages fluently, having 
spent six months in each country through a school scholarship in 1909. He greatly enjoyed 
his stay in Germany, in a small town near Hanover, where he enjoyed going on walks with 
the local boys through the forests, playing football, parading in front of the girls and drinking 
beer at the local Kneipe.
20
 He recalled writing to his mother that:  





He served in the First World War as an officer in Salonika, Ireland and France, where he was 
wounded.
22
 Towards the end of the war, a chance encounter in London with his former 
university tutor led to a transfer to the Intelligence Corps and a posting with the army of 
occupation in the Rhineland. His work as intelligence officer involved travelling from one 
town to another, often in German civilian clothes and with a German passport, talking to the 
local people and trying to assess their mood and attitudes.
23
  
The inflation of 1920 made a deep impression on him and, in later life, he would speak of 
how ‘the hardships experienced by the middle classes were one of the chief recruiting 
grounds for Hitler.’ His ‘favourite story’ was that of a retired elderly jeweller and his wife, with 
whom he was billeted for several months. Before the inflation the jeweller had been wealthy, 
with an income equivalent to £800 a year, able to support an extended family as the ‘rich 
uncle’. Within three months he had lost all his money and had to work again. The family were 
appalled by what had happened to him and the next generation joined the Nazi party. Berry 
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sympathised with the jeweller, perhaps relating his experience of having ‘come down in the 
world’ to that of his own family.
24
 
In 1920 he joined the Inter-Allied Control Commission and was appointed District Officer for 
a small town, Benrath, near Düsseldorf. He subsequently acquired additional responsibilities 
for the larger and strategically important district of Solingen in the Ruhr.
25
 He was well placed 
to see at first hand the occupation of Düsseldorf by French troops in 1921 and the 
subsequent occupation of the Ruhr in 1924. Together with many of his British colleagues, he 
sympathised with the Germans rather than the French.
26
 In notes for a speech he gave in 
1962, he outlined his understanding of the period: the young Weimar Republic never had a 
chance; the steps taken by the Allies were all too little too late; in the late 1920s, Germany 
was hit by the world economic crisis; it was the 6 million unemployed that gave Hitler his real 
opportunity and within 3 years he was in power. There were clear parallels, his notes 
continued, between his experiences after World War One and when he returned to Germany 
in 1946. On both occasions he had seen hunger, a ration of only 1000 calories, and inflation 
in which people lost nine tenths of their savings. The scale of destruction and disruption to 
society was even worse after the Second World War than the first, with at least 6 million 
people dead and missing and 2-3 million refugees entering the British Zone from the east. 
Above all there was no Government or authority with which to deal. The conclusion he drew 
was that to avoid continuing chaos, ‘the Allies had to take steps to rehabilitate Germany’.
27
  
Similar critical views of Allied policy after the First World War were common in the 1920s 
among British people in the occupied Rhineland, such as the distinguished journalist Eric 
Gedye,
28
 whom Berry first met in Germany in 1919 when both were young officers in the 
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 Gedye wrote that by imposing harsh conditions in the Treaty of 
Versailles, attempting to annex territory and supporting Rhineland separatists, the Allies 
reinforced reactionary forces within Germany, rather than improving security and deterring 
renewed aggression. Furthermore, by misusing their superior military power during the 
occupation, rather than acting in strict accordance with the law, they fatally weakened the 
Social Democratic government, set the example of rule by force and paved the way for a 
nationalist revival:  
Month after month we watched the spontaneous efforts of the German people … to secure 




The ‘pro-German’ views of Berry and his friend Gedye, that the rise of nationalism and the 
Nazi seizure of power had, at least in part, been caused by a failure by the Allies to support 
progressive forces within Germany in the 1920s, were quite distinct from the views of those 
who supported appeasement in the 1930s. Gedye left Germany in 1925 to take up a position 
in Vienna, where he remained until 1938. His second book, Fallen Bastions,
31
 was a searing 
indictment of Nazi brutality and condemned the British government’s failure to stand up to 
Hitler and resist the invasions of Austria and Czechoslovakia.  
When Berry returned to Germany a second time in 1946, the conclusions he drew from his 
experiences in the occupied Rhineland were similar to those of General Robertson and other 
senior army officers described earlier,
32
 that while disarmament was necessary, a harsh 
occupation based on a desire for revenge was not only wrong but counter-productive. 
However much the British may, as Berry wrote later, have ‘hated and detested Germany and 
the Germans as a result of the war’
33
 the only alternative, in their own interest, was a 
constructive policy of economic reconstruction, active support for democratic German 
politicians and personal reconciliation. 
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6.2   Active cooperation, shared ideals and aims 
 
 ‘In Hamburg, why was I supposed to be successful – because the socialist govt. of the 
province knew that basically I shared their ideals and therefore they would put [up] with 
orders from me which they would not without trouble from another.  




Berry claimed later that he was offered and accepted the position as Regional Commissioner 
in Germany due to chance. He had hoped to be appointed a director of the Bank of England. 
These hopes were not realised, so he negotiated early retirement from the Union Discount 
Company and made arrangements to retire to the country. According to Berry, Morgan 
Philips, the general secretary of the Labour Party, told him, when they met by chance at the 
House of Commons after an XYZ Club meeting, that ‘the government needed people who 
shared its political convictions.’ Philips asked him if he would like to be ‘the governor of a 




In due course Berry was offered the post. Although he was interested, his wife was reluctant 
to move. The older of their two sons, Michael, had died in July 1944 from an unknown illness 
in Egypt. Berry was about to decline the offer when another personal tragedy changed their 
future outlook and expectations. Their second son, Peter, who was training to be a doctor, 
was killed in a motorcycle accident. Berry described how: 
His death after that of Michael two years before … was a shock in the real sense of the 
word. But when it came to deciding our own next moves, it seemed clear, or at any rate 





Their ‘dream of having two fine sons each in a fine profession,’ which he ‘had sometimes 
said was too good to be true,’ was shattered.
37
 Rather than retreating into private life, his 
personal experience of loss appears to have heightened his sense of duty and obligation to 
others, and he accepted the position in Germany. 
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Berry claimed later that he received no serious briefing on his role as Regional 
Commissioner and ‘no hint …of the kind of policy we were to adopt in our different regions.’
38
 
He appeared unaware of the planning that had been done for the occupation and the 
numerous directives issued to Control Commission staff. After a brief spell as Regional 
Commissioner for Westphalia, before the merger with North Rhine Province to form the new 
Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, he moved to Hamburg. Elections were held soon after he 
arrived, resulting in victory for the SPD. The previous Bürgermeister, a conservative who had 
been appointed by the British, was replaced by a socialist, Max Brauer, who had returned 
from exile in the United States and was untainted by any connection with the Nazis.
39
 
Without being specific as to how this affected their relationship, Berry claimed that their 
sharing a socialist ‘fundamental philosophy … proved to be of enormous help to me during 
the ensuing three years.’
40
 
Berry was concerned that both he and his staff should establish a good working relationship 
with the German administration in Hamburg. He took great care over a speech he gave on 
22 November 1946 at the ceremonial opening of the Bürgerschaft or city parliament.
41
 The 
content of the speech was unremarkable, emphasising that free elections had been held in 
the city for the first time in 15 years, that he was a civilian and not a military governor and 
that during the election he had permitted the greatest possible freedom of speech, including 
criticism of the British military government. More important was the tone, which he intended 
to be as conciliatory as possible, and the fact that he delivered the speech in German. He 
said later that, had he spoken in English, ‘they probably would have paid little attention, 
taking it as a mere formality’.   
Germans are very conceited about their knowledge of foreign languages and would sit up 
and take notice if they found their new civil governor speaking to them in what I flatter 




At the end of the speech he referred to his officials being ‘ready at all times to discuss your 
problems in a spirit of co-operation.’ The ceremony was followed by a dinner, at his own 
expense, to which he invited the new ‘senators’, as the ministers in the city government were 
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called, and some of his own staff. This, he believed, was ‘well worth any expense, because it 




Berry quickly established excellent relations with the new mayor, Max Brauer,
44
 whose aims 
he appears to have made his own. In his first monthly report as Commissioner for the city in 
January 1947, Berry outlined four aims for the year: to deliver the full ration of 1,550 calories, 
create a reserve of fuel, remove uncertainty over reparations and complete the process of 
denazification.
45
 These were all issues of immediate concern to the local population. At the 
end of the year, in another speech to the Bürgerschaft, again in German, Berry reviewed 
progress against his four aims, again striking a conciliatory tone.
46
 All except the first, he 
said, had been achieved, though significant problems remained. They had all expected too 
much, too soon from the peace, in Britain as well as in Germany. For two and a half years, 
English and German officials had worked side by side, learning to understand, trust and 
respect each other. He concluded by referring to the great fire of Hamburg in 1842 when 
much of the city had been destroyed, saying he trusted that the same spirit which guided its 
reconstruction then was still alive in the city.
47
 
Throughout his tenure as commissioner, Berry represented the interests of the city to the 
British authorities and advocated special measures, such as subsidised inland transport 
rates, which would benefit the port.
48
 In his first monthly report, in January 1947, he wrote 
that ‘I feel it is still necessary to stress the fact that a big metropolis always presents special 
difficulties.’
49
 Later in the year, the city was declared an emergency area (Notstandsgebiet) 
after the food ration was cut by a third to an average of 1,000 calories a day and 200,000 
people attended a hunger demonstration.50 Berry wrote in his monthly report:  
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The food situation improved, but he continued to advocate special treatment for the city in 
other areas. When a list of factories to be dismantled was published in late 1947, he reported 
that the reaction from the city’s population was generally reasonable, but there was ‘of 
course one reservation for Hamburg.’ The future permitted level of the shipbuilding industry 
had not yet been decided and it would be ‘a great mistake to settle what for this great Port is 
a vital matter without consultation with the people of Hamburg.’
52
  
Berry’s principal concerns, however, as expressed in his monthly reports to the Military 
Governor and senior British headquarters staff, were to keep order, avoid discontent and 
represent British interests. The welfare of the inhabitants and good relations with the city’s 
German administration were the means by which he achieved these ends. If Berry assisted 
Brauer by advocating special treatment for the city, Brauer helped Berry maintain order, 




6.3  The ‘Hamburg Project’: from defusing conflict to promoting a common 
interest 
 
The burgomaster [Brauer] stated that if we stopped at the right point we could  
defend our reasons … The British and German authorities were “in the same boat”,  




Berry arrived in Hamburg in September 1946 at a difficult time. Relations with the local 
German population had started to deteriorate, following widespread protests against the 
continued requisitioning of houses for occupation personnel.
55
 The winter of 1946-7 was the 
worst in living memory. The River Elbe froze and ships carrying essential supplies could only 
reach the port through a channel cut by icebreakers. Unable to dock at the wharves, they 
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had to unload into lighters in mid-stream.
56
 In January and February, 85 people froze to 
death, and a further 200 died each month from inflammation of the lungs.
57
 Due to a 
shortage of coal, the supply of electricity was reduced to maintain essential services.
58
 The 
suburban railways ceased to run, trams stopped at 8pm and theatres and cinemas remained 
closed.
59
 Building was at a standstill.
60
 Because no coal was available for domestic heating, 
there was massive thieving of coal from freight trains arriving in the marshalling yards, with 
crowds of up to 30,000 taking part.
61
 Berry reported that 6,000 people were arrested for 
stealing coal in January, 17,000 in February and 11,000 in March.
62
 Unsurprisingly, he 
expressed concern over the authorities’ ability to keep order. Unable to resolve shortages of 
food and fuel, he decided on a token gesture of increasing unemployment relief to a level 
sufficient to purchase ‘rationed necessities’. ‘Without the prospect of this particular 
concession,’ he wrote, ‘which at least gave evidence of a sympathetic attitude with the plight 
of the people, public order would not have been maintained.’
63
 ‘The price was cheap’ he 
added in his report. He retained the support of the Bürgermeister and ‘responsible trade 
union leaders’, and there were relatively few disturbances in the city over the winter.
64
 In 
April, the Bürgermeister authorised the German police to use firearms, and arrests for 
stealing coal ceased with the warmer weather.
65
 
Berry had good reason to be concerned about possible unrest. The city was badly 
overcrowded, with little prospect of any improvement in the immediate future, due to British 
plans to concentrate zonal headquarters in Hamburg, rather than in the small towns in 
Westphalia where the army was stationed at the end of the war. This scheme, known as the 
‘Hamburg Project’ had been agreed in 1945. In the second half of 1946, it became the focus 
of opposition to the occupation in Hamburg. The original plan envisaged an imperial-style 
‘enclave’ in the city, requiring the evacuation of up to 50,000 German civilians to make room 
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for around 30,000 British personnel.
66
 In June 1946 a revised, slightly smaller, plan was 
announced and work started, resulting in the eviction of 650 German civilians.
67
 A peaceful 
protest by 500 German women, handing in a petition at the Town Hall, grew rapidly over the 
course of the day to around 10,000 people. The mood of the demonstrators deteriorated and 
they became increasingly antagonistic to the British, shouting ‘we are not Indians or coolies’ 
and singing the German national anthem.
68
 Brauer’s predecessor as Bürgermeister, Rudolf 
Petersen, tried to speak to the crowd from a balcony but was shouted down.
69
 Ten 
demonstrators were arrested and a few days later sentenced, in a special session of the 
British military court, to a total of 27 years imprisonment.
70
 
Berry claimed later that he threatened to resign if the plan was not abandoned. He recalled 
in his memoir that he considered it ‘politically disastrous’ as: 
It seemed to be treating a very ancient city in Europe in much the same way as a town in 
India or China with its cantonments and its international settlements and to preclude any 
possibility of furthering reasonably good relations between the occupation and the 
Germans.
71
    
 
He added that he made his views known to the Military Governor, Sholto Douglas and his 
deputy, Brian Robertson; the matter was discussed at the Regional Commissioners’ 
conference in Hamburg and it was decided to abandon the project.
72
  
Although Berry’s memoir is generally reliable and consistent with documents in the archives, 
I have been unable to confirm his claim that he offered to resign. The minutes of a Regional 
Commissioners’ conference held in Hamburg in December 1946 made no reference to the 
Project,
73
 although it appears, from references in other documents,
74
 that a decision to 
suspend it was taken at an earlier, unrecorded, high-level meeting. Berry flew to London to 
advise the government of the decision. He wrote to Robertson from London on 28 December 
1946, to say he had notified Hynd of the decision. Hynd, Berry continued, was annoyed as 
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he had prepared, but not submitted, a Cabinet paper recommending continuation.
75
 
Robertson replied that ‘Hynd’s reaction to our decision’ surprised him, but he hoped to 
‘smooth him down’ on his next visit to Germany.
76
 This indicates that Robertson endorsed 
the decision to suspend the project and it was probably more consensual than Berry 
suggested in his memoir. 
Berry was not alone in his opposition to the project. It had been extensively criticised in 
Parliament, notably by Richard Stokes MP who referred to it in a House of Commons debate 
in October 1946 as the ‘Hamburg Poona’, alluding to similarities with imperial enclaves in 
India, from which the native inhabitants were excluded.
77
 Berry’s predecessor as Military 
Governor in Hamburg, Brigadier Armytage, also opposed the project, writing a strongly 
worded memo to Robertson in July 1946, drawing his attention to the ‘extremely serious 
situation’ which had arisen due to evictions required for the Hamburg Project, evictions 
elsewhere in the city to provide accommodation for British families and the general shortage 
of building materials.
78
 Armytage estimated that by September, 6,000 German families would 
need to be evicted. Due to the shortage of alternative accommodation, they could only be 
housed by ‘doubling up’ with other families in already overcrowded homes. He told 
Robertson he had agreed with the Bürgermeister that alternative accommodation would be 
found for 6,000 families, but no more. He would not ‘agree to any further evictions than those 
already referred to unless I receive direct orders from you to do so.’
79
 
An equally strongly worded memo was written in September 1946 by the officer commanding 
army intelligence for the city, Lt. Col. Philip Ramsbotham.
80
 He stated that Hamburg was 
‘undoubtedly an unfortunate choice’ as the designated headquarters of the zone, due to 
‘chronic overcrowding’ in which ‘some 30,000 persons are living in appalling conditions in 
cellars, bunkers and attics.’
81
 There had been, he continued, a ‘marked change from 
undoubted goodwill to open hostility’, the ‘feeling amongst the Hamburg population’ was 
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already intense and increasing, and ‘the hostility of the Hamburg populace, half-starved and 
entering a second winter of “peace”, may reach a dangerous level.’ A further reason for 
cancelling the project, Ramsbotham argued, was that Hamburg was no longer the most 
suitable location for British headquarters. The recent decision to merge the British and US 
zones economically to form the ‘Bizone’, and the city’s closeness to the Russian Zone, made 
it preferable to locate headquarters in a small town ‘not yet openly hostile to Military 
Government,’ in the southern part of the British Zone.
82
  
Opposition to the scheme therefore reflected differences among the British in addition to 
tensions between British and Germans. Robertson, the original proponent of the plan, was 
concerned about the effectiveness of the central administration, whereas regional officials, 
such as Berry, Armytage and Ramsbotham, wished to maintain a harmonious relationship 
with the local German population. The main reason the project was abandoned, however, 
was that by the end of 1946 it had become redundant. A large central British headquarters 
was no longer required once the decisions had been taken, following the Paris Council of 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting in the Spring of 1946, to merge the British with the US zone and 
reduce the total number of Control Commission staff. However, the project had acquired a 
momentum of its own, and criticism in Parliament and from the press in both Britain and 
Germany made it difficult to cancel, without damaging the prestige of Military Government. 
Once the decision had been taken to abandon the project, Berry and his colleagues worked 
closely with the German administration to defuse the situation, save face and salvage 
something from the debacle. British staff were told in January 1947 that the project had not 
been abandoned, but temporarily suspended due to a shortage of building materials.
83
 At a 
Regional Commissioners’ conference attended by Robertson and Hynd, it was agreed that 
work should continue to complete the foundations of blocks of flats under construction.
84
 
Rather than taking the opportunity to criticise the British, the SPD government in Hamburg 
decided it was in their interest to help manage the presentation of the issue to the public. 
                                                     
82
 Ibid. Ramsbotham’s recommendation foreshadowed the decision two years later, in 1949, to locate the capital of 
the Federal Republic in Bonn, a small town at the southern edge of the British Zone. 
83
 FO 1014/904, minutes of a meeting  to discuss and ‘examine the eventual implementation of the Hamburg 
Project’, 3 Jan. 1947 
84
 FO 1014/15, informal conference of Regional Commissioners with the Chancellor, 15 Jan. 1947 
 178 
Brauer agreed with Berry that the project should be continued, but ‘slowed down’, on the 
grounds that:  
A complete abandonment of the project after such great investments would justify any 
reproach by the public that the planning had lacked the necessary foresight. The point that 
much greater use could have been made of the material spend and the labour employed for 
the building and the repair of other flats in Hamburg could then not be countered effectively. 
 
On the other hand … after the present work has been completed to a certain extent, it 
should be slowed down. Thus the reproach would be avoided that for the continuation of 





A few days later the issue was discussed at a joint meeting of British and German officials, 
chaired by Berry. Brauer reiterated his view that the British and German authorities were ‘in 
the same boat’ and if the project was abandoned, both would be blamed for spending money 




The project continued slowly. Both sides understood that the buildings would never be used 
to accommodate British personnel, although this was tacitly assumed, not stated explicitly. It 
had always been intended that the British ‘enclave’ would be handed back to the Germans 
after the occupation. On 10 March 1948 a meeting was held to discuss the ‘final hand-over 
of the residue of the Hamburg project to the Germans’.
87
 In February 1949 Robertson wrote 
to Berry, after learning that the German administration in Hamburg was going to resume 
work on the flats: 
I am of course delighted to hear that the Hamburg project is to be restarted. I always held 





This comment reflected a sincere, if optimistic, belief that the occupation would ultimately 
benefit the Germans, despite the original plans for the Hamburg Project requiring the eviction 
of 50,000 Germans from their homes, with no alternative accommodation, in an already  
                                                     
85
 FO 1014/890, letter from the Bürgermeister to the Regional Commissioner, 28 March 1947 
86
 FO 1014/890, ‘Minutes of a meeting of the Regional Commissioner’s conference with the Burgomaster and 
members of the Building Administration’, 1 April 1947 
87
 FO 1014/890 
88
 SHC, A/BCU8, Letter from Robertson to Berry, 18 Feb. 1949 
 179 
overcrowded city. The Grindelhochhäuser,
89
 as the blocks of flats originally designed to 
house British occupying forces were called, were completed in 1956. They were renovated 
between 1995 and 2006 and now stand under historic buildings protection. 
 
6.4   Personal reconciliation through Anglo-German discussion groups 
 
‘Dem Gegner von gestern, dem Freunde von Morgen 
Das ist das Ziel, dem wir nachstreben sollten.’
 90
 
(‘Yesterday’s enemies, tomorrow’s friends, that is the goal we should strive for.’) 
 
In later life, Vaughan Berry liked to recall his discussions with German students from the 
University of Hamburg: 
It is a matter of some pride to me that the present Chancellor, Helmuth [sic] Schmidt, was in 





Once power was devolved to local German administrations, the British authorities could no 
longer issue detailed instructions or tell the Germans what to do. They believed that their 
influence over the future development of the country was best maintained through personal 
relationships with Germans in responsible positions in government, business, the media and 
education.
92
 Frances Rosenfeld has documented the many ways in which British occupation 
officials in Hamburg created a ‘successful arena’ for ‘postwar reconciliation and cultural 
exchange’ through promoting a network of interlocking Anglo-German clubs and 
associations, supported by officially sponsored reading rooms and information centres, 
known as Die Brücke (The Bridge).
93
 Hamburg was not unique in this. Similar initiatives took 
place throughout the British Zone. 
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The first Anglo-German discussion groups were formed on an entirely voluntary basis, 
outside their normal working hours, by individual Control Commission staff.
94
 The idea was 
taken up, in slightly different ways, by Political Division and Education Branch. A proposal for 
an ‘informal re-education scheme’, modelled on the ‘Education for Citizenship’ activities 
developed by the British Army Bureau of Current Affairs, was approved in July 1946.
95
 
Meanwhile Education Branch promoted the idea of informal discussion groups, run 
voluntarily by enthusiastic individuals.
96
 A branch memo in November 1946 suggested that 
Germans tended to view all official news sources with suspicion and would gain a better 
understanding of the ‘British way and purpose’ through personal contacts.
97
 The idea was 
endorsed at a Regional Commissioners’ conference in September 1946.
98
 An article in the 
British Zone Review in January 1947 announced that the Commander-in-Chief had given 
formal approval for groups to be promoted and encouraged throughout the Zone, so that: 
through personal contact and free discussion, the Germans will gain a fuller appreciation of 
the British way of thought, and conversely the British will reach a better understanding of 




Practical guidelines were offered on how to run the groups. A ‘sufficiently keen and capable’ 
British person should act as sponsor. Thirty should be the maximum number of participants; 
if there were more, it was difficult to hold a genuine discussion. Until the group had existed 
for some time, controversial subjects were best avoided, but topics should be of current 
interest, such as housing, food, education reform, films and music.
100
 By 1948 several 
thousand groups had been formed in the Zone, including at least twenty-five established 
Anglo-German groups and sixteen other regular discussion groups in Hamburg.
101
 
Other initiatives to promote mutual understanding and personal reconciliation were initiated 
at the highest levels of the Control Commission. In July 1946, soon after their appointment, 
Regional Commissioners were told that Robertson, the Deputy Military Governor, believed it 
desirable they should develop social contacts with ‘German officials, political leaders, Trade 
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Union leaders and so on’, as ‘many things can more suitably be discussed unofficially at a 
cocktail party or a dinner party than officially in an office.’
102
 In May 1947 most of the 
restrictions on personal and social contacts between British and Germans were lifted in a 
new ‘Special Order’, the preamble to which stated that ‘British policy aims at encouraging the 
democratic way of life among the Germans’.
103
 Control Commission staff were encouraged 
to visit German families (but not to ‘spend the night with them’) and to entertain Germans 
‘both officially and as private individuals.’
104
 A year later the regulations were revised again, 
at the instigation of the Minister for Germany, Frank Pakenham, to state that British 
personnel should ‘behave towards the Germans as the people of one Christian and civilized 
race towards another, whose interests in many ways converge with our own and for whom 
we have no longer any ill-will.’
105
 
Over time, some informal discussion groups developed into social and cultural clubs and 
societies and were complemented by other activities designed to promote mutual 
understanding, such as exchange visits between Britain and Germany. As Regional 
Commissioner, Berry provided official endorsement and gave his personal support to some 
of the most high profile activities, such as the Hamburg International Club, for young men 
and women aged between 18 and 30, and the elite Hamburg Anglo-German Club. At the 
inaugural meeting of the International Club, Berry spoke of a need for mutual tolerance and 
understanding. The club’s German members, he said, had ‘a difficult past to face.’ Although 
many were only children at the time, they had to face the fact that: 
The Nazi Government, which was enthusiastically supported by large masses of the 
German people, committed unspeakable crimes against humanity, and you must not expect 





British members, on the other hand, should ‘not be too critical of those Germans who spent 
their childhood under the Nazi regime.’
107
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Whereas the International Club was for young people, the Hamburg Anglo-German Club, 
deliberately modelled on a traditional English gentlemen’s club, was designed to cater for the 
city’s elite. Founder-members included Berry, Brauer and some of the city’s leading 
politicians and businessmen.
108
 After the currency reform in June 1948, Berry complained 
that British officials could no longer afford the costs of returning hospitality offered to them by 
‘affluent Germans’ in the club. This, he believed, was unfortunate as it was in clubs such as 
these, ‘that we can reach the ruling 5 per cent of the population.’
109
 The Hamburg Anglo-
German Club survived proposals to close in 1951 and still exists in 2013.
110
 
From 1947 the British made a deliberate effort, in Berry’s words, ‘to impress our ideas on the 
small elite of the population who lead in administration, industry, education and arts, 
journalism and so forth,’
111
 but this did not extend to courting popularity among the German 
population as a whole. As an unelected military government, imposed on a defeated nation 
by force, there was no obvious need to do so. Berry wrote in February 1948 that the 
‘occupation is not exactly popular and we make little effort to win the support of the German 
people.’
112
 A few months later, he warned that although the air-lift had resulted in a more 
favourable attitude towards the Western Allies in Berlin, in the British Zone the occupation 
was: 
intensely disliked and we must not be misled by the excellent relations which exist between 
the Administrations on both sides. It is not so much that we ourselves are becoming more 




He asked his staff to investigate further. They reported that the British were disliked for their 
alleged aim of exploiting Germany, ‘muddlesome inefficiency’, and because the Germans 
held them responsible if anything went wrong. There was ‘admiration for individual British 
integrity’ but ‘very little for our administrative ability’. ‘British psychology in official relations 
with the Germans’ was considered poor and ‘The only virtue seen in the British occupation is 
that it keeps the Russians out.’
114
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Despite concerns over the unpopularity of the occupation, Berry’s later reports show 
satisfaction with progress. In March 1948 he attached a declaration from the city government 
welcoming the Marshall Plan. This showed, he commented, that ‘the right spirit rules in the 
Senate of Hamburg.’
115
 In June, as the availability of food improved for the first time since 
the end of the war, he reported that, ‘For the first time in Occupation history food has not 
been the most absorbing topic’.
116
 The following month, as tensions over Berlin eased, and 
fears lessened that the Western Allies would give way to Soviet pressure and evacuate the 
city, he reported that, for the first time in the occupation, ‘the majority of Hamburgers are 
openly and vigourously [sic] championing Western democracy against Russian 
totalitarianism.’
117
 The economic transformation following currency reform had been ‘quite 
remarkable’ and the city’s finances were much improved.
118
 In his last report as 
Commissioner, for April 1949, he could state that, following the signing of the Atlantic Pact, 
agreement on the Basic Law, and concessions on shipbuilding and dismantling, ‘a spirit of 
optimism prevails at the moment among all responsible elements and general morale has 
probably never been higher since the Occupation began.’
119
  
By the time Berry left Hamburg in May 1949, to take up a position as the British 
representative on the International Authority of the Ruhr, his aim of establishing a good 
working relationship with the city’s German administration had been achieved. In a study 
completed in 1974, Hilary Balshaw conducted interviews with a number of Hamburg 
senators, all of whom spoke of the ‘respect and admiration’ he inspired in them and praised 
him in exceptional terms as, for example, ‘a most marvellous man’.
120
 In January 1949, 
Robertson provided further endorsement of the strength of his relationship with his German 
colleagues by telling Berry that he had recently asked the heads of government of the four 
Länder in the British Zone for their views on the current state of Anglo-German relations. 
Brauer had replied that:  
Relations between the Germans and the British and between the City Administration and 
the British occupation authorities can properly be described as ideal. That is largely due to 
your Regional Commissioner. There are of course difficulties from time to time but we 
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always manage to straighten them out. In my view the difficulties are not greater and 




Berry was able to look back on his achievements in Hamburg with satisfaction. In a speech 
during a celebratory return visit in 1959, he attributed much of his reputed success, and that 
of the City of Hamburg, which now ‘formed part of the German miracle’, to the ‘far-sighted 
and humane policy of the Western Allies,’ adding that he retained his admiration for men 




6.5   Conclusion 
Recent historians of the occupation in Hamburg
123
 have not agreed with the self-
congratulatory view, expressed by Berry and many of his former colleagues in the 1950s and 
1960s, that far-sighted and humane British policies contributed to the political and economic 
success of a democratic West Germany. Their criticisms of British occupation policy, 
however, should be placed in the context of what Berry and his colleagues aimed to achieve. 
Berry’s primary concern was the future welfare of the British people, not the social, political 
or economic organisation of Germany. His principal aim, shared by all the British individuals 
examined in this study, was simple and uncontroversial: to create a peaceful and democratic 
Germany that would never again threaten the national interests of Great Britain. He believed 
that this aim could best be achieved by representing the interests of the city, defusing 
conflicts, establishing a good working relationship with the German SPD administration and 
promoting mutual reconciliation as a means of preserving British influence among the 
German governing elite. 
Axel Schildt has argued that it is an oversimplification to see the occupation from 1945-49 as 
harmonious throughout. Growing trust was paralleled with tense conflicts, of which the 
Hamburg Project was one.
124
 Similarly, Arnold Sywottek has highlighted German opposition 
to British Military Government, as well as initiatives by both sides to promote mutual 
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 These comments are valid in correcting an overly rose-tinted view of 
growing trust and uninterrupted harmony but, in Hamburg, unrest was successfully defused 
and had little impact on the ability of the British to achieve their primary aims.  
In the conclusions to his thorough and wide-ranging study of Die Briten in Hamburg, Michael 
Ahrens argued that the occupation was over-complicated and badly planned. The cost was 
too high, the British and Germans lived in ‘parallel worlds’, there was a ‘deep division’ 
between the civilian and military arms of the occupation, and no single point of contact for 
German authorities to deal with.
126
 These criticisms are valid from a German perspective. 
They describe various ways in which the occupation made life more difficult for Germans in 
Hamburg, and they question the extent to which the British goal of mutual reconciliation was 
achieved. The Germans paid the occupation costs, resented the privileges assumed by the 
occupiers, such as travel in reserved compartments on over-crowded trains, and were 
annoyed by sometimes having to deal separately with British civilian and military authorities. 
None of these issues, however, significantly hindered British achievement of their primary 
aim of creating a peaceful and democratic Germany.  
Frances Rosenfeld considered that the encounter between British and Germans in Hamburg 
was a ‘unique experiment in postwar reconciliation and intercultural understanding’ of which 
both sides were proud at the time, but which was achieved at the cost of ignoring difficult 
situations and topics: the German Nazi past, the British colonial legacy of separation from 
the natives and the Allied fire-bombings of the city.
127
 The Hamburg bourgeoisie claimed, 
incorrectly, that they had opposed the Nazis during the war. They looked back to the city’s 
pre-1933 liberal and cosmopolitan traditions and in so doing reasserted their own social, 
economic and political pre-eminence in the city. British policy on the other hand, Rosenfeld 
claimed, was unduly influenced by an outmoded colonial model and ‘reflected the essentially 
conservative values and self-image of the Foreign Office establishment, by projecting a 
generally old-fashioned, rose-tinted, middle and upper class view of British life.’
128
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This study supports Rosenfeld’s view that part of the price paid for mutual reconciliation was 
that difficult but important issues were avoided and rarely discussed, such as the city’s Nazi 
past and, on the British side, the wartime bombing. These issues remained unresolved and 
re-emerged in later years as a source of conflict between British and Germans and in public 
debates within Germany. Her claim that British policy was unduly influenced by an outmoded 
colonial model, however, was a generalisation that was true of many members of the 
occupation but not of Berry. As discussed previously, there were strong ‘echoes of empire’ in 
British occupation policy as formulated by men such as the former colonial official, Harold 
Ingrams, Field-Marshal Montgomery and Generals Robertson and Bishop. Although Berry 
was of similar age and could be considered part of the same ‘generation’, his personal 
experience of Empire was negative. Berry’s life history was an illustration of an alternative 
grand narrative, also highlighted by Rosenfeld, of Britain as a great power in Europe.
129
 He 
studied French and German at university, spoke both languages fluently, fought in the First 
World War, served in the occupied Rhineland and worked in the City of London, then, as 
now, the leading financial centre in Europe. His role as the representative of British interests 
in occupied Germany was a natural extension of his earlier career and of British attempts to 
maintain a pre-eminent role in post-war Europe. 
Berry did not act as the representative of a power in decline. He was supremely confident in 
his own values, ability and judgement, based on his personal experience and the 
conclusions he had reached from his work in politics and business between the wars. He 
understood and respected local traditions and never treated Germany as a colony. He did 
not share the wartime ‘Vansittartist’ prejudices of some of his Labour Party colleagues 
against the German Social Democrats and accepted without question that they represented 
a progressive movement with similar ideals to his own. He represented the interests of his 
city to the central British authorities, but he was willing to reprimand and overrule the local 
German government if he considered this necessary. His experiences in the Rhineland from 
1919-1925 were more important than the emerging Cold War in influencing his policy and 
attitudes. Over time, they reinforced each other and the conclusion he could draw from both 
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was that he and his British colleagues had a vital role in actively supporting and encouraging 
democratic forces within Germany. 
Did he achieve his aims, and can the British occupation of Hamburg be considered a model 
for a benevolent occupation under favourable circumstances? As recent historians have 
shown, there were periods of tense conflict between occupiers and occupied, some actions 
of the British were unnecessarily high-handed and antagonised the local population and 
some difficult issues were ignored. There is little evidence of any long-term British influence 
on the city arising from the occupation, apart from the continued existence of a few blocks of 
flats and the Anglo-German club. On the other hand, Berry established excellent relations 
with the German administration on a basis of mutual trust. He maintained British control in 
those areas he considered important but did not interfere unnecessarily. He kept the peace 
but tolerated dissent, provided a channel for the discussion of grievances and defused 
difficult situations. He oversaw the transfer of power from direct British rule to an 
independent German administration. He did what he could to promote economic 
reconstruction, political renewal and personal reconciliation in the city, with results that have 
generally stood the test of time. Overall, despite criticisms from recent historians, this offers 




Personal reconciliation:  
Four young officers with no adult experience but war 
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7  John Chaloner, Michael Howard, Michael Palliser and Jan 
Thexton: Changing aims and personal relationships: May 1945 – 
May 1948  
 
‘And I want to get to know the people here, and I can assure you that I wouldn’t learn much 




In this chapter, the activities of four young officers responsible for the implementation of 
British policy are examined, to discover whether they shared the aims of the senior officers 
and civilian diplomats and administrators at the top of Military Government, and to explore 
how personal relations between British and Germans changed over the course of the 
occupation. To compensate for any bias in the source materials, which were inevitably more 
personal than those used in previous chapters, and to help assess how representative this 
small group of four individuals was of the views and actions of other young officers in 
occupied Germany, this chapter also draws on a selection of interviews from the Imperial 
War Museum (IWM) Sound Archive with twenty young British men and one woman, who 




The family backgrounds of all four young officers were typical of the British professional and 
middle classes and similar to those of the senior officers, diplomats and administrators 
discussed in previous chapters. Though clearly less influential than the Military Governors, 
army generals and senior civilian administrators, they all held responsible positions and 
could be considered part of a ‘governing elite’ of British officers and administrators in 
occupied Germany. Two of the young officers had considerable freedom to act on their own 
initiative and were influential in their own right. John Chaloner was Press Officer in Hanover, 
where he created the news magazine Der Spiegel. Michael Howard was Intelligence Officer 
for T-Force, the unit within the British Army responsible for ‘evacuating’ German equipment, 
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research laboratories, scientists and technicians to assist British economic recovery after the 
war. The other two young officers worked in more routine positions. Michael Palliser
3
 was a 
tank commander during the war and remained in Germany as part of the army of occupation 
until he was demobilised in January 1947. Jan Thexton served during the war as a non-
commissioned signals officer and joined the Control Commission for Germany after he was 
demobilised, working initially in Reparations Division in charge of a team of 45 German staff, 
and subsequently in the Mandatory Requirements Office, where he was responsible for 
procuring items for the occupation forces from the German economy. He met and married 
his wife in Germany. 
Oral history interviews I undertook with Palliser and Thexton
4
 and personal accounts by 
Howard and Chaloner
5
 were cross referenced with documentary evidence, if available, and 
the twenty-one IWM interviews, to identify significant differences or variations and to ensure 
that research findings were reasonably representative of the ‘younger generation’ of British 
officers and NCOs in post-war Germany. The IWM interviewees
6
 include some who were a 
little older than the four ‘protagonists’ and some from less established or affluent family 
backgrounds. They also cover a greater diversity of roles, including intelligence, 
denazification, the care of Displaced Persons, the Judge Advocate General’s department 
responsible for prosecuting war crimes, RAF ground crew, two naval officers on 
minesweeping and customs and excise patrols, two volunteers working for Friends’ 
Ambulance and Salvation Army units and a Russian interpreter.  
The first theme examined in this chapter is the response of the ‘younger generation’ of 
officers and NCOs to the end of the war and the situation in occupied Germany: what they 
aimed to achieve before demobilisation and returning home and how their aims differed from 
those of their senior officers. With some exceptions, they did not respond in the same way to 
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the death and destruction they saw around them. They did not share Montgomery’s, 
Robertson’s or Bishop’s ideological concerns about the spread of disease and communism 
or believe there was a religious or spiritual need to ‘save the soul of Germany’. They were 
too young to have been politically active before the war or to have voted in a British General 
Election. Unlike Ingrams, Albu, Flanders or Berry, they were not inspired by attempts to 
convert the Germans to the British democratic ‘way of life’, or change the political and social 
structure of Germany. Personal goals were generally more important than collective national 
aims.  
Two case studies, Michael Howard’s experience as Intelligence Officer for T-Force and John 
Chaloner’s creation the news magazine Der Spiegel, illustrate how some exceptional 
individuals combined personal ambition with an idealistic desire to make a significant 
contribution to the aims of the occupation, as they understood them. Both Howard and 
Chaloner encountered resistance from higher authorities as British policy changed, in 1946 
and 1947, from direct control of the German economy to emphasise the need for 
reconstruction and to devolve more power and responsibility to the Germans. 
A second theme, illustrated by the personal experiences of all four young officers and many 
IWM interviewees, is that of reconciliation with the former enemy.
7
 Personal relationships 
with German civilians were widespread among junior officers and other ranks in the British 
army and Control Commission, especially those whose work brought them into regular 
contact with the local population. Some made friendships that lasted long after the 
occupation and around ten thousand British men, including Jan Thexton, met their future 
wives in Germany. The British occupiers came to see Germans as individuals, rather than as 
reflections of the collective images promoted in wartime, but this did not happen 
automatically and required a conscious effort on both sides.  
Many of the British occupiers started to see their role in Germany as protecting ‘their’ 
Germans from a threat from Soviet Russia. This change to a Cold War mentality is not easy 
to explain, as it developed soon after the end of the war and appeared to pre-date any 
general awareness of international tensions between the four wartime allies at inter-
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governmental level, in the Council of Foreign Ministers or the Allied Control Council. This 
change in attitude was due, at least in part, to a perception that despite the differences, they 
had more in common with their former enemies, the Germans they met and worked with on a 
daily basis, than with their former allies, Russian soldiers and Eastern European Displaced 
Persons, whom they also encountered in Germany but met less frequently and nearly always 
in negative circumstances of confrontation or disagreement.   Reconciliation between British 
and Germans was possible because their personal experiences during the occupation 




7.1   Personal backgrounds and positions in Germany 
John Chaloner 
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John Chaloner was born on 5 November 1924.
10
 Both his parents were journalists and 
writers.
11
 His mother was the daughter of Sir Gilbert Barling, a distinguished surgeon and 
Vice-Chancellor of Birmingham University.
12
 She attended a girls’ boarding school before 
studying music for three years in Germany, returning to England, a short-lived marriage, 
separation and divorce. During the First World War she worked as a secret agent and 
uncovered a German spy who was sabotaging production in a factory. She was promoted to 
the rank of Captain and awarded an MBE for her efforts. She was disowned by her father 
after her divorce, but eventually reconciled after she married a second time and had four 
children, of whom John was the eldest.
13
 
Chaloner’s parents held liberal and progressive views. When he was ten years old they sent 
him to the Beltane School in Wimbledon, where many of the other pupils were the children of 
German Jewish immigrants.
14
 The co-director of the school, Ernst Bulova, had formerly been 
the principal of the Montessori Dahlem School in Berlin, before he was arrested by the 
Gestapo in 1933 on account of his left-wing political activities and fled to Britain.
15
 Chaloner 
left school aged 15 and worked as assistant editor on the Boys Own Paper and later on a 
magazine for Officer Cadets. He volunteered to join the army as a private, was soon 
promoted to sergeant and identified as a potential officer. He was accepted at Sandhurst and 
commissioned as an officer in the Westminster Dragoons.
16
 He took part in the invasion of 
Normandy and subsequent battles in France, the Netherlands and Germany as commander 
of a Sherman flail tank. On one occasion his tank was destroyed by enemy fire and, though 
he survived unharmed, one of his crew was killed.
17
 At the end of the war, by now promoted 
to captain, he heard there were opportunities for officers with experience of publishing to join 
PR/ISC, the Public Relations and Information Services Control division of the British Military 
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Government. As he could speak German, though not fluently, and saw this as an alternative 
to a possible posting to the Far East, he applied and was accepted.
18
 
As press officer in Hanover, Chaloner was responsible for re-establishing German 
newspapers, initially under direct Military Government control and subsequently licensed to 
suitable German individuals. He established newspapers in Lüneburg, Osnabrück and 
Hanover, before creating a new magazine, Der Spiegel.
19
 After returning to Britain in early 
1947 he formed a company, Seymour Press, which became one of the largest distributors of 
foreign publications in the UK. He also published six novels and wrote and illustrated a 
series of books for children. In later life he bought and ran a dairy farm in Sussex, started a 
vineyard, acted as publishing adviser to the Institute of Directors and Confederation of British 






Michael Howard in 1947
21
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Michael Howard was the youngest of the four young officers discussed in this chapter. He 
was born in May 1926, in Fiji, where his father was a Colonial Administrator. He left Fiji when 
he was eight years old to attend boarding school in England. At the outbreak of war in 1939 
he was at school at Rugby,
22
 where he was a keen sportsman and athlete. He volunteered to 
join the forces as soon as he could, on his seventeenth birthday in May 1943, but was not 
called up for another fifteen months, too late to see active service. Meanwhile he joined the 
Home Guard and Junior Training Corps at school. He was commissioned as an officer in the 
Rifle Brigade in August 1945, three months after the end of the war in Europe.
23
 
Rather than joining the First or Second Battalions of the Rifle Brigade, he was sent to a 
holding unit, in Osnabrück in North West Germany. In a conversation with John Kirby, 
another newly commissioned officer, whose father was Deputy Chief of Staff for the Control 
Commission, he learned about a new unit, supposedly engaged in secret and interesting 
work.
24
 T-Force had been established a year earlier, to examine and secure factories and 
research laboratories, by-passed by the front-line troops as they advanced. Their job was to 
investigate these facilities, guard them to prevent looting and damage to potentially valuable 
equipment and secure and preserve documents. After the end of the war their role 
broadened to provide a base for the teams of scientists and businessmen sent to Germany 
by BIOS, the British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, to investigate German scientific 
and technical capabilities and ‘evacuate’ reparations material, including documents and 
blueprints, machinery and equipment, and key scientists and technicians, to Britain.
25
 
Howard had been offered a place at Cambridge University and hoped for as short a stay in 
the army as possible. However, he became absorbed in his work, rapidly received promotion 
from 2
nd
 Lieutenant to Captain and stayed until he was demobilised in December 1947, by 
which time the work of T-Force was largely complete and the unit was being wound down. 
He went up to Cambridge in January 1948. After completing the shortened two year degree 
course usual at the time, he was selected from 200 Oxbridge graduates to work in the 
London office of W.R. Grace, a large US-based, international manufacturing and trading 
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company, and subsequently followed a career in business.
26
 He published his memoir of life 
in occupied Germany in 2010.  
Michael Palliser 
 
Michael Palliser, by Elliott & Fry, 1942 © National Portrait Gallery 
Michael Palliser was born in 1922 to a family with significant naval connections on both 
sides. His father, Admiral Sir Arthur Palliser, joined the Royal Navy as a young man in 1907, 
rose to command first a destroyer then a battleship and, from 1938-1940, was captain of the 
gunnery school HMS Excellent at Whale Island near Portsmouth. At the end of the Second 
World War, he was Fourth Sea Lord at the Admiralty and finished his naval career as 
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. Michael Palliser’s mother was the daughter of a 
distinguished naval engineer, who had been in charge of naval dockyards at Simon’s Town 
in South Africa and Cockatoo Island, Sydney, Australia.
27
 
Because his parents were often overseas, Palliser spent most of his childhood with his 
grandparents. He learnt to speak French fluently at an early age, as the only way to talk to 
the family’s French cook and housemaid. While still a young child, he travelled widely in 
Europe. His mother’s brother, a soldier in the army, took him and his grandmother on a 
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series of holiday trips across Germany to Berlin, where he remembered seeing riots in the 
streets, to Danzig and East Prussia, Prague, Vienna and Italy. He suspected later that his 




He went to school at Wellington College,
29
 finishing in the summer of 1939. He remembered 
spending most of July that year digging air raid shelters at school. At Oxford he read classics 
for a little over a year, before joining the Coldstream Guards. After initial training and six 
months at Sandhurst, he was commissioned as an officer in an armoured tank battalion. He 
spent a further two years with the regiment in England preparing for the invasion of 
Normandy and landed in France two weeks after D-Day. He fought with the army through 
France, Belgium and Holland, across the Rhine to Germany, and on VE Day had reached 
Neumünster, a small town in Schleswig Holstein, north of Hamburg.
30
 
After the end of the war, he stayed in Germany for eighteen months, before his 
demobilisation in January 1947, stationed mainly in Berlin and later in Bad Godesberg, near 
Bonn. Despite claiming that his unit was ‘pretty parochial’ and had little contact with 
Germans, he could still recall, in considerable detail, many circumstances and events which 
made an impression on him, including being placed in charge of the administration of a 
German village for two weeks shortly after VE Day, attending a performance by the Red 
Army Choir in Berlin, a long train journey through the Ruhr in a Wagons-Lit sleeping car, 
seeing large numbers of Displaced Persons and ‘the constant movement of people’, and 
conversations with a widowed German countess and her sister, who lived in a large house in 
Bad Godesberg which had been requisitioned for his officers’ mess.
31 
After leaving Germany in 1947 he had a distinguished career in the Foreign Office and 
played a significant role in British applications to join the European Community under both 
Labour and Conservative governments. In 1948 he married the daughter of Paul-Henri 
Spaak, Prime Minister of Belgium and later Secretary General of NATO. After various 
diplomatic postings, he was appointed private secretary to the Prime Minister Harold Wilson 




 A leading British public school, with a reputation for preparing pupils to follow a career as officers in the army 
30




in 1966, Minister at the British Embassy in Paris in 1969, head of the UK delegation to the 
European Community in Brussels in 1971 and, following British accession, UK ambassador 
and permanent representative to the European Communities in 1973. Two years later he 
was appointed Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
Head of the Diplomatic Service.
32
 He died on 19 June 2012. 
 
Jan Thexton 
Jan Thexton was born in April 1920 in Plymouth. His father was a non-commissioned officer 
in the army and he spent his early childhood in Bermuda, where his father was Garrison 
Chief Clerk to the Governor, responsible for much of the administration of the British base. 
He returned to the UK in the late 1920s, when his father was offered a position in the Military 
Secretary’s branch of the War Office. After leaving school, he worked in an accountant’s 
office, joined the Middlesex Yeomanry as a territorial and was called up shortly before the 
start of hostilities in 1939, to help prepare for mobilisation. He was posted to a signals unit in 
an armoured tank division and fought for two years in North Africa, where he took part in the 
decisive battles of El Alamein and Medenine. He returned to England to prepare for the 
invasion of Normandy, landing on D-Day plus one, and fought with the army through France, 
Belgium and Holland into Germany. At the end of the war he was in Hanover. His rank at the 
time was sergeant. He said later that he and several others in his unit were offered 
commissions but declined, because everyone who accepted was sent to the Far East, to 
fight against the Japanese.
33
 
After twelve months with the army in Germany, he decided to stay in Germany and join the 
civilian Control Commission.34 Though officially designated as civil servants, Control 
Commission staff were offered temporary contracts, with no security of employment. He 
entered a competition for entry into the permanent civil service, was successful and stayed in 
Germany for over twenty years. His first position was in the disarmament and reparations 
branch of the Control Commission, where he was responsible, with a team of 45 German 
staff, for compiling lists of armaments plants and equipment to be made available as 
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reparations for the British and other Western allies. He then moved to the Mandatory 
Requirements office, where he was responsible for purchasing equipment and supplies for 
the British, Belgian, Norwegian and Canadian occupation forces. He met his wife in 
Germany soon after the end of the war, when he was working on restoring the German 
telephone system and she was a supervisor in the Hanover telephone exchange, though 
they were not able to marry until June 1947.
35
  
He started to learn German before the war and did what he could to improve his ability to 
speak the language. He was proud of this and considered it did much to further his career. 
After German rearmament in the 1950s, he was a liaison officer at the British Embassy, 
where, in contrast to his earlier work on disarmament and reparations, his job was to try to 
persuade the newly formed German armed forces to buy British equipment. He became 
close friends with General Albert Schnez, later appointed Inspekteur des Heeres, the most 
senior position in the West German army. He was godfather to one of Schnez’s sons and the 
two families stayed in touch for the rest of their lives, regularly exchanging letters and phone 
calls and visiting each other when they travelled to Britain or Germany. He and his wife had 
no children and he said later that this family relationship was the closest they came to having 
their own children. After leaving Germany and returning to the UK, he continued to work as a 
civil servant at the Ministry of Defence in London, ending his career as director of a branch 
helping to promote British arms exports to Europe, Turkey, Iran, Israel and Pakistan. He died 




7.2 Personal fulfilment rather than collective goals 
 
‘I just didn’t really know what to do. I was far too old to start again for accountancy or 
anything like that. I had no other qualifications apart from my basic educational qualifications. 




The four young officers and twenty-one IWM interviewees discussed in this chapter were 
generally practical, realistic and conscientious. None recalled hearing or reading the 








exhortations from Montgomery, Robertson or other senior officers to ‘save the soul of 
Germany’ or ‘rebuild civilisation’ let alone being influenced or inspired by these. Similarly, no-
one mentioned reading articles in the British Zone Review, Montgomery’s proclamations to 




Most were in Germany when the fighting stopped and had to stay while awaiting 
demobilisation or, as in the case of two interpreters, were posted there when the war was 
over. Some were filling in time before they could progress to their chosen career, such as 
one IWM interviewee who wanted to train as a teacher, but was faced with a two year 
waiting list before he could take up his college place.
39
 Two naval officers were reluctant to 
return to civilian life after six or seven years at sea.
40
 The only IWM interviewee who 
appeared to have applied for his position for idealistic reasons was a conscientious objector, 
who had a strong commitment to voluntary work and community service.
41
  
Some took their work very seriously, including all four of the young officers considered in 
detail. Jan Thexton spoke of working long hours when he was compiling lists of war plants 
and machinery available for reparations. He was in the office from 8am until 8 or 9pm. 
Sometimes he was travelling and did not return home for days at a time.
42
 Others, however, 
treated their work more casually. For some in the army of occupation or the air force in 
Berlin, the end of the war meant a return to peace-time soldiering, but in a foreign country. 
One IWM interviewee spoke of ‘going back to polishing things again’.
43
 Another could not 
remember what he did in Germany, referring to ‘staff duties’ or ‘something like that’.
44
 One 
had ‘a jolly twelve months’ in a jazz band at HQ British Air Forces of Occupation at 
Bückeburg from Sept 1945 - Sept 1946, playing there or at nearby locations most nights in 
the week. He had a ‘sainted life’, he said, and could do more or less as he liked. They were 
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just waiting for demobilisation but ‘it was a lovely way to do this … It was just one big ball 
actually while we were there.’
45
  
Most knew little about other divisions or how their actions related to the overall aims of the 
occupation. They had no doubts that the war had been just and necessary but, unlike their 
senior officers, they were not motivated by high ideals or the need to serve their country or 
the British Empire. Now the war was over, there was a retreat from the public to the private 
sphere and they were, above all, concerned for their own welfare. Having accepted during 
the war that this had to be subordinated to the greater good, they could look to the future and 
start to think again about their personal needs and ambitions.
46
  
A younger generation? 
It has been common practice in German historiography and culture to classify people as 
belonging to a particular age group or ‘generation’, following theoretical work by Karl 
Mannheim and Helmut Fogt,
47
 according to which, for a ‘generation’ to be of historical 
significance, a group of people need to share common experiences and have a similar 
understanding of the meaning of historical events, as well as having been born within the 
same period of time.
48
 It is not claimed that a generational framework explains British actions 
and attitudes in Germany, in the same way as, for example, Christina von Hodenberg used 
generations as a model to explain changes in post-war German media,
49
 but a categorisation 
by age and a comparison between older and younger ‘generations’, can make it easier to 
understand some of the diversity of views among the British in occupied Germany.  
The Military Governors and army generals discussed in Part 1 were all born within a few 
years of each other.
50
 They shared similar experiences in their early lives and possessed a 
common understanding of historical events, such as the First World War and the British 
Empire, so they appear to meet the criteria required for consideration as a ‘generation’. They 
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all received a traditional public school education, followed (with the exception of Douglas 
who went to Oxford University) by attendance at the Military Academies at Sandhurst or 
Woolwich, where they were commissioned as officers. They all fought as young men in the 
First World War and stayed on as regular soldiers or re-joined the forces later. In the interwar 
years they served in the British Empire, in India, the Middle East or Africa, and attended or 
taught at the army or RAF staff colleges. Though not from especially wealthy or aristocratic 
families, they were very much part of the British professional establishment. They had grown 
up at a time when the British Empire was at its height, fought to defend the Empire in the 
First World War and worked to protect and preserve its power and influence in the interwar 
years. 
The four young officers considered in this chapter were around 25-30 years younger, born 
between 1920 and 1926. Eleven of the IWM interviewees were the same age and ten a little 
older, born between 1913 and 1919. Although the family background of the four 
‘protagonists’ was similar to that of the senior officers, analysis of the wider group of IWM 
Sound Archive interviewees, who had little in common apart from their age, reveals the 
limitations of a generational form of analysis. Class and social background, religious 
convictions, their expectations of what to do when the war was over, and their personal 
skills, training and aptitudes, appear to have had at least as great an influence on their 
understanding of their task in Germany, as any shared experience as a generational cohort. 
Their experiences before joining the forces were very different. Some had already left school 
and spent several years at work, some had been to university for a year or two before being 
called up, others joined as soon as they left school. There were significant differences in 
outlook even within the small group of university students at Oxford during the war. One IWM 
interviewee said that there were no pacifists at Oxford in 1942, all were servicemen and 
‘deeply engaged on the whole thing’,
51
 whereas another, also a student at Oxford but himself 
a pacifist and conscientious objector (CO), recalled that there were ‘quite a lot of students at 
Oxford who were also COs.’
52
 
Yet despite diversity in personal background and outlook, all four young officers and many of 
the IWM interviewees later remembered the war and its aftermath as a significant formative 
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influence on the rest of their lives. Michael Palliser, for example, said that his experience in 
Europe and Germany at the end of the war had made him a convinced European, as this 
was the best way of trying to ensure that the devastation and destruction he saw then would 
never be repeated and war between two European countries, such as France and Germany, 
would become unthinkable.
53
 On a more personal level, John Chaloner referred, in a semi-
autobiographical novel published in 1991, to the combination of starting his first successful 
publishing venture and experiencing his ‘first love affair of timeless but futureless passion’, 
as ‘a pattern he would always seek for the rest of his life.’
54
 To some extent therefore, the 
‘younger generation’ of young men and a few women in occupied Germany did share a 
common experience during the war and after, and a comparison with the older and stronger 
‘generation’ of senior officers can reveal similarities and differences between the two groups. 
Reactions to death and destruction 
The statistics of the scale of damage to the major towns and cities in Germany are well 
known, with official British figures stating that in Cologne, for example, 66 per cent of the 
houses were totally destroyed and in Düsseldorf 93 per cent were uninhabitable.
55
 According 
to government statistics, around 600,000 civilians in Germany were killed by bombing raids, 
compared with 62,000 in Britain. A further 900,000 civilians were wounded and 7.5 million 
made homeless.
56
 Many more civilians, of course, were killed in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union during the German invasion and retreat,
57
 but British soldiers did not see this 
for themselves. 
Whereas the senior officers quoted previously, and other observers including journalists and 
war correspondents, reacted with apparent shock and wrote that ‘you have to see it to 
believe it’, only a few of the young officers and IWM interviewees discussed in this chapter 
responded similarly to ruined buildings and the scale of destruction in the German cities. The 
senior officers could tell a relatively simple story, which emphasised their own achievements, 
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of chaos and destruction followed by the restoration of law and order. The younger 
generation may have related the ruined cities they saw in Germany to their personal 
experiences, which were largely those of wartime, and assumed that death and destruction 
were an obvious consequence of war, too well-known to be worth mentioning.  
The few who did refer to the scale of destruction in Germany showed a mixed response. Two 
IWM interviewees described it as shocking and unjustified.
58
 The scale of destruction in 
Berlin and the industrial towns of the Ruhr made a lasting impression on those stationed 
there, such as one young man, who was part of the British advance guard sent to Berlin in 
1945: ‘It was like the rest of Germany really … No-one who didn’t see Germany in 1945 and 
1946 knows what bombing’s all about … It really appalled everyone …You don’t let much 
worry you at that age’ but ‘it appalled me.’ There were still many bodies buried under the 
rubble. The summer of 1945 was very hot and after it rained the smell was terrible. He added 
that he could understand why Bomber Harris was ostracised after the war and that the 
destruction of Dresden could be compared to a war atrocity.
59
 Others, however, assumed 
that destruction on this scale was an inevitable consequence of war, perhaps regrettable, 
perhaps a notable achievement which had contributed to winning the war, but no more than 
the Germans deserved and had inflicted on others.  
Michael Howard had not seen active service in the war. When asked in an interview in 2008 
about the condition of Osnabrück, he replied that it was quite severely damaged, but what 
struck him most was that it must have been the target for medium artillery as many houses 
had lost their roofs and top floors: ‘Yes, it was a pretty desolate place.’ The barracks where 
he stayed was relatively undamaged but the town was a heap of rubble. This was much as 
expected and made no particular impression on him: ‘It was much as it ought to be.’
60
 
Contemporary letters to his parents gave a slightly different, but not inconsistent, picture. 
The scale of destruction, he wrote, was an ‘amazing sight’, but he did not draw any 
conclusions from this, apart from describing his concern for the animals and children, (who 
presumably, in his view, did not share responsibility for the war with the adults), and 
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expressing the conventional view that the bombing had been effective in destroying 
Germany’s ability to wage another war for ‘some forty years.’
61
 
When Michael Palliser was asked in 2010 if he was surprised by the destruction he saw in 
German towns and cities, he related this to his own experiences of bombing in Britain, 
fighting in Normandy, and having to ‘knock out’ church spires in Holland, which might 
‘appear savage’, but was necessary as they made an ideal observation and sniper post for 
the enemy.
62
 Without being explicit, he appeared to be making two points: that the 
destruction was not unique to Germany, and that destruction was sometimes an undesirable 
but necessary means to an end. Later in the interview, he told the story of a conversation 
with a Swedish businessman, in the restaurant car of a train travelling through the industrial 
cities of the Ruhr. The Swede looked out of the window at this ‘absolute lunar landscape’ 
and ‘banged on about how dreadful we’d been to bomb the Ruhr.’ Palliser was furious with 
his companion who ‘had enjoyed his neutrality during the war’ and replied that if he looked at 
cities like London and Coventry, he would soon realise that the Ruhr was not unique.
63
  
Palliser was incorrect in telling his Swedish travelling companion that the extent of damage 
caused by Allied bombing in the Ruhr was similar to that in London or Coventry, though he 
may have believed this at the time. As the official statistics showed, the destruction of 
buildings and number of civilian casualties was far greater in Germany than in Britain and far 
greater in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe than in Germany. But Palliser was surely 
correct that the destruction of the Ruhr and other German cities was not unique, and needed 
to be placed in the wider context of whether the end justified the means.  
War crimes and Holocaust survivors 
Only four of the twenty-one IWM interviewees made any mention of the Holocaust, war 
crimes or atrocities. One was an officer who was a member of the panel on a trial at the 
Volkswagen works, where 450 babies born to Displaced Persons were kept in a nursery and 
allowed to starve to death.
64
 Another was a lawyer who worked as a prosecutor for the 
Judge Advocate General’s department. Some of those he prosecuted were, in his view quite 
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rightly, found guilty and condemned to death, such as a German official who had taken an 
Allied airman, who had landed by parachute, to his office and shot him, and an interrogator 
at Neuengamme concentration camp, who fitted a spike to a chair, operated by a pedal, to 
make those he questioned stand up more quickly; an idea he had taken from Dachau. 
Occasionally, though, he dealt with cases he was less sure about, such as six German 
civilians accused of ill-treating an RAF officer. ‘They had done it’, he said, but ‘most people 
would have done the same after an air raid’ and it could be difficult to understand that while 
the pilot was in an aeroplane they could shoot him, but if he landed by parachute, he was a 
POW and they must not touch him. On balance he considered ‘it was fairly done.’
65
 
Whereas most cases of war crimes were clear cut, others were less so. With incomplete 
information, it could be difficult to know how victims met their fate. Another officer, based at 
Travemünde on the Baltic coast, spoke of a ‘ghastly incident’ in April or May 1945, shortly 
before the surrender, when a ship in the harbour, loaded with camp victims, was taken out to 
sea and sunk by the guards. At least, he said, that was one story. Another was that the ship 
had been sunk by a British aircraft and he was inclined to believe this second version. In 
June a large number of bodies were washed up on the beach and SS prisoners-of-war were 
made to haul out the bodies.
66
  
It is sometimes claimed that British and American soldiers who witnessed the liberation of 
the concentration camps were provoked to acts of revenge. Richard Bessel, for example, 
referred to US forces after the liberation of Dachau, where ‘Germans were gunned down 
while surrendering; captives were shot at the slightest provocation…’
67
 He claimed that the 
liberation of Bergen Belsen had a similar effect on the British, taking as an example the 
British military commandant at Münster who was ‘inclined initially to take a punitive attitude 
towards the German population due to [his] personal experiences of liberating the camps.’
68
 
For the individuals examined in this chapter, however, there is no evidence that initial 
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feelings of hatred were translated into acts of revenge.
69
 A more common reaction was to 
make a distinction between those who had committed war crimes and the individuals they 
met face to face. One IWM interviewee described how they were always hearing rumours of 
SS atrocities, of their having shot prisoners, or murdered Americans, which made the British 
soldiers angry: 
But when you see a person face to face and he’s unarmed you lose this anger and 




The only two prisoners he took personally were ‘a couple of lads of about 16’ who ‘came out 
of a wood with their hands up. They were just terrified…’
71
  
Only one of those considered in this chapter, John Chaloner, was present at or soon after 
the liberation of the concentration camps. His sister wrote that seeing Belsen soon after 
liberation was an experience that affected him deeply and the memory stayed with him for 
the rest of his life,
72
 but there is no record of his referring to it in any public context. He did so 
only in private conversations and in fictional works based on his experiences in Germany. In 
his novel Occupational Hazard, he described the reaction of a tank crew after seeing Belsen 
for the first time: ‘Two of my men who have after all, seen a few things, were very quiet, and 
then suddenly sick. They lay on the grass. We brewed up tea, and they had a cigarette and 
everyone said that nothing was too bad for the Germans.’
73
 Nevertheless, although the 
experience was deeply moving, it did not prevent him from making lasting personal 
friendships with German journalists and editors he met later when re-establishing 
newspapers in Osnabrück, Lüneburg and Hanover.
74
 His sister recalled a long conversation 
with him about Belsen. She believed that, of all his wartime experiences, it was the one that 
affected him most deeply, together with seeing tanks either side of him blown up ‘with his 
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Contemporary reports indicate that all British soldiers in Germany knew of the liberation of 
the camps in April and May 1945, from reports in newspapers or by word of mouth from 
colleagues, if not from their own experience,
76
 but this did not appear to affect their 
behaviour when carrying out their duties. They combined a harsh view of Germans 
collectively with a pragmatic view of those they met as individuals. Michael Palliser, for 
example, said that, although neither he nor anyone in his battalion personally discovered or 
visited any of the camps, another battalion in his regiment had and they heard accounts 
‘which were absolutely horrific.’ When asked if this changed, or possibly reinforced, his 
attitude to the Germans, he replied that:   
I think it possibly reinforced it a bit. I’m not sure. I think that there was already a feeling that 
this had been a very barbaric regime, which was partly the result of whatever you like, 
wartime propaganda and so on, but I wouldn’t say we were surprised. I think there was a 
tendency to say ‘how typically German’ in the mood of the time. I think that we were almost 




This attitude was reflected in a similar comment from the officer on the war crimes panel at 
the Volkswagen works, who, when asked why the babies had starved to death, replied that: 
‘It was just typical German … [The Germans believed] they were Slav and there was nothing 
lower in life.’
78
 When asked about the camps, he replied that he had not seen any himself, 
but knew others who had. He added, incongruously, that he went to Belsen once, to buy a 
dog from some Germans who had moved into the huts.
79
 A second interviewee said that he 
passed through Belsen in June 1946, when leaving Germany, but it had been cleared and 
there were no inmates.
80
 
These anecdotes illustrate a possible reason why the care of former inmates of the 
concentration camps, especially Jewish survivors, was not given the priority by the British 
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occupiers that many historians believed it should.
81
 The number of Jewish survivors in the 
British Zone was relatively low compared to the US Zone and remained constant throughout 
most of the occupation period. Estimates vary, but in June 1946 the number of Jewish 
Displaced Persons in the British Zone was calculated by UNRRA as 19,373, around half of 
whom were accommodated in Hohne camp, near Bergen Belsen, and most of the remainder 
in cities such as Hamburg, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Hanover and Kiel.
82
 In the US Zone the 
number was higher, around 36,000 in January 1946,
83
 and increased rapidly, due to 
immigration of around 250,000 Jews from Eastern Europe.
84
 With a few exceptions, such as 
John Chaloner, most of the British occupiers did not experience the liberation of the camps 
or meet Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. Many more would have encountered the far 
larger number of Russian, Polish and East European Displaced Persons (DPs), of whom 
there were over two million in the British Zone at the end of the war, over 600,000 in October 
1945 and 365,872, mostly Polish DPs, in June 1946.
85
 
For those not personally affected, or who had not seen the liberation of camps, the 
Holocaust, though recognised as ‘absolutely horrific’, could appear as something that had 
occurred in the past, rather than as a major concern for the present and future, and not 
morally, but numerically insignificant compared to the two million DPs who remained in the 
British Zone after the end of the war and five million ethnic German refugees who arrived in 
the zone between 1945 and 1951.
86
 The approach of trying to draw a line under the horrors 
of the past was perhaps best typified by an eight page supplement on Belsen in the second 
issue of the British Zone Review on 13 October 1945. This was described as: ‘An account, 
based on Official Reports, of the uncovering by the British Army of the Belsen Concentration 
camp and of the action taken during the vital days to minimise the suffering of the 60,000 
inmates.’ 
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The story of that greatest of all exhibitions of ‘man’s inhumanity to man’ which was Belsen 
Concentration Camp is known throughout the world. Therefore it is not intended to repeat it 
here except very briefly, and then only as background for the story of what the British 
soldier did with the aid of British medical students and units of the British Red Cross to 
succour its tens of thousands of stricken inmates to prevent the spread in epidemic form of 




Belsen was therefore presented as something which was uniquely horrifying and ‘known 
throughout the world’, but which had occurred in the past, been dealt with and was now best 
‘wiped off the face of the earth.’ 
 
7.3 Two individuals, out of step with official policy 
 
‘We have been forced by the change of policy to come out with our hands up in a lot of 
cases, and I don’t like it. About every third day I put up a very strong protest, and one of 




‘I know myself that this business of producing a magazine means not just an exciting new 
idea but real hard work, patience, a keenness that must not flag and a willingness to go on 




Despite a general lack of idealism and the absence of the ‘missionary spirit’ so evident 
among the senior offices, a few young officers, such as Chaloner and Howard, took the 
initiative to go beyond the call of duty to do what they considered right, even when this was 
not consistent with official policy. Their stories illustrate how the legacy of the British 
occupation could depend on individual initiative. Michael Howard started by looking for an 
interesting job and useful experience for a few months before going to university, but 
became absorbed in his work. He continued to pursue his original goals of ‘evacuating’ 
material and equipment from Germany to benefit the British economy, as official policy 
changed, until the Deputy Military Governor, Brian Robertson, issued a directive that 
removals should cease.
90
 John Chaloner exceeded his authority by creating a magazine he 
knew would be critical of the British and Allied authorities, because he believed that a free 
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press should be popular, easy to read and independent of the government. Remarkably, with 
the help of two Jewish staff sergeants and a team of talented German editors and journalists, 
he succeeded.  
Howard and Chaloner started their work in Germany believing that what they were doing was 
consistent with overall British objectives, but by the time they left, this was no longer the 
case. And, in both cases, despite successful careers after the war, their sense of injustice, 
that their efforts and achievements have never been fully recognised, remained for the rest 
of their lives.  
 
Michael Howard: The story of T-Force 
Michael Howard had been offered a place at Cambridge University and hoped for the 
shortest possible stay in Germany before his demobilisation.
91
 At first he expected to return 
home in October 1946, after a stay of no more than six months, but things turned out better 
than he had imagined with his appointment as Intelligence Officer for No 1 T-Force.92 In 
addition to being pleased at finding a responsible job, he believed he was doing something 
to help his country. On 10 May 1946 he wrote home that: 
This is the only unit in Germany which is not a liability to the taxpayer in that the 
consequences of the work have a considerable and direct bearing on our economic 




Having just missed active service, a desire to serve his country may have been more 
important for him than for those who fought in the war.
94
 Over sixty years later, concerned to 
refute the charge by a Guardian journalist that T-Force used ‘Gestapo methods’ and was 
engaged in the ‘looting of German industry’,
95
 he wrote that he and his colleagues took 
satisfaction in the knowledge that: 
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There was a tangible benefit to be derived for the economic state of the nation from our 
main and unique role: the evacuation by T-Force of machinery, documents and scientists 




Howard certainly worked hard. In May 1946 he wrote home that: ‘The pressure of work is 
unparalleled’, he was ‘evacuating’ 150 tons of machinery and ‘removing to the U.K.’ on 
average 5 German scientists a week.
97
 In December the workload increased again, following 
a false alarm that their activities would cease at the end of the year. He wrote home to say 
that: ‘The flap is now off, but we still have some £5,000,000 worth of machinery or 6.5 
thousand tons to move—so my job isn’t folding in on me at any rate.’
98
 Later he could not 
recall where the figure of £5 million came from, but his letters and memoirs show that his 
perception of the value of reparations obtained by Britain from Germany was very different 
from figures quoted in official sources.  
According to Sean Longden’s history of T-Force, UK official receipts for reparations from 
Germany totalled just over £30 million.
99
 Alan Bullock quoted a similar figure of £29 million in 
his biography of Ernest Bevin.
100
 Howard believed these figures were misleading and 
suggested in his later memoir that the actual figures were many times higher. In December 
1946 he wrote to his parents that he had seen a ‘confidential document’ in which ‘the value 
of T-Force to the country in the last year was given as not less than £100,000,000’
101
 and 
referred to an article in the Daily Express of 9 October 1946, which stated that: 
A British Government authority agreed with me yesterday that to put the nominal value of 




Howard also claimed later that an internal report compiled in 1949 by staff who had worked 
for T-Force proposed the extraordinary figure of £2 billion as the total value of T-Force to the 
British economy.
103
 This report has not survived, but it is likely that it placed a high value on 
intangibles, such as documents, patents and technical knowledge transmitted by German 
scientists recruited to work in Britain.  
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At the end of 1946 the Board of Trade were still keen to publicise their achievements in 
extracting benefits for British industry from German scientific and industrial expertise,
104
 but 
other factors had already started to work in the opposite direction, making it in the interests 
of the government to under-state, and possibly conceal, the full value of reparations obtained 
from Germany. Instead of being an asset that could be exploited for reparations, the British 
Zone proved to be an economic liability, requiring financial support estimated in the April 
1946 budget at £80 million for the 1946-47 financial year.
105
 Despite attempts to increase 
industrial production and coal exports, there was no prospect of the zone moving to financial 
surplus for several years. Hence it was not in Britain’s economic interests to extract 
reparations or remove equipment, which might damage the economy of the zone still further 
and increase the level of support required. Policy makers and officials such as Howard had 
to perform a delicate balancing act, extracting what they could to benefit British economic 
and commercial interests, while not adversely affecting economic recovery in Germany. 
According to the Potsdam Agreement, the Soviet Union was entitled to 25% of the total value 
of reparations from the Western Zones,
106
 and following the formation of IARA, the Inter-
Allied Reparations Agency, in January 1946, Britain was also obliged to account for and 
share reparations with 17 other Western Allies.
107
 The British were therefore paying all the 
costs of occupation in their zone, while having to share with their Allies any economic benefit 
gained from exploiting it for reparations. At the same time, they were trying to persuade the 
US to pay a greater share of the costs, mainly food imports.
108
 It was therefore in their 
interest to under-report the value they booked on their own account, to avoid prejudicing 
negotiations with the Soviet Union and Western European Allies on how reparations from 
Germany were shared,
109
 and with the US on the costs of supporting the British Zone.    
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For Michael Howard, the practical effect of these shifts in policy was that he had to obtain 
agreement from his colleagues in the Control Commission Economics Division before items 
could be ‘evacuated’ to England. He described with evident satisfaction one occasion when 
he, a junior Captain, was able to over-rule a full Colonel working for the Control Commission 
and remove some high grade alloy tanks, which had been used for fuel for V2 rockets, but 
which the German factory and the Control Commission said were now required for the 
storage of milk.
110
 On other occasions his objectives became as much to deprive the 
Russians of material as to secure it for the British.
111
 
As the activities of T-Force were wound down, he wrote to his parents that, despite his 
dislike of the new policy, he remained committed to the job. His use of military metaphors 
suggests that, having just missed active service, he was still trying to make a personal 
contribution to the war effort:    
The routine part of my work has for all practical purposes ceased. I still have one or two 
violent rearguard actions to fight: T-Force has been my hobby as much as my job, and 
there are several battles going on which I should be very sorry to see lost. We have been 
forced by the change of policy to come out with our hands up in a lot of cases, and I don’t 
like it. About every third day I put up a very strong protest, and one of these days I am 




Although official policy had changed, he continued fighting his personal battle to achieve the 
original goal of securing material and equipment to assist Britain’s economic recovery, 
though without the support of his own HQ, let alone that of other parts of the Control 
Commission responsible for promoting economic recovery in Germany. He later quoted what 
he described as the ‘rather broken-backed’ reply he received from his superior following an 
attempt to enlist his support: 
You can see the trend of high policy in Germany & it is, clearly, at any cost to put Germany 
back to work so that we can be repaid some of our current expenses—the future can 
apparently look after itself. In this light T-Force activities in the document & equipment field 
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Michael Howard left Germany in December 1947, to take up his place at Cambridge. A 
sense that his and his colleagues’ efforts and achievements have never been fully 




John Chaloner: The English army officer who created Der Spiegel 
When John Chaloner died in February 2007, his obituary in The Times described him as a 
‘Distributor of foreign journals who, with Der Spiegel, reinstated press freedom in 
Germany.’
115
 However, although he had the original idea, created the first dummy and took 
the decision to go ahead and print the first issue of Diese Woche, the precursor of Der 
Spiegel, he had little involvement with the day-to day running of the magazine, which he left 
to his two German-speaking Jewish staff sergeants and team of German editors and 
journalists. Nevertheless, his role in creating Der Spiegel was to overshadow his 
achievements in later life, resulting in a sense of pride and achievement on the one hand 
but, on the other, lasting resentment at being officially reprimanded and losing his post, for 
initiating what turned out to be a great success.
116
  
The decision to create the magazine was taken entirely on his own initiative, at a time when 
official British policy had already changed from direct to indirect control; from establishing 
new publications, to transferring ownership and management to approved German 
licensees.
117
 Ironically, this action by an individual officer, out of step with official policy, was 
to prove more influential for the future of the press in West Germany than any other action 
the British took in the field of printed media. The circulation of Der Spiegel rose from 50,000 
copies per week in early 1947 to 110,000 in 1951 and 811,000 in 1966, far higher than other 
political weekly magazines.
118
 By the end of the 1950s, the distinctive style of Der Spiegel 
was adopted as a model by much of the German press.
119
 In 1962 in what has become 
known as the ‘Spiegel Affair’, the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, tried to close the 
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publication, after it revealed details of a NATO manoeuvre. The attempt failed after 
widespread protests. The ‘affair’ led to the resignation of the Defence Minister, Franz Josef 




John Chaloner’s involvement with the magazine was short, lasting no more than eight or 
nine months. In April 1946, while based in Osnabrück, he and two German secretaries put 
together a dummy from translations of articles and pictures from various newspapers and 
magazines obtained from England. At some point over the next three or four months, 
Chaloner took the dummy to Military Government Public Relations and Information Services 
Control (PR/ISC) headquarters and received authorisation to go ahead.
121
 He persuaded 
one of his staff sergeants, Harry Bohrer, a German-speaking Jewish exile from Prague, who 
had no previous experience of journalism, to act as editor-in-chief. He appointed another 
staff sergeant, Henry Ormond, also a Jewish exile, as business manager and work started in 
earnest in October.
122
 Chaloner and Bohrer recruited a team of German journalists, including 
the future editor and publisher, Rudolf Augstein, whom Chaloner had employed some 
months earlier to work on the daily newspaper, the Hannoverschen Nachrichtenblatt.
123
 They 
shared the same birthday; Augstein was exactly one year older than Chaloner.  
Preparations for launch went ahead at breakneck speed. Paper, office equipment, supplies 
and transport were a constant problem. Newsprint for the first three issues was provided 
direct from the UK, an extraordinary achievement given the drastic paper rationing in force in 
both Britain and Germany.
124
 Two pre-production dummy issues were produced, dated 25 
October and 1 November. Chaloner wrote to Ormond to congratulate him and the staff: 
I know myself that this business of producing a magazine means not just an exciting new 
idea but real hard work, patience, a keenness that must not flag and a willingness to go on 
learning; all things that cannot be gained without sweat, blood and some tears. The fact that 
you have started from scratch and have always to compete against to-day’s appalling 
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As this message shows, the mechanics of production and availability of supplies offered 
tremendous challenges. Echoing Churchill’s wartime exhortations, Chaloner wrote that they 
could not succeed without ‘sweat, blood and some tears.’ He was interested in the layout 
and appearance of the magazine, the typeface and style of writing and in motivating his staff, 
but appeared to have little interest in the content, leaving this to Harry Bohrer and his team 
of German journalists.  
Although published by a British Military Government unit, the paper did not set out to 
represent or promote British views. In an interview with Der Spiegel in 2006, in response to a 
question asking why he decided to create the magazine, Chaloner explained that, above all, 
he wanted to establish a paper that was independent of the government:  
It was to strongly develop the independence of the German press, so that there could be no 





In Chaloner’s view the greatest danger to British interests came, not from a hostile press, but 
from hostile governments. If this meant that his magazine published articles that were critical 
of the British and Allied authorities, then so be it. As he said in the interview: ‘that seemed to 
me the natural role of a so-called free press.’
127
  
His superiors, however, did not entirely share his idealistic, if naïve, view of a free and 
independent press. The first issue of the magazine, then called Diese Woche (This Week), 
appeared on 16 November 1946, without, it appears, formal authorisation to go ahead with 
printing or putting copies on sale. According to one story, shortly before it was due to go to 
press, Chaloner received a letter stating that certain conditions had to be met. He told his 
secretary, ‘I have not read this letter’ and denied ever having received it.
128
 In another 
account, his two staff sergeants were in his office when he received an order to stop the 
printing. He told them to swear the telegram had arrived after he left the office.
129
 
The magazine included a number of stories which were critical of the British authorities and 
their Soviet former allies. One article described how a German refugee from the Soviet Zone 
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had escaped from a train, full of German scientists and technicians being taken by force to 
Russia.
130
 A second described how soldiers in the Second Polish Corps in Italy, under the 
command of General Anders, did not wish to return home, quoting General Anders telling a 
press conference that many who had already done so had been transported across the 
Urals, to a large ‘concentration camp’ in Siberia.
131
 According to Brawand’s history of Der 
Spiegel, Augstein was summoned by the British authorities to answer accusations that such 
articles provided ammunition to unrepentant Nazis. He replied that he and his colleagues 
were doing no more than repeating stories which had already appeared in British 




Chaloner was summoned a few days later to answer accusations of having ‘collaborated 
with the enemy’ through giving excess freedom to, and working too closely with, Augstein 
and the other German journalists.
133
 On 29 November 1946, C.J.S. Sprigge, Chief of the 
British Public Relations and Information Services Control division (PR/ISC), confirmed the 
decisions he and his senior colleagues had reached in the case. Chaloner was to be officially 
reproved for exceeding his responsibilities in going to press without authorisation and should 
have ‘nothing whatever to do with the paper from this moment.’
134
  
What happened next is uncertain. Chaloner remained in post at least until the end of 
December,
135
 though he appears to have had no further involvement with the magazine. 
Four further issues of Diese Woche appeared, on 30 November, 7 and 14 December, and a 
Christmas double issue on 21 December. The staff sergeants, Harry Bohrer and Henry 
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Ormond remained in post
136




Sometime between 11 and 13 December, Chaloner was summoned again to meet Brigadier 
Gibson, deputy head of PR/ISC, to explain why another proposed magazine, Das Andere 
Deutschland [‘The Other Germany’], had still not been published, due to a shortage of paper, 
ten months after Gibson had given instructions to go ahead.
138
 According to Brawand, 
Chaloner had diverted the newsprint intended for Das Andere Deutschland to Diese 
Woche.
139
 In a letter to Lt. Col. Bayer, Chaloner’s immediate superior, Gibson wrote that the 
whole thing was ‘very mysterious’ and he had not quite got to the bottom of it, but they were 
‘under some pressure to publish [Das Andere Deutschland] from personages in England’, 
presumably influential German émigrés, who had long been keen to demonstrate that there 
was an ‘other Germany’ different from that of Hitler and the Nazis.
140
  
Chaloner later claimed that, as long as he remained in Germany, he was able to protect his 
protégés, prevent the magazine from being closed and persuade his British colleagues that 
the licence should be issued to Augstein.
141
 I have not been able to verify these claims, but it 
appears that the magazine had developed a momentum, which would have made it difficult 
to close without incurring further criticism. Fifteen thousand copies of the first issue of Diese 
Woche were printed and some were soon re-sold on the black market at fifteen times the 
cover price of one mark.
142
 On 9 December Ormond reported that 44,900 copies had been 
ordered from bookshops and wholesale firms,
143
 far more than they were able to supply. A 
few days later, on 14 December, he reported that ‘numerous applications for subscriptions 
were coming in’, from the whole of Germany including the US and Russian Zones, and the 
number of orders had increased further to 56,800.
144
 In January 1947, despite the severe 
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paper shortages, Ormond successfully argued for an increase in circulation to 50,000 
copies
145
 by appealing to Anglo-American rivalry.
146
 
At some point, probably towards the end of December, a decision was taken to transfer 
ownership and issue a preliminary licence to Augstein. This required a change in name and 
the first issue of Der Spiegel appeared on 4 January 1947.
147
 A full licence was not issued to 
Augstein and two colleagues until six months later, in July 1947,
148
 after the British 
authorities had tried and failed to find at least one alternative German licensee.
149
 
The magazine survived without Chaloner, who left Hanover in early 1947 and worked briefly 
as a PR adviser to Montgomery, before being demobilised and returning home.
150
 Bohrer 
and Ormond ceased their involvement with the publication a little later, after the grant of a full 
licence in July 1947.
151
 With Augstein as licence holder and editor, Der Spiegel continued to 
criticise the British and other Allies. Despite some financial difficulties and attempts by the 
British authorities to impose a temporary ban on publication in August 1948 and August 
1950,
152
 it emerged in the 1950s as a highly successful, established and influential part of 
the German media.  
Howard’s and Chaloner’s stories illustrate some of the contradictions of the occupation at its 
lower levels. The lack of established institutional structures and clear lines of control led to 
implementation diverging from official policies, which were changing rapidly. Some of the 
original aims of the occupation, such as Howard’s desire to obtain reparations to benefit the 
British post-war economy, were superseded by concerns over the cost of the occupation and 
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the acceleration of the process of devolution of power to Germans. Chaloner’s idealistic aim 
of promoting a free press, independent of government, succeeded in the case of Der Spiegel 
as much through the efforts of his two Jewish staff sergeants and team of young German 
journalists, as through his own work. Despite instructing Chaloner to cease all involvement 
with the publication, the British authorities in Germany tolerated the magazine, once it was 
licensed to Augstein, and allowed it to survive.
153
    
Individual British officials, such as Howard, Chaloner, and most of the others considered in 
this chapter, combined their daily work implementing official policies, as they understood 
them, to the best of their ability, with pragmatic concerns regarding their personal futures. 
After the promulgation of Ordnance no. 57 at the end of 1947, they had limited scope to 
achieve structural change within Germany, as significant administrative powers were 
devolved to the Länder, in health, education and local government. From early 1947 
onwards, the establishment of good personal relations with Germans was seen by those at 
the top as a means of preserving British influence.
154
 The number of Control Commission 
staff reduced rapidly from a peak of 25,740 in January 1947,
155
 but for those who remained, 
personal reconciliation became an occupation objective in its own right. The following section 
discusses different kinds of engagement between British and Germans, from cooperation at 
work to friendships, sex and marriage. 
 
7.4 Getting to know the Germans 
 
‘My strongest memories really are just getting to know the Germans … and associating  
with them. Because I wasn’t a bit anti-German in any shape or form.  
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All four of the young officers discussed in detail, and seventeen of the twenty-one IWM 
Sound Archive interviewees, referred to their impressions of the local population and to 
meeting Germans in various contexts. Most described their relations with Germans as 
‘remarkably friendly.’
157
 Although the British requisitioned houses and buildings, sometimes 
placed them under armed guard and erected barbed wire fences around them, reserved 
hotels and theatres in many cities exclusively for their own use, ate in the mess, shopped in 
the NAAFI and arranged segregated film performances that excluded the local population, 
there was a high degree of contact between occupiers and occupied. Despite occasional 
comments, such as that of Noel Annan in Berlin, who spoke of the British as ‘the new lords 
of creation, [who] swept by in our cars bound for some snug mess remote from hunger and 
cold’,
158
 this was not an occupation in which the victors remained isolated from the local 
population. 
When British soldiers and administrators met individual Germans, they generally found them 
cooperative and friendly. Most were women, children or old men who had little if any direct 
involvement in the war. Some were clearly victims, having lost their homes, belongings and 
families. They came to know and like as individuals some Germans who, while denying they 
had ever supported the Nazis, may have been nominal members of the party or one of its 
many associated organisations. The attitudes of many British people towards the Germans 
remained ambivalent, but despite continued mistrust, the occupation reinforced the 
similarities, rather than the differences, between them. 
Early attempts by the occupation authorities to regulate personal relationships, through the 
ban on any form of fraternisation, including shaking hands or speaking to someone in the 
street, proved unenforceable and soon broke down. The ban was relaxed in July and 
September 1945, but official restrictions on personal and social relations remained in 
place,
159
 though these were widely flouted. In some cases, encounters between occupiers 
and occupied were short lived matters of convenience or necessity, such as casual 
prostitution, black market deals, instructions to subordinates at work, or attending a film, 
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theatre or concert performance. Others developed into longer term relationships, including 
marriage and friendships which lasted many years after the end of the occupation.  
Singular or plural? 
During the war the British had been encouraged to view the German people in the plural, 
collectively all alike, most famously by Vansittart: 
The German is often a moral creature; the Germans never; and it is the Germans who 
count. You will always think of Germans in the plural, if you are wise. That is their 




In a study of Anglo-German relations, Anthony Nicholls wrote that ‘when it came to the 
practicalities of occupation, the obsession with peculiarities of national character began to 
wane quite rapidly,’ and ‘common sense overcame the myths about national character’.
161
 
The evidence examined for this study, however, suggests that the process of treating people 
as individuals, rather than collectively as ‘Germans’, required a conscious effort on both 
sides. In particular, reconciliation appeared to be dependent on a shared interest of some 
kind, such as working together, living nearby as neighbours, music or literature, or an 
attraction to someone of the opposite sex. 
Many of the British occupiers came into contact with Germans through their work, and found 
they were working with, rather than against, their former enemies. A British naval officer, for 
example, who commanded a German minesweeping flotilla felt this was ‘an odd experience’, 
as all he had to defend himself was a revolver, which would have been no help had they 
attempted to throw him over the side, so he got rid of it. He added:  
I have to say this. They work impeccably and are very fine seaman, and I had no problems 
of any kind at all. They seemed to accept me. I got on well with them. They were very 





Thexton assumed that good relations at work meant being willing to socialise with his 
colleagues outside work, even if this conflicted with official regulations: 
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Fundamentally it was illegal more or less. But certainly you found that most people had 
some sort of association [with the Germans] … One couldn’t say: “we’re going to have a 




Many German civilians went out of their way to be friendly with the occupying forces, with 
several IWM interviewees commenting that they were favourably disposed to the British, if 
only because they were not the Russians.
164
 Some British soldiers reciprocated and made a 
conscious effort to be civil and polite, sometimes friendly, to the Germans they met at work, 
since that was their understanding of normal social behaviour. An RAF ground crew member 
in Berlin, for example, when asked about his feelings towards the enemy, described how the 
wife of an old man working in his billet suffered from polio and he felt sorry for him, saying 
that despite the ‘no fratting’ rules, ‘if you’ve got a person working in your billet you’ve got to 
talk to them. How the hell can you get him to do anything if you don’t talk to him?’
165
 A 
Russian interpreter remarked that relations with the Germans were, on the whole, ‘very good 
and very friendly’.
166
 A conscientious objector, who worked with ethnic German refugees 
from the areas ceded to Poland, when asked about non-fraternisation, said that it did not 
affect them. His team’s remit was to regenerate the local German welfare organisations, 
such as Evangelische Hilfswerk, Caritas, and the Red Cross, and to feed supplies through 
these organisations. They made friends wherever they could, he said, and he made an 
enormous number of friends, adding that it was an ‘exhilarating period’ in his life.
167
 
When Michael Palliser was asked if he had much contact with German people he replied ‘not 
much’ in the first year or two after the end of the war, but he was referring to social contacts, 
not those made in the course of his work or with neighbours. A dislike of ‘everything 
German’, due to their wartime experiences and prejudices, did not prevent him and his 
colleagues conducting polite, even friendly, relations with individuals, such as the former 
owners of a house they requisitioned for their officers’ mess in Bad Godesberg. The house 
was occupied by an aristocratic war widow and her sister, who moved upstairs to the 
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 On one occasion she offered to travel to Cologne to buy a ‘spare part’ 
for them and came back in despair, quite unaware of how badly damaged the city was: 
She had had no idea of what had happened to Cologne, although she was living in Bad 
Godesberg which is, what, fifteen miles or something. That seemed to me quite 
extraordinary. It showed they had lived an extremely restricted life, if you like, during the 
war in Germany. It was an extraordinary thing. Of course she hadn’t found the spare part 
because whichever shops she tried to go to had all been destroyed. She was very shocked 




Some of the IWM interviewees were surprised at the lack of resistance. A denazification 
officer said that part of his job was to keep an eye on any sign of opposition, but there was 
none, and no trace of the Nazi ‘werewolf’ movement they had anticipated. He thought the 
Germans were ‘just so weary of the whole business.’
170
 An NCO in Berlin commented that it 
was strange meeting German civilians. He had been led to believe that resistance would 
spring up very quickly, but it never happened, adding: ‘Some of the Germans treated us as if 
we were the victorious army and they were pleased to see us.’
171
 His main spare time 
activity was attending the State Opera, where every Sunday there were performances by the 
major German orchestras or the ballet. He saw the film Henry V for the first time with 
German subtitles in a German cinema: ‘It was as relaxed as that’.
172
  
Many of the British occupiers employed German servants, at home or in the officers’ mess or 
clubs, or encountered German tradespeople when they needed goods or services. A 
woman, in Germany with her husband, revealed that her feelings were mixed towards the 
Germans who worked for them. They were ‘very nice to German people’ she said: 
We gave them little jobs. You went to the hairdressers and you paid them the money you 




But she implied that she thought the Germans were not suitably grateful. When asked if 
Germans had a hard time at the end of the war, she agreed, but added defensively that the 
British ‘had a hard time too’ and still shared what they had with the Germans. She repeated 
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the point, as if she felt it was in doubt and needed to be emphasised: ‘I think we were all very 
nice to the people who worked for us.’
174
 
Friends and lovers 
In some cases, including three of the four young officers considered in this study,
175
 
relationships between British and Germans developed further, from casual acquaintances, or 
socialising with neighbours or colleagues at work, to lasting friendships, sexual partnerships, 
or marriage. Personal relationships between British men and German women were 
widespread, though the IWM interviewees were reluctant to talk in detail about personal and 
intimate matters, admitting their own relationships with reluctance or apologies. They 
presented their experiences as in keeping with generally accepted morality and standards of 
behaviour, placing their relationships with German women in the context of going out with 
friends, sightseeing, parties, the cinema, getting to know people at work, meeting the family, 
or the prospect of marriage. Though anxious to say that the Germans they met were not 
Nazi supporters, they expressed no sense of disapproval of social or sexual relationships 
with the defeated enemy. 
Among the more senior commissioned officers the position may have been different. When 
Jan Thexton asked his commanding officer for his permission to marry (as required by the 
official regulations), the officer tried to dissuade him, saying, ‘Look I’d much sooner you 
married a wog, than marry a German,’
176
 (thereby revealing that his prejudices were not 
confined to the Germans). On the other hand, an NCO in Berlin said that ‘the officers were 
just the same as the other ranks regarding fraternisation’
177
 and some IWM interviewees 
described the hypocrisy of more senior officers, who outwardly disapproved of their men’s 
fraternisation, but had German girlfriends. Jan Thexton recalled accompanying an 
intelligence officer who ‘used to go out at night and tap into all the telephone calls’, including 








 Chaloner described his relationship with a woman he called ‘Heidi’ in his semi-autobiographical novel 
Occupational Hazard. Howard’s and Thexton’s relationships are discussed further below. 
176
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According to Michael Howard, all the men and NCOs in his Intelligence Section ‘settled in’ 
with German girls and at least two of them eventually married their girlfriends, but he claimed 
that ‘it was different for officers’, though attitudes varied and there were exceptions. Two 
officers in his unit, from a different regiment, had German girlfriends and no one raised any 
formal objections. Their colleagues in the mess may have frowned on it, but ‘not to the extent 
of being disagreeable about it.’ As regards any ‘serious entanglement’ with the opposite sex, 
all ‘had ambitions’ of education or future careers, which would have made it ‘extremely 
foolish’ to ‘acquire a German bride’, so none thought of this as a possibility.
179
  
In his later memoir, Howard gave a frank account of his relationship with the daughter of the 
local doctor, which indicates that perhaps it was not so different for officers. The story 
combines elements of a holiday romance, in a strange but generally friendly country, with 
changing perceptions of the former enemy. The doctor owned the house in which Howard 
and other officers were billeted. He and his family had to move out, but he was allowed to 
keep three consulting rooms on the ground floor so he could continue his practice, and his 
family retained use of the garden. Howard wrote to his mother in July 1946:   
One of the Mess gardens has been most beautifully kept and you can lie there and forget 
the rest of Germany. The family who used to live in the house have kept it up to scratch: it 
is the doctor’s house—he is a nice fellow and interesting to talk to … The younger daughter 
aged 19 also would like to be a doctor, she doesn’t think she will ever qualify as she is not 
good enough at the subjects that matter. I quite often meet them in the garden and natter to 




This letter must, as he said: ‘have rung alarm bells in my mother's mind; the very idea that I 
might have social rather than, say, master/slave relations with German civilians must have 
set them off, not to mention the suspicion that social might easily develop into sexual 
relations, as indeed they might.’
181
 A month later he wrote to his mother to reassure her that 
she had nothing to worry about, while at the same time explaining that he had become bored 
with the all-male company and conversation in the officers’ mess and found he had more in 
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The relationship continued and a few months later, in January 1947, Howard sent his 
parents photos, taken with a camera he had acquired in Germany. In the accompanying 
letter, as he commented later, he was ‘at pains to reassure my parents that there was no 
romantic attachment, when it must have been plain to them that one was developing 
nevertheless’.
183
 In his later memoir he emphasised the practical and social constraints upon 
them, such as his family’s assumptions regarding acceptable behaviour within their social 
class, the need to achieve financial security before marriage, the ‘unacceptable stigma in the 
society’ in which his family moved of marrying a German, that ‘pregnancy would mean 
marriage’ and ‘at once be interpreted as a naked attempt at entrapment.’
184
 We were not, he 
wrote, ‘in the grip of an entirely uncontrollable passion.’
185 
Soon after this exchange of letters, a new colonel was appointed to command the unit. As he 
brought his wife and family with him to Germany, he needed a larger house and decided to 
take the doctor’s house for himself, ejecting the British officers and the doctor from his 
consulting rooms. Michael Howard’s sympathies were now fully on the side of the German 
doctor and his family against his own colonel, whose behaviour he considered morally 
unacceptable. As he explained to his mother, the colonel was: 
… quite incapable of understanding that in a country where there are only 230,000 houses 
for 6 million inhabitants, it literally is morally wrong for two people to occupy a 32 room 
house … The Colonel was so childish as to ask me to try and prove that the doctor had 
been an ardent Nazi. When I told him that I knew the old boy quite well, and was quite 
certain that he had not been one, he was a bit taken aback … The stupidity of it – no 




The matter spread to involve local politicians and trade unions in the town and opposition to 
the requisition antagonised relations between British and Germans, which had already 
started to deteriorate due to local protests at the continued low level of food rations. The 
dispute was eventually resolved by designating the house as offices for the Intelligence 
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Section, rather than living quarters, allowing the doctor to keep his consulting rooms, while 
the colonel found another house in a town eighteen miles away. This was, according to 
Howard, ‘a blessing in disguise.’
187
 His judgement on the colonel, whom he considered had 
‘learnt to dispense entirely with a moral sense of any sort’, was devastating: 
Trying to explain to him why something is ‘right’, or ‘wrong’ instead of ‘a good thing’ or ‘a 
bad thing’ is like trying to explain the colour of a sunset to a man who has been blind for 




Personal relationships in occupied Germany between male occupiers and female occupied 
are often discussed in physical terms, as prostitution and casual sex, liaisons and marriages 
of convenience, or, occasionally, as love at first sight followed by marriage. Howard’s story 
shows the importance of another dimension: that of social constraints, moral judgements and 
a code of accepted behaviour, understood by both sides. Soon after his arrival he wrote to 
his parents that the destruction of German cities was ‘much as it ought to be’ and no more 
than the Germans deserved.
189
 A year later, his personal relationship with, and sympathy for, 
a German family, led to his perception that it was not the defeated Germans, but the British 
colonel who breached the moral code.  
Margret, the doctor’s daughter, gained a place to read medicine at the University of Bonn 
and moved there in early October 1947. Howard went to visit her, before he left Germany in 
December, to take up his own university place at Cambridge: 
It was unthinkable that I should leave Germany without saying goodbye to Margret in 
person, now in Bonn. At this stage I needed no pretext, fictitious or otherwise, to make the 
trip … There was much sighing, some tears, many promises, promises to write, promises to 
meet again. We knew that neither of us would be deflected from our immediate aims, she to 
qualify as a doctor and I to get my degree and find financial independence. But there was 
still the prospect that I might spend a semester at the university in Bonn in the New Year, 
which we both knew would pose a serious threat to our standing as demi-vierges. In the 
event, we were to correspond, often and passionately … We continued writing for most of 
two years, by which time, starved of actual face-to-face contact, our correspondence had 
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Husbands and wives 
Some personal relationships between British men and German women resulted in marriage. 
In total around ten thousand ‘war brides’ emigrated from Germany to the UK between 1947 
and 1950.
191
 These figures were slightly lower than the number of German war brides who 
went to the United States, although estimates vary.
192
 Some war brides have published their 
memoirs
193
 which describe extraordinary personal histories, but it is difficult to know how 
typical their experiences were. Fourteen war brides were interviewed by Inge Weber-Newth 
and Dieter Steinert, as part of a study of German immigration to Britain between 1947 and 
1951.
194
 In a later article, Weber-Newth presented a generally negative picture of their 
experiences, both in Germany and Britain, quoting a German charity, Caritas, that only a 
small number were content and stating that the interviews showed that unfavourable 
perceptions of their status as war brides ‘remained a burden for many decades.’
195
 
While acknowledging that ‘the spectrum of relationships was diverse’, Weber-Newth placed 
post-war occupation marriages in a context of social and cultural dislocation at the end of the 
war, claiming that ‘Allied troops were not generally welcomed … during the first few weeks a 
harsh regime was practised and the occupiers took what they saw as their rights as a victor’, 
and corruption, sex and prostitution were inevitable in the circumstances.
196
 The reasons the 
women interviewed for the study gave for marrying were generally practical, such as hope 
for improved material conditions, the higher status and better appearance of Allied soldiers, 
a desire to have a family and children and a concern that otherwise they might not be able to 
marry,
197
 given the gender imbalance in post-war Germany.
198
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More recently, Isobel Schropper has conducted similar research among Austrian war brides. 
She discovered that the situation was similar in many ways but, despite a generally negative 
reaction in Austria to women who associated with British soldiers, significant barriers to 
marriage imposed by the British authorities and original expectations not being met when 
they arrived in Britain, the eighteen war brides she interviewed generally displayed more 
positive attitudes: 
Irrespectively of how difficult it was to deal with cultural differences, all the interviewees 
expressed pride in having overcome them and in having established their place in the 




Given the similarities in the situation in Germany and Austria and the small samples 
considered, it is difficult to generalise from these results and claim that Austrian war brides 
were more content in Britain. It is more likely that both studies reflected individual differences 
among those interviewed. Some German and Austrian war brides settled in Britain and 
remained married for the rest of their lives. Others, unsurprisingly, found it difficult to cope 
with cultural differences and unmet expectations and returned home, separated or divorced. 
Historical research on German and Austrian war brides has generally been conducted with 
wives rather than husbands, either because the research was conducted as part of a wider 
study of migration,
200
 or because women were more likely to retain links with German or 
Austrian religious or cultural organisations, which made it possible to identify them later, but 
not husbands in cases where they had separated or divorced. Husbands were often older 
than their wives, died earlier and few are still alive, so there is limited scope for further 
interviews.
201
 However, some conclusions can be drawn from contemporary records. British 
men were under very little practical or material pressure to marry.
202
 Even if their girlfriends 
became pregnant, members of the occupying forces were under no legal obligation to marry 
the mother or provide financial support for illegitimate children.
203
 It has to be assumed, 
therefore, that those who married did so for romantic reasons, to keep the woman they 
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loved, because they were encouraged or persuaded to do so by their girlfriends, or because 
it was in accordance with their moral and social understanding of correct behaviour, or a 
combination of all these reasons. 
British men who decided to marry a German woman had to devote a considerable amount of 
time and effort before they received permission to do so. In addition to antagonism from 
some members of the local population and concerns or explicit disapproval expressed by 
parents or other family members on both sides, official regulations at first prohibited and then 
strongly discouraged marriage. Despite the relaxation of the non-fraternisation rules, 
marriage with ‘ex-enemy aliens’ was forbidden until 31 July 1946, when a government 




Bureaucratic and legal obstacles had still to be overcome before the marriage could take 
place. Approval in each case was required from commanding officers. No marriage was 
permitted until six months after the date of application, during which time the man was 
required to return to the UK on leave, presumably intended as a cooling-off period. In 
addition, the prospective wife had to undergo a medical examination and receive a certificate 
of good health from a British medical officer, and a certificate of good character signed by 
the Oberbürgermeister or other suitable German official.
205
 Prospective wives, and in some 
cases their families, were subject to security examinations and a ‘list of certain categories of 
women considered politically undesirable for marriage’ was compiled by the British 
authorities though not openly circulated.
206
 Regulations and guidelines, issued by the British 
Control Commission for Austria for the administration of marriage policy, specified that it was 
‘the duty of the Commanding Officers to try and dissuade members of the forces from 
marriage overseas,’ both for security reasons and in their own interest, by making them 
aware of cultural differences which could cause difficulties. In addition the regulations 
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specified that the proposed marriage had to be discussed with a religious chaplain, and the 
husband had to ensure that suitable accommodation would be available in Britain.
207
 
Jan Thexton had great difficulty obtaining authorisation from his commander in Germany, a 
brigadier, who denied any knowledge of a change in the regulations and whose initial 
response has been described above.
208
 Thexton went home to enlist the support of his MP, 
who agreed to help. On his return to Germany he found a big notice on his desk: ‘Here is 
your authority to get married. God help you.’ Having obtained authorisation from the British, 
he still had to obtain permission from the German authorities, before he and his wife could 
be married in a German registry office. When interviewed in 2007, he said that he had 
written an official notice of the correct procedure, which was circulated in the British Zone. 
He was told later that ‘three thousand other couples married in that year [1947-8] … based 
upon what I’d negotiated with the Germans.’
209
 
Marriage with a former enemy alien was the ultimate symbol of acceptance and 
reconciliation, especially as this automatically meant the spouse acquired British nationality 
and the right to live in Britain. Personal relationships, both sexual and non-sexual, between 
British men and German women were common and widespread, but marriage was different, 
as this implied a long term commitment on both sides. It is worth noting that, for a small but 
significant number of British men in occupied Germany, such as Jan Thexton, meeting and 
arranging to marry their future wives was a deliberate decision that meant they had to 
overcome significant personal, bureaucratic and social obstacles, and which inevitably 
affected and changed their future lives as much, if not more, than anything else they did 
during and after the war. Rather than providing evidence of ‘the breakdown of moral and 
cultural norms’ in a society ‘confronted with destruction, death and the flight of women and 
children for survival’, as claimed by Weber-Newth,
210
 the history of the 10,000 German and 
Austrian war brides who married British servicemen and members of the Control 
Commission shows the strength and persistence of social convention and moral standards. 
Despite the experience of the war and its aftermath, in the field of personal relationships, 
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British and German individuals applied and expected similar standards of social and 
personal behaviour.  
 
7.5   People like us? 
 
‘But it was part of the normal scene almost, this constant movement of peoples  




In contrast to their view of German civilians, the four young officers and IWM interviewees 
considered here increasingly perceived Russian soldiers, and Russian, Polish and other 
Eastern European Displaced Persons (DPs), unfavourably in terms of national stereotypes, 
despite the Soviet Union having fought on the same side as Britain in the war and the DPs 
having suffered as forced labourers under German rule. Whereas extensive contacts with 
the German civilian population on many different levels and in different contexts, at work, as 
neighbours, domestic servants, friends, lovers and potential marriage partners, resulted in 
their being perceived as individuals and ‘people like us’, lack of contact with Russian soldiers 
and Eastern European DPs contributed to their being perceived as socially and culturally 
different. 
One IWM interviewee, for example, described the Russians in Berlin as ‘fine fighting soldiers’ 
but a ‘very different sort of people from what we were.’
212
 Similarly, initial sympathy for DPs 
as victims of Nazism was replaced with a perception of them as a problem. Although this 
view was often based on hearsay and rumour, there was no lack of circumstantial evidence 
which reinforced numerous stories of Russian soldiers and DPs looting, raping, stealing and 
murdering.
213
 These post-war perceptions contributed to the development of a Cold War 
mentality, as they reinforced long-standing suspicions of Soviet intentions and more recent 
concerns about new communist regimes in Poland and Eastern Europe,  
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Russian soldiers 
In the closing stages of the war in Europe, it appeared to some British military units on the 
ground in Germany, with justification, that their movements were directed as much against a 
potential Russian threat, as against German military opposition which had already collapsed. 
Michael Palliser, for example, described how, when his battalion of Churchill tanks was 
dispersed around the countryside north of Hamburg, hoping to be sent to Denmark, which 
had a reputation of being something of a ‘land of milk and honey,’ another brigade ‘came 
zooming through us one day, to our indignation, and zoomed on up to Denmark’ in order to 
get there before the Russians.
 214
   
This was not an isolated occurrence. In the final days of the war, a number of British units 
raced to reach positions ahead of the Russians. In his history of T-Force, Sean Longden 
described how one unit, under the command of Major Tony Hibbert, was ordered on 1 May, 
shortly before VE Day, to advance urgently to the naval port of Kiel on the Baltic.
215
 Hibbert 
later made enquiries as to where his orders had originated and discovered that, a month 
earlier, on 4 April 1945, a radio signal from the Japanese embassy in Stockholm to Tokyo 
had been intercepted, stating that the Russians intended to occupy Denmark. As a result, on 
1 May, the same day that Hibbert was ordered to advance to Kiel, the Royal Navy received 
orders to enter Copenhagen harbour, which it did on 4 May, and British troops advanced to 
Wismar on the Baltic coast, twenty miles inside the area agreed as forming the Soviet Zone, 
arriving on 2 May just before the Russians.
216
 
Throughout the Cold War, the idea that the British and Americans could, or should, have 
combined with Germany, their wartime enemy, against the Soviet Union, their former ally, 
was commonplace in West Germany, while British government officials were anxious to deny 
they had ever been sympathetic to the idea. When interviewed in 2010, Michael Palliser 
explained that in his view, tensions between the Allies at the end of the war could never have 
developed into open conflict, as British troops would have refused to fight with the Germans 
against the Soviet Union.
217
 But if, as Palliser suggested, the attitude of the great majority of 
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British troops towards their Russian allies was favourable during and immediately after the 
war, the situation changed quickly. When asked when he first became aware of increasing 
suspicion of the Russians, Palliser replied: 
I think that within, I would say, two or three months it was quite clear that there were 
tensions. The Russians were making life more difficult and one kept getting stories of how 
they treated returning prisoners-of-war and there was a build-up of distrust of the Russians, 
which in a way …  I was in Berlin a year after, ’46 rather than ’45 … there was undoubtedly 




The IWM interviewees who spoke of their encounters with Russian soldiers told a similar 
story, of a short period of friendly relations, followed by tensions soon after the war, 
consolidating over the next twelve months into a deep sense of suspicion and mistrust.  
There was more contact between British and Russian soldiers in Berlin than elsewhere, but it 
was limited, hence the British saw and heard evidence of the behaviour of Russian soldiers, 
as dirty, drunk, looting and raping, without having sufficient personal contact to question 
these stereotypes or appreciate the Russian point of view. Four of the IWM interviewees 
were members of an advance party of British servicemen who went to Berlin in July 1945. 
The stories they told reflected the German population’s image of the Russians and 
highlighted behaviour both British and Germans considered socially, culturally and morally 
reprehensible.  
One IWM interviewee was the British officer responsible for security in the Tiergarten, the 
principal black market district of Berlin. He had been told that if they could work with the 
Russians in Berlin they could do so in the rest of Germany and Europe, but they never did. 
People would rush in to say that Russians were looting. On one occasion a man came in 
stark naked claiming that the Russians had stolen his clothes. They had to employ 1,000 
Germans for a week, he continued, to clean the barracks they took over from the Russians. 
In the garages where they stayed there was a dead body in the cellar. All washbasins had 
been used as toilets.
219
 One evening he saw a large number of Russian soldiers, men and 
women, with their ponies loaded with loot, singing songs which may have come from Central 
Asia: ‘There was something ominous about it all.’ Asked about the attitude of the Russian 
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troops to the British, he said that on the whole it was very good. They wanted schnapps, and 
it didn’t matter if it was real or petrol. Personally he had few connections with the Russians 
but when he came across them he found them very helpful.
220
 
An NCO told a similar story: ‘The Russians behaved appallingly.’ All the stories of soldiers 
with watches up their arms were quite true. He saw that dozens of times. Also ‘pulling 
standard lamps out of a house and wondering why they wouldn’t work.’ Leaving a cinema 
one night, he walked straight into rifle fire where British troops were firing at Russians. When 
they first arrived in Berlin the troops were meant to stay in the Olympic Stadium, but it was 
uninhabitable. Two Olympic pools had been used as latrines. Statues had their heads 
knocked off and cupboards were reduced to matchwood. For the first two to three weeks, the 
British soldiers slept in lorries at the back of the stadium. In general, he said ‘It must have 
been terrible for the Germans – without a doubt … Like the Vikings, plunder, pillage and 
rape.’ Asked about the attitude of the Russians to the British troops he replied that it was 




The evidence examined for this study indicates that most British people in Germany had little 
contact with Russian soldiers. After an initial period of friendly relations, they adopted the 
stereotypes prevalent at the time among the German population, as these views were 
generally in accordance with their own preconceptions and were confirmed by the negative 
experiences of those who did encounter Russian troops, especially in Berlin.  
Displaced Persons 
At the end of the war it has been estimated there were around 10.8 million DPs in the area of 
the former German Reich, plus occupied parts of France and Belgium,
222
 but this number 
reduced rapidly over the next twelve months to less than 400,000 in the British Zone.
223
 At 
the end of September 1945, it was estimated that the number in the western zones was 
between 1.2 and 1.4 million,
224
 including 825,000 Poles, 100,000 Ukrainians and 188,000 
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from the Baltic States.
225
 Around 600,000 DPs were accommodated in each of the US and 
British zones, and 100,000 in the French zone.
226
 Numbers then declined more gradually to 
365,872 in the British Zone in June 1946,
227
 and 217,725 in August 1947.
228
  
Official policy and planning for DPs conducted during the war by SHAEF, the combined US 
and British Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force, was based on the 
assumption that liberated DPs would wish to return home as soon as possible, but would be 
amenable to staying in temporary ‘Assembly Centres’ for a short period while travel 
arrangements were made.
229
 Once Displaced Persons were accommodated in camps, the 
British occupiers had little contact with them, except when required to resolve a dispute or 
conflict. From September 1945, most DPs in the British Zone were Poles who refused to 
return following reports of poor living conditions in Poland under communist rule. Some 
feared enlistment in the Polish army or of being treated as collaborators. Others, originally 
from the east of the country, were concerned that their former homes were now under 
Russian control and part of the Soviet Union.
230
  
In a pioneering study, Wolfgang Jacobmeyer claimed that the perception of DPs by 
American and British occupation forces was misinformed and based on inaccurate 
stereotypes.
231
 In a study of crime statistics for Bremen from May to November 1945, he 
showed that the crime rate among the DP population, 2.03% including minor offences, was 
roughly similar to that among the German populations of other major cities at the same time. 
This was much higher than in 1928 but, as Jacobmeyer argued, comparison with a pre-war 
norm was not appropriate for post-war crime rates as most crimes in Germany in 1945 and 
1946, whether committed by DPs or the local population, were related to obtaining food and 
a consequence of the economic conditions at the time.
232
 However, figures for Bremen may 
not be typical of the rest of the country. Records of crimes tried at the British Military 
Government High Court in Hamburg, 22 June 1945 to 31 March 1947, tend to support the 
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anecdotal evidence from contemporary observers of a high crime rate among DPs. Over 
25% of those accused were Polish, Russian or Eastern European. Of the nine people 
sentenced to death, eight were Polish and one German.
233
 
Of those considered in this chapter, three of the four young officers and five of the twenty-
one IWM interviewees spoke of contacts with DPs, in all cases referring to them as potential 
sources of trouble, but not without sympathy. Initially the predominant image was of the 
constant movement of people, both Germans and other nationalities, as if, as one 
commentator described it, a giant ant-heap had been disturbed.
234
 Michael Palliser referred 
to it as ‘part of the normal scene … the feeling of the lost tribe almost.’
235
 
Michael Howard described how one of his colleagues, a British officer, was killed by a 
‘marauding band of DPs’. His colleague was taking his German girlfriend home when they 
were flagged down by a German woman, who told them that ‘drunken Polish DPs were 
ransacking the farm where she lived.’ He drove to the farm but was shot dead. His girlfriend 
managed to get into the driving seat of the car and return to the town. The Polish DPs were 
later captured by a platoon of British soldiers, tried and condemned to death by firing 
squad.
236
  Howard was not unsympathetic towards DPs as individuals, though critical of the 
Soviet and Polish governments, whom he blamed for the DPs’ unwillingness to go home. He 
explained that Belgians, Dutch and French returned home very quickly, as did Russian DPs, 
although those who had been captured in the fighting were ‘seen as cowards, collaborators 
and traitors’ by the Soviet government and ‘many were eliminated on return.’  By the end of 
1946, he wrote, the great majority of those remaining were Poles and ‘the DP problem had 
effectively become a Polish DP problem.’
237
 
The US soldier and commentator, Saul Padover, has suggested that Germans blamed 
Eastern European DPs whenever a crime had been committed and US soldiers believed 
them, though everyone plundered at that time, including US soldiers and German civilians. 
Padover added that Goebbels would be ‘laughing up his sleeve’ at this ‘final triumph of his 
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 This explanation is not satisfactory, as, initially at least, British (and US) 
soldiers had no reason to believe the Germans rather than the DPs; everything they had 
been told during the war encouraged them to see DPs favourably, as representatives of 
Allied nations and victims of the Germans who deserved their sympathy. In addition, as the 
examples quoted above from the young British officers and IWM interviewees show, they 
were not as naïve as Padover suggested. In the absence of any functioning German police 
at the end of the war, the occupation forces investigated and resolved many cases 
themselves and were not necessarily dependent on second hand reports from the local 
population. 
Jacobmeyer suggested a different explanation for the US and British Allies placing an 
exaggerated emphasis on crime committed by DPs: that they were disappointed at the lack 
of gratitude shown by DPs for their liberation and surprised that they of all people should 
resort to crime.
239
 This explanation is not satisfactory either. The occupation forces may at 
times have felt that DPs were not suitably grateful for what they believed had been done for 
them, but this view did not necessarily lead to a perception of them as criminals. It could be 
argued that they expected DPs, as oppressed slave labourers, to take revenge against their 
former masters and that a high level of crime was therefore, initially at least, understandable 
and unsurprising. For example, as General Templer wrote in the British Zone Review, about 
the chaos of ‘The Early Days’: 
Over this grim scene there swarmed a milling mass of displaced persons, drunk with 
liberation and in some cases alcohol, looting, raping and killing. Considering the history of 




If revenge attacks by DPs were to be expected, the British occupiers found the reluctance 
among some DPs to return home more surprising. Their assumption, based on everything 
they had been told during the war, was that liberated slave labourers from countries invaded 
by the Nazis would wish to return home as soon as possible, as many did. The British had 
entered the war to defend the independence of Poland. After the fall of France they fought to 
defend themselves, but as the threat of invasion receded they, with their US Allies, believed 
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they were fighting a crusade to liberate the rest of Europe from their Nazi oppressors. Once 
this had been achieved, the reluctance of some DPs to return home raised difficult 
questions. Was a country truly liberated if the people who had lived there before the war did 
not want to return? Or were the DPs reluctant to return because they were collaborators who 
had volunteered to work in Germany rather than being forced to do so, in which case did 
they deserve favourable treatment? The British perception of DPs depended on their 
nationality. Rather than seeing all as victims of Nazi oppression, the greatest criticism was 
focussed on the ‘Poles and Russians,’
241
 as they were the most reluctant to return home.
242
  
By the end of 1945, the remaining DPs were mostly Polish and did not want to return home 
to a country now under communist control. In these circumstances, both sympathy for DPs, 
and a perception that they represented a problem that needed to be controlled, served to 
reinforce Cold War attitudes. As DPs were kept isolated in camps, often in poor conditions 
and unable to obtain work, encounters between British occupying forces and DPs were 
limited and, when they occurred, were often in difficult circumstances of confrontation and 
dispute. DPs therefore came to be perceived as troublemakers and were stereotyped as 
members of a national group, Poles or Russians, that did not observe accepted standards of 
behaviour. At the same time, sympathy with the difficulties experienced by individual DPs 
served to reinforce a Cold War perception of communist governments in the Soviet Union 
and Poland as oppressive regimes, that did not share the same values or abide by the same 
standards as those the British believed were typical of their own ‘civilised’ behaviour.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
The four young officers discussed in depth in this chapter, together with the twenty young 
men and one woman interviewed for the Imperial War Museum Sound Archive whose views 
are also considered here, were highly diverse. They came from varied family and 
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educational backgrounds and performed a wide range of tasks in occupied Germany, to 
which they brought diverse experiences, attitudes and prejudices. Although they cannot be 
categorised as a ‘strong generation’, sharing a common understanding of significant 
historical events, they formed a ‘weak generation’, or age cohort, with one important 
characteristic: all had little, if any, adult experience other than war and had to adapt to an 
entirely new and unfamiliar situation in a strange country. Some had to deal with people from 
several different national cultures: Americans, French, Poles and Russians, as well as 
Germans. Most found themselves in Germany because their units were stationed there at 
the end of the war. Instead of returning home, they had to stay for at least twelve months 
until they were demobilised. Some were simply glad to be alive, some took advantage of the 
opportunity to enjoy themselves and a few, including Howard and Chaloner, were given 
important jobs with responsibilities far in excess of what was usual at their age.  
Unlike their senior officers, the majority of those considered, with a few significant 
exceptions, did not explicitly mention the evidence of death and destruction they saw around 
them, regardless of whether this was due to Allied bombing campaigns and the land battles 
at the end of the war, or to war crimes and atrocities committed by Germans in concentration 
camps or elsewhere. Their overwhelming concern, reflected both in their work and their 
personal relationships, was not to look back on the horrors of the past, but forward to the 
future, uncertain as this was. It could be argued that Hannah Arendt’s reference to the 
‘absence of mourning for the dead’, that ‘nowhere is this nightmare of destruction and horror 
less felt and less talked about than in Germany itself’
243
 applied at least to some of the 
British as well as to defeated and apathetic Germans.  
Two other themes noted previously as characteristic of the senior officers were also absent 
from the reactions of those considered in this chapter. There were no ‘echoes of Empire’ or 
references to the Imperial ideals of trusteeship and service which were so prominent among 
the older generation, though Howard was born in Fiji, where his father was a colonial 
administrator, Thexton spent his early childhood in Bermuda and three of the IWM 
interviewees had served in India during the war and one in Africa. The only exception was a 
comment by Michael Palliser, (whose maternal grandfather had worked as a naval engineer 
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in South Africa and Australia). When asked about the overall aims of the occupation, Palliser 
replied that there was: ‘a rather British feeling, semi-colonial in a way ... [to] ensure the 
colony worked well,’ but he described this as a ‘post-colonial atmosphere’ suggesting a 
perception of the end of Empire, rather than its heyday.
244
 
Similarly, there was no evidence of the ‘missionary idealism’ or the exhortations to ‘save the 
soul of Germany’ and ‘rebuild civilisation’ expressed by Montgomery and Robertson in their 
speeches and broadcasts. With the exception of two conscientious objectors, religious faith 
or belief was not mentioned in interviews or considered relevant to their time in Germany. 
Ironically, personal idealism and moral principles were most in evidence when they acted in 
opposition to official Military Government policy, as in Howard’s determination to continue to 
secure material from Germany to assist British economic recovery and Chaloner’s belief in 
the need to create a free press, independent of government.   
The overwhelming concern of these young people was their personal welfare and their 
future. They were not rebels. They were in no doubt that the war had been just and 
necessary. They were pragmatic, accepted orders and worked hard when required. But now 
the war was over, individual goals were more important than collective aims. In the absence 
of any serious resistance from the German population, personal relations became as, if not 
more, important than their work.  
All four young officers, and seventeen of the twenty-one IWM interviewees, spoke of 
contacts with the local German population. These ranged from meeting people through work 
or as neighbours, providing goods and services, leisure activities such as going to the 
theatre, concerts or the cinema, to girlfriends, casual sex and marriage. Through making 
personal contact, they came to see Germans as individuals, rather than collectively as the 
enemy. This perception went further than making a black and white distinction between 
‘good’ Germans who had opposed and ‘bad’ Germans who had supported the Nazi regime. 
The Germans they met and spoke to appeared to share the same values as they did, of 
respect for life and property, self-control and respect for authority. Michael Howard found he 
had more in common with ‘a pleasant and intelligent German than a stupid and uncongenial 
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Englishman’ and sided with a German doctor in a dispute over the use of his house, against 
his own colonel and commanding officer who, in his view, displayed a lack of ‘moral sense of 
any sort.’
245
 Some collective prejudices remained, but wartime stereotypes of Germans as 
militaristic, aggressive and brutal, were replaced with others that reflected their status as a 
defeated nation, such as apathetic, self-pitying and unconcerned for others. 
In contrast with the German population, personal contacts with Russian soldiers and 
Displaced Persons were very limited and, from September 1945, nearly always in 
circumstances of conflict. Jacobmeyer has written of the alienation of DPs from the German 
population once they were gathered together in camps and claimed this contributed to a 
perception of them as ‘the enemy.’
246
 It appears that a similar process applied to the British 
occupiers. The policy of internment in camps and the lack of direct personal contact led to a 
collective, and often incorrect, perception of Russian soldiers and those DPs who remained 
after September 1945 as drunken, criminal troublemakers, who did not observe accepted 
standards of behaviour and had no respect for ‘civilised’ values, such as respect for life and 
property, personal cleanliness and self-control. 
Despite their differences, both senior and younger officers were more concerned with the 
future than the past, which led them to focus on reconstruction rather than restitution and 
reparations. The senior officers understood their role to be the restoration of order and the 
prevention of disease and social unrest, which presupposed a reasonably effective civil 
administration and a functioning economy. With a few exceptions such as Chaloner and 
Howard, the younger generation was not motivated by the same ideological concerns as 
their seniors, nor did they respond to the end of the war by seeking revenge, or justice. 
Facing an uncertain future, in the interlude between the end of the war and returning home, 
they started to adjust to a peacetime mentality and rebuild their lives. Through personal 
contacts, at work and in their leisure time, they became reconciled to their former enemies, 
cooperated willingly on the task of reconstruction and found no difficulty working with 
Germans they came to see as individuals and ‘people like us.’ 
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These changes were reflected in the personal histories of all four of the young officers 
considered here. Although this period was a brief interlude, it was also a formative influence 
on the rest of their lives. John Chaloner created a new magazine, Der Spiegel, as a model 
for a free press, independent of government. Having succeeded, he found his new magazine 
could survive without him and, in time, become more financially successful and politically 
influential than any equivalent British publication. Michael Palliser, who said he understood 
the army of occupation was there in case there was any trouble with the Germans, and ‘to 
make sure Germany was not in a position to do it again’, became a convinced European and 
spent much of his later working life negotiating British entry to the European Community. Jan 
Thexton, who accepted a job with the Control Commission because he believed he was too 
old to return to accountancy, whose strongest memories of his time in Germany were ‘just 
getting to know the Germans’, and who met and married his wife in Germany, changed jobs 
from compiling lists of equipment for reparations, to procuring supplies for the occupation 
forces from the German economy, and then to promoting sales of British weapons and 
equipment to the newly formed German armed forces. Michael Howard, whose role was to 
exact as much as possible in reparations from Germany, found that, by the time he was due 
to leave, he was out of step with official policy. Over 60 years later, he still claimed that the 
contribution he and his unit made to assist British economic recovery had never been 
properly recognised. Shortly before he left Germany, he exchanged fond farewells with a girl 
he had met through his work, and they stayed in touch, as friends, for over 60 years. 
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8 Conclusion 
This thesis explores what twelve important and influential British individuals aimed to achieve 
in occupied Germany, and why, and how this changed over time. In so doing it aims to 
contribute to a better understanding of the motivation of the ‘governing elite’ of leading British 
officials and administrators in the first three years after the war ended in May 1945, and 
explain why British policies changed rapidly from conflict to cooperation, from the ‘Four Ds’ 
agreed at Potsdam to a more positive policy, which I have described as the ‘Three Rs’ of 
physical and economic Reconstruction, political Renewal and personal Reconciliation. 
Diversity 
The biographical approach adopted highlights the diversity of aims and intentions among 
British people in Germany, which varied according to their age and experience, roles and 
responsibilities, political and religious beliefs. This diversity helps to explain some of the 
apparent contradictions in British policy, such as the combination of pragmatism and 
idealism, economic constraints with attempts to promote reconstruction, and the parallel 
worlds of occupier and occupied living apart with examples of intense engagement. Mary 
Fulbrook has noted in her book, Dissonant Lives,
1
 that to describe patterns of behaviour in 
dichotomous terms, such as ‘coercion vs consent’, ‘misses the complexities surrounding 
different degrees of constraints and a related sense of agency.’
2
 Similarly, it appears from 
the evidence collected for this study that generalised descriptions of British policy and 
actions, which do not account for diversity of attitudes and behaviour, are at best an over-
simplification and at worst a distortion. For example, the occupation cannot be characterised 
simply as ‘pragmatic’ or ‘idealistic’, or as ‘isolated’ or ‘integrated’ with the local population. 
The reality was more complex. 
While Montgomery, Robertson and their senior colleagues accepted and implemented the 
Potsdam decisions to disarm, demilitarise and denazify Germany, they perceived these 
tasks as relatively straightforward, compared with the far more difficult work of creating order 
out of chaos and promoting an economically viable, stable democracy. A policy of economic 
reconstruction, to be followed by political renewal, was outlined as early as September 1945 
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in a new Directive of Military Government, prepared by Montgomery, Robertson and their 
colleagues at the highest level of Military Government, at a time when the Foreign Office had 
no formal responsibility for internal affairs within the British Zone and the new Labour 
Government had only recently assumed office. In 1946 the Foreign Office played a 
significant part in accelerating the process of devolution of power to local German 
administrations, but the process had already been foreshadowed in Montgomery’s memos a 
year earlier, and implementation started before the end of 1945, with the creation of 
nominated representative councils, licensing of political parties and preparations for 
democratic elections.  
The three army generals, Montgomery, Robertson, and Bishop, were concerned to restore 
order from chaos, prevent unrest, and more generally, preserve the established social order, 
as this was in their own interest as members of a professional British establishment that had 
gained its wealth and social position from public service at home and in the empire, in the 
army, in government positions, in business, or through inheriting landed estates. They 
justified a policy of reconstruction through reference to the need to ‘rebuild civilisation’ after 
the destruction of war, missionary ideals of ‘saving the soul of Germany’, and paternalistic 
notions of imperial trusteeship, caring for a nation until the inhabitants were, in their view, 
mature enough to take responsibility for government. After leaving Germany, they were able 
to present a self-congratulatory account of humane and benign British policies, which had 
contributed to a peaceful and economically prosperous Federal Republic. Sholto Douglas 
was the exception among this group. He hated his time in Germany, was pragmatic rather 
than idealistic, and troubled by personal issues, such as being instructed to confirm the 
death penalty on Goering, and allegations of corruption made in the British press.  
The partial and self-congratulatory account of the army generals can be qualified by 
examining the histories of other British individuals, who also played an important and 
influential role in occupied Germany. The four civilian administrators were a very diverse 
group with little in common, despite all working in different ways to promote their conception 
of democracy in Germany. Ingrams’ background was similar to that of the army generals. He 
was influenced by his religious beliefs and experience of imperial administration. Despite 
some early success in establishing nominated representative councils, his attempt to model 
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political renewal in Germany on antiquated notions of British ‘parish pump’ democracy 
encountered strong resistance from leading German politicians and some of his British 
colleagues. The two committed international socialists, Albu and Flanders, left Germany at 
the end of 1947, disappointed that their achievements had not matched early hopes of 
establishing a ‘positive socialist policy’ in Germany. Their socialist colleague, Berry, was 
apparently more successful in Hamburg, though his aims were more modest. Heavily 
influenced by his experience as a district administrator during the occupation of the 
Rhineland after the First World War, he supported the newly elected SPD administration in 
Hamburg led by the former exile Max Brauer, promoted the interests of the city, established 
good working relations between British and German officials, and in so doing defused 
potential conflicts and preserved British interests, which he perceived as similar to those of 
the city: stability, economic reconstruction, personal reconciliation, and the maintenance of 
good relations with the city’s business and political elite. As Frances Rosenfeld has shown, 
both sides were proud of this at the time, but reconciliation was achieved at the cost of 
ignoring difficult issues, such as the city’s Nazi past, and its destruction by Allied bombing.        
The four young men with no adult experience but war were concerned above all for their own 
welfare and personal future. In two cases, Howard and Chaloner, they decided to act on their 
own initiative, even when this ran counter to official policy. They were not motivated by 
religious beliefs or ideals of service to the British Empire, and appeared unaware of 
exhortations from the generals at the top of the administration to ‘rebuild civilisation’ or ‘save 
the soul of Germany’. Nevertheless, all four were conscientious, worked long hours when 
required, and did not question the aims of the occupation, or the policies of economic 
reconstruction, political renewal and personal reconciliation. Inevitably, as young men, they 
had greater involvement with Germans than their senior officers, both through their work and 
socially. Personal contacts of all kinds, including friendships and sexual relations with 
German women, and in Thexton’s case, marriage, led them to see Germans as ‘people like 
us’, rather than in terms of the stereotypes prevalent during the war.  
Partial truths 
Many earlier claims by historians regarding British policy in occupied Germany appear to be 
partial truths that reflect some aspects of the situation, but not all. For example, some have 
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argued that the principal motivation underlying British policy was security: the need to disarm 
Germany and memories of the failure of appeasement after the First World War.
3
 Although 
this was true of many in Britain, such as Brigadier Morgan and the Parliamentary Post-War 
Planning group,
4
 security concerns were not especially prominent among the individuals 
researched for this study. Based on their personal experience of the scale of destruction, the 
lack of resistance and a generally positive attitude of the Germans towards the British, they 
considered there was little threat in the foreseeable future. Though aware that this might 
change in future, they did not draw the conclusion that a harsh occupation was required, 
either to extract reparations or to limit and control German economic activities indefinitely.  
The post-war period was experienced by most Germans as a time of great hardship, not 
surprisingly in view of widespread hunger, outbreaks of disease, overcrowded 
accommodation and an uncertain future, but this was not, as some Germans claimed at the 
time, the result of deliberate British policy. The British tried to ameliorate the worst effects of 
war and twelve years of Nazi rule, through securing imports of wheat, repairing the transport 
infrastructure and reviving the economy. The lessons both Robertson and Berry drew from 
their personal experience of the Rhineland occupation, were not only that appeasement had 
failed in the 1930s, but also that they had failed to support German democrats in the 1920s, 
and that, through inflicting unnecessarily harsh terms in the peace settlement of 1919, they 
and their Allies had helped create the economic and social conditions which made it possible 
for Hitler to seize power in 1933. As Military Governors, Robertson and Montgomery 
emphasised the positive aspects of their policy of promoting reconstruction and giving 
Germans ‘hope for the future’, rather than the negative aspects of disarmament, 
denazification and economic controls. 
A popular view of the occupation, widely held in Germany, was that the British were 
motivated by commercial competition and wished to gain economic benefits from the 
occupation. This was later denied by many senior British figures.
5
 The history of T-Force, 
and Michael Howard’s claims that the value of reparations to the British economy was much 
greater than officially acknowledged, show that there was some truth in these allegations, 
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but the British Zone proved to be an economic liability, not an asset that could be exploited. 
After a brief idealistic phase lasting until the end of 1945, the most important economic factor 
affecting British policy and actions was the perceived need to reduce the cost of the 
occupation. This perception in turn reinforced a policy of promoting German economic 
revival, to generate exports of manufactured goods to pay for the import of raw materials, 
especially food, subsidised by the British taxpayer.  
The reactions of those discussed in this study to the Holocaust and other atrocities 
committed by Germans were similarly complex. According to Mass Observation reports, 
British attitudes towards Germany reached a low point at the end of the Second World War, 
following press reports of the liberation of the concentration camps,
6
 but this was not 
necessarily typical of British soldiers in Germany and did not prevent them from having good 
relations with the local inhabitants. Palliser reported that he and his colleagues were not 
surprised by reports of ‘horrific atrocities’. They considered this ‘typically German’ and ‘were 
almost beyond being surprised by anything’,
7
 but still had friendly relations with the owners 
of the house where they were billeted. Chaloner was the only one of the twelve who was 
present at the liberation of a concentration camp. According to his sister, the experience 
affected him deeply, but he never spoke of it, except in private family conversations, and 
indirectly in a later novel. The experience did not prevent him, or his two Jewish staff-
sergeants, Bohrer and Ormond, from working closely with a team of young German 
journalists to create Der Spiegel. Some British soldiers were motivated, at times, by a desire 
for revenge, but this was not typical and was officially discouraged. A more common 
response, typified by Montgomery, was to generalise the issues of war crimes and the 
Holocaust and speak of the need to ‘restore civilisation’, or refer, as did the British Zone 
Review in October 1945 and Chaloner later in private conversations with his sister, to ‘man’s 
inhumanity to man.’ 
Common assumptions 
Despite diversity among those considered in this study, it is possible to identify a number of 
assumptions shared by all. The most significant of these was the aim of preventing another 
war. This was rarely stated explicitly but always assumed. All agreed that the greatest failure 
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of the peace settlement in 1919 was that it had not prevented a Second World War. ‘Winning 
the Peace’ meant that, this time, there would be no more war.
8
 
A second assumption was that the war had been caused by German aggression, and that it 
was essential to prevent the Nazi Party and former Nazis from achieving political power 
again. But, while there was general agreement on the aim, there was no consensus about 
how this could best be achieved. The socialist view, held by Albu and Flanders, was that the 
Nazi Party had achieved power through the support of the armed forces, landowners and 
industrialists, and it was necessary to remove their political influence in Germany through de-
militarisation, land reform, and the socialisation of industry. However, many of the most 
senior members of British Military Government were landowners, or had worked in business, 
and could not be expected to subscribe to these views. Montgomery’s family held land in 
Ireland. Robertson had managed a factory for Dunlop in South Africa. They found it easier to 
think in terms of a population led astray by their leaders, or a group of evil men who had to 
be removed from power. Once this had been done, they hoped the German people would 
learn to live in peace with their neighbours. 
Perhaps surprisingly, an anti-Russian, anti-communist consensus was shared by all, 
regardless of their political principles. Over time four distinct issues combined to form the 
prevalent and near universal Cold War mentality of the 1950s and 1960s. Firstly, long-
standing concerns about Russia as a possible threat to the British Empire, expressed most 
clearly by Montgomery.
9
 Secondly, a fear of communism among the professional middle 
classes, typified by Bishop, as a social and political ideology that could spread, like a 
disease, across Europe, create difficulties in the administration of Germany and possibly 
threaten their social position at home in Britain. The two socialists, Albu and Flanders, did 
not share this view but were equally opposed to Russian communism for a third set of 
reasons, which dated back to the conflicts between socialists and communists in Germany in 
the 1920s and 1930s. These came to a head in the Fusion campaign in Berlin in early 1946, 
when Albu compared communist ‘totalitarian’ tactics with those of the Nazis. Fourthly, 
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changing perceptions of Russian soldiers and Polish Displaced Persons reinforced anti-
Russian and anti-communist prejudices. Accounts by British personnel, including by Palliser, 
Howard and IWM interviewees, show that DPs were viewed sympathetically by many British 
personnel who came into contact with them, but at the same time they were perceived to be 
culturally different and not ‘people like us’. Alternatively, as part of a different but 
complementary narrative, DPs were described as ‘gallant allies’ whose reluctance to return 
home confirmed a negative view of life under communism in Poland and the Soviet Union. 
By the end of the period examined, ‘winning the peace’ had come to mean resisting Russian 
communism, as much as preventing a revival of Nazism within Germany. 
A further assumption shared by all was that, as the occupying power, the British had an 
obligation to maintain the basic functions of government in their zone of occupation and care 
for the welfare of the inhabitants. This meant they had to preserve life, prevent hunger and 
disease, maintain law and order and provide opportunities for employment, thereby 
preventing idleness and resulting discontent. These paternalistic notions were expressed 
most explicitly by those who had worked in the Empire, such as Montgomery, Robertson, 
Bishop and Ingrams, but were shared to some degree by all. Similar ideals, together with a 
sense of duty and personal obligation, were promoted in the English public schools
10
 and 
may have influenced those who had not worked in the Empire. All but two of the twelve 
individuals discussed in this study received a public school education.
11
 
All twelve believed that Britain was and would continue to be a great power in Europe and in 
the world.
12
 They gave no indication that they thought they were representatives of a power 
in decline. Although they understood that Britain lacked economic resources, this was to be 
expected after a long and difficult war. Even Albu, who before the war had voted for an anti-
imperialist candidate and advocated the creation of a socialist community of nations, had 
been brought up on the adventure stories of Kipling, G.A. Henty and Captain Marryat.
13
 The 
attitudes I have described as ‘echoes of empire’ and ‘missionary idealism’ were most 
prevalent among the older generation of army officers, such as Montgomery, Robertson and 
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Bishop, and former colonial administrators such as Ingrams. In their cases, direct parallels 
can be observed between their experiences in the Empire and policy and practices in 
occupied Germany. Imperial attitudes were less apparent among the socialist civilian 
administrators, Albu, Flanders and Berry, or the younger generation of officers, although 
Palliser, Thexton and Howard all had fathers who had worked overseas, in the navy, 
Bermuda and Fiji.  
All agreed that Britain should not have to bear the cost of the occupation. Early idealistic 
notions that the British would stay in Germany for twenty-five years and do whatever was 
necessary to prevent another war, were soon superseded by the requirement imposed from 
London that the cost to the British taxpayer had to be reduced. From early 1946 onwards, all 
those considered in this study accepted that British involvement in Germany would be 
temporary and had to be progressively scaled back.
14
 This implied that new social and 
political structures could not be imposed against the will of the Germans, as any reforms 
could be reversed once the British left. Even Ingrams accepted that he had to obtain 
agreement from the ‘German Working Party’ to his proposed changes to electoral procedure. 
Once Ordnance 57 devolved responsibility to local German administrations, British scope to 
implement any structural change was further reduced. British policy was limited to giving the 
Germans space to make their own decisions and reform their own institutions, while the 
British retained the power of veto, offering guidance and advice, but not imposing an alien 
model of government upon reluctant Germans.          
Aims and intentions and how these changed over time 
Although much of the evidence presented in this study was subjective, reflecting the 
perceptions of the twelve individuals researched, as recorded at the time in contemporary 
documents and in later memoirs and oral history interviews, some very broad generalisations 
can be made regarding British aims and policy in occupied Germany, on the basis of this 
study of twelve individuals. They all responded pragmatically to the chaos and destruction 
they saw around them, while the generals at the top of the administration justified a policy of 
taking active measures, rather than sitting back and doing nothing, in idealistic terms. Only a 
minority wanted to change fundamentally the structure of German social and political 
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institutions. All, including those who had hoped for a revolution within Germany to overthrow 
Hitler, now considered it essential to keep the peace, maintain law and order, control disease 
and provide employment, as they believed a stable, peaceful and democratic Germany was 
in Britain’s national interest and in their own interest as members of a professional middle 
class. They worked to restore what they understood to be representative and responsible 
government by Germans, initially at local level and later regionally.  
A deliberate policy of personal reconciliation followed later, in 1947, after numerous 
individual encounters at all levels between British and Germans had started to build trust and 
mutual respect. Examples given in this thesis include tributes paid by leading CDU 
politicians, Konrad Adenauer and Karl Arnold, to Robertson and Bishop respectively, the 
close working relationship between Berry and Brauer, the connections Albu and Flanders 
had with their German socialist colleagues in Neu Beginnen and the ISK, Chaloner’s 
recruitment of a team of young German journalists to create Der Spiegel, Howard’s 
relationship with the daughter of the doctor in whose house he was billeted and the 10,000 
British men, including Thexton, who met and married their wives in Germany. The policy of 
personal reconciliation received official endorsement with the formation of officially approved 
Anglo-German discussion groups and cultural centres, and from May 1947 in official 
directives and instructions.  
The twelve individuals justified a policy of Reconstruction, Renewal and Reconciliation in 
different ways, on the basis of the ‘mental baggage’ each brought with them. The older 
generation drew on personal religious beliefs, referring to the need to ‘rebuild civilisation’ or 
’save the soul of Germany’, and their understanding of the British Empire as a force for good 
in the world. Those who had lived through the occupation of the Rhineland after the First 
World War wrote of the need to support democratic politicians, and prevent a recurrence of 
economic and social conditions which had favoured the rise of extreme political parties, by 
which they meant both Nazis and Communists. The socialists argued that only a ‘positive 
socialist policy’ could prevent a return to fascism. Some members of the younger generation, 
such as Chaloner and Howard, were motivated by the ideals for which they had fought the 
war, or principles acquired at school or from their families, such as an understanding of what 
they considered morally right. At the same time, they and others were concerned for the 
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future, trying to rebuild their careers or personal lives after six years of war, and exploiting 
the situation as best they could for their personal advantage.       
It has been claimed that the stable democracy which later emerged in the Federal Republic 
was primarily the result of economic success, not the political or social steps taken by the 
Western Allies.
15
 This reflects the view expressed by many Germans in the first three years 
after the war, repeated and assumed to be correct by many of the British, including 
Montgomery and Douglas, that ‘it’s no use talking to us about democratic ideals unless you 
first fill our bellies.’
16
 It can, of course, be argued that there is a close connection between 
capitalism, economic prosperity and liberal democracy, but this was by no means apparent 
in the 1940s and it was not a simple matter of cause and effect. Many of the early British 
attempts to promote political renewal achieved few direct results. If however, the process of 
democratisation in Germany is seen as a ‘learning process’ that extended over 50 years 
from 1945, through social and political liberalisation in the 1960s, to eventual reunification in 
1990 and beyond,
17
 the twelve individuals discussed in this study may have made a 
significant contribution, not through deliberate structural reforms or ‘forced reorientation’
18
 
but by promoting dialogue and debate, and offering various institutional models the Germans 
could compare with their own traditions and modify, adopt or reject, as they thought best. 
To return to the question implied by the title of this thesis, did the British in occupied 
Germany succeed in ‘winning the peace’ after winning the war? There has been no further 
war in Europe,
19
 and both Britain and Germany have been politically stable and economically 
prosperous,
20
 so it could be argued that the goal of ‘winning the peace’ was achieved. On 
the other hand, many people in both countries are still coming to terms with the past; in 
Germany with memories of death, violence, the Holocaust, loss of their homes, and forty 
years of division between a capitalist West and Communist East. In Britain, although the 
ruptures were less, some still have difficulty coming to terms with the end of Empire and a 
diminished global role. It is hoped that this thesis can contribute to a better understanding of 
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British aims in occupied Germany and assist further research on how Germany emerged 
from Nazi dictatorship, war and foreign occupation, and the role of the British in helping or 
hindering this process. In so doing it can help us understand better the legacies of competing 
ideologies, oppressive governments, violent wars, and the subsequent defeat, occupation 
and rule of one country by another, that continue to cast their long shadows
21
 on the world 
today.
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Appendix A: Note on Sources 
Personal memoirs and autobiographies 
Personal memoirs and autobiographies were a useful starting point for further research in 
the primary archives, and a valuable indication of the subject’s attitudes, intentions and 
motivation. They have the advantage of providing a coherent and easily comprehensible 
account of the time the subject spent in Germany, together with their own accounts of their 
aims and intentions. On the other hand, they have the disadvantage that, written with 
hindsight, they may project an artificial coherence onto the course of events and, consciously 
or unconsciously, seek to present the author and his or her actions in a favourable light, 
whilst being selective as to what they include. 
Personal memoirs have been used for seven of the twelve individuals, though they vary 
greatly in scale and quality. Montgomery and Douglas both published autobiographies,
1
 but 
whereas Montgomery based his on a contemporary ‘log’ written for him while he was in 
Germany,
2
 Douglas based his on personal memories and made less use of official 
documents. Michael Howard published his memories of his time in Germany in 2010, based 
on letters he wrote as a young officer to his parents, carefully preserved by his mother.
3
 
Bishop’s and Albu’s memoirs both consist of unpublished typescripts written in retirement,
4
 
whereas Berry recorded his memories at the end of his life on an extended series of over 
forty tapes.
5
 Ingrams did not write a personal memoir of his time in Germany, but a published 
account of a journey across the Sahara to take up a position in Africa shortly afterwards, is 
an excellent source for his views on the future development of the British Empire and 
complements official papers he wrote in Germany.
6
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Official documents 
The official papers of the British Military Government and Control Commission in Germany 
have been used extensively but can be problematic. Only 1% of the records have survived; 
the rest were lost in transit from Germany to Britain or destroyed, apparently haphazardly 
rather than due to any consistent archival policy.
7
 There is extensive duplication and many 
gaps in the record, which makes it difficult to follow any person or theme over time. Many 
papers deal with routine and often trivial administrative matters. The papers are poorly 
catalogued in The National Archives (hereafter TNA). An additional 11 volume finding aid 
and inventory, published in 1993, is indispensable.
8
 Identifying the author and the recipient 
of papers can be difficult, due to the practice of addressing and signing papers by official 
position, rather than name, and initialling papers on behalf of others. Many of the papers are 
in a poor physical condition. However, those that have survived have been kept in their 
original context, as working files of the relevant individuals or departments. The official 
archives were most useful in combination with other sources, for example to check facts and 
claims made by individuals in memoirs or oral history interviews, but in some documents the 
subjects explicitly expressed what they aimed to achieve in Germany, or discussed this with 
others, for example in personal correspondence, speeches or newspaper and magazine 
articles. These were useful as they related directly to the questions posed in the thesis, but, 
as with all types of source, statements of opinion had to be treated with caution. The authors 
may not have been expressing their own views, but conforming to an official line, writing or 
saying what they believed the recipient wished to hear, or writing a speech to be delivered by 
someone else. Understanding the context could reveal issues which were not apparent from 
reading the document in isolation. 
Personal papers 
Collections of personal papers in the public archives have been used extensively where they 
exist. These were very variable, some extensive including a diary, personal correspondence, 
and official papers, others little more than a few newspaper cuttings. The Montgomery and 
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Bishop papers at the Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM) are in excellent condition, well 
catalogued and include much relevant information. Sholto Douglas’ papers, in the same 
archive, contain little on his time in Germany, apart from those used to write his 
autobiography. Robertson did not keep personal papers, but a reasonably full collection of 
his official papers has been preserved at TNA. Good collections of personal papers exist for 
three of the four civilian diplomats and administrators. Berry’s papers are held at Somerset 
Heritage Centre (SHC) and Bath Record Office (BRO) and those of Austen Albu and Harold 
Ingrams, at Churchill College Archives (CAC). Flanders’ papers at the Modern Record 
Centre (MRC) contain little on Germany, but were useful in providing information on his pre-
war connections with German socialists. In the case of Ingrams, many papers are out of 
context, not held as part of an original file and are unsigned and undated. However, cross-
referencing with documents in TNA enabled some of these to be identified as first drafts of 
papers submitted to an official working party on democratic development in Germany, and 
were useful in identifying his role and intentions.  
Oral History 
Oral history sources were used particularly for the ‘young men’ considered in part 3, for 
whom there is less material in the public archives compared with both the senior officers and 
civilian diplomats and administrators. Thexton and Palliser were still alive when research for 
the study was undertaken, (though unfortunately both have now died), which meant that it 
was possible to interview them, but not members of the other groups who were all much 
older.  
It is possible that some personal bias was introduced in the two interviews I conducted for 
this study, despite my best endeavours to follow best interviewing practice, remain objective 
and ask open-ended questions. On the other hand, the interviews enabled me to cross-
check information obtained from other sources, probe for further information, interrogate my 
sources directly, and ask questions directly related to the themes examined in the thesis. 
Both interviews have been transcribed, approved by the interviewees, and the recordings 
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and transcripts lodged at the IWM Sound Archive, where they have been catalogued and 
form part of the collection open to other researchers and the general public.
9
 
Oral history interviews were also used for the other two selected ‘young officers’, though not 
as the principal source. Michael Howard was interviewed for the IWM Sound Archive in 
2008,
10
 and subsequently published a book on his experiences in occupied Germany, 
comprising his letters to his parents, reprinted verbatim, with a commentary providing 
background and context.
11
 This enabled three types of source to be cross-referenced: the 
letters; an interview; and his written commentary. With one or two minor exceptions, the 
three accounts were fully consistent. On the other hand, two journalistic interviews with John 
Chaloner, conducted by the German news magazine Der Spiegel, were less reliable.
12
 The 
interviewers asked questions on specific topics, based on a published history of Der 
Spiegel,
13
 rather than open ended questions or asking him to tell his story chronologically. 
Fortunately it was possible to discover some material on Chaloner and the creation of Der 
Spiegel in the National Archives, and I was able to consult an extensive collection of 
contemporary documents in the private business archive of Der Spiegel in Hamburg. Cross 
checking the factual information in the interviews with contemporary documents revealed 
inconsistencies and possible errors.
14
 Chaloner was in poor health at the time and died three 
months after the second interview. However, the interviews were still useful, when used 
together with other sources, in providing evidence of his intentions when he created the 
magazine.  
The Imperial War Museum Sound Archive 
There were many more young British officers in occupied Germany than there were Military 
Governors, generals or senior administrators, so to compensate for the small sample of 
‘young men with no adult experience but war’, and the possibility of personal bias introduced 
in my interviews with Palliser and Thexton, I consulted the comprehensive collection of 
experiences of conflict held by the Imperial War Museum Sound Archive (IWM SA) to ensure 
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that findings based on detailed research into four individuals were reasonably representative 
of this group as a whole.  
The IWM SA was started in 1972 and is now one of the largest collections of its type in the 
world, comprising over 50,000 hours of recorded material.
15
 The interviewing and collection 
policy of the archive is inclusive, aiming to record a cross-section of material from all ranks, 
civilians and soldiers, women and men, conscientious objectors and war heroes. Until 
recently, the archive has not targeted the British occupation of Germany or the post-war 
period and so had no agenda which might have biased the material in any direction. One 
objective of the archive has been to collect experiences of all World War Two campaigns, 
with interviewees generally recruited through veterans’ and regimental associations.
16
  Much 
of the material on post-war Germany appeared at the end of these interviews, after they had 
recounted their pre-and post-war experiences. Reference to a larger collection enabled me 
to validate if evidence obtained from the four ‘young men’ examined in detail was generally 
representative of this age cohort, although, as with all oral history collections, the archive’s 
selection process and interviewing style will have introduced some bias, and the interviewers 
did not probe on some specific subjects as much as I would have liked. 
The catalogue was searched for interviews with British men and women who served in 
Germany or Austria between 1945 and 1948 with either the armed forces or the Control 
Commission and aged between 18 and 32 at the end of the war. All interviews which met 
these criteria were consulted, except for a small number excluded as being outside the 
scope of the study or of such poor quality as to be unusable.
17
 The resulting selection of 
twenty men and one woman covered a wide range of family and educational backgrounds, 
wartime experiences and roles in Germany. There was a bias towards the officer and 
professional and middle classes, but this is consistent with the aim of the thesis to identify 
the views of those with authority, power and influence. Only one of the interviewees was a 
woman, but this reflected the gender balance among British people in occupied Germany.  
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been digitised and the original tapes could not be found. 
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The twenty-one IWM Sound Archive interviews used in this study were recorded by IWM full-
time or trained freelance staff between 1988 and 2008.
18
 Interviewers applied a consistent, 
open and non-prescriptive ‘life history’ approach, asking first about family background and 
education, before moving on to wartime and post-war experiences, which made it possible to 
collect data and analyse it across a number of interviews. They encouraged the interviewees 
to tell the story of their lives, not restricting them to a particular theme or time period as, in 
the view of the curator, it was impossible to know what future historians would consider 
important. The guidelines given to interviewers were to allow people to say whatever they 
remembered in their own time and try to capture the unique experience of the individual; 
being flexible as to the style of the interview, asking open ended questions, and using any 
specialist knowledge the interviewer might possess to decide how best to formulate 
questions, not challenging apparent errors or contradictions or probing too deeply into 
personal feelings or emotions.
19
 
Unlike most other European countries, Britain’s role in the war and its immediate aftermath 
has, in most respects, been remembered with pride and veterans and their memories are 
generally respected. The IWM interviewees were describing their experiences as they 
remembered them, the interview provided a structure and context which may have led them 
to emphasise some things and neglect others and the passage of time may have led them to 
forget things or remember them incorrectly. On some sensitive subjects, such as sexual 
relationships with German women, they tended to speak about what others had done, rather 
than relate their personal experiences. In general, however, they appeared to answer 
truthfully to the best of their knowledge. Most gave considered replies to questions, spoke 
freely and openly about their own experiences and were willing to provide their personal 
opinions on difficult subjects, such as personal injuries, the destruction caused by Allied 
bombing and individual relationships with German civilians. Despite very little prompting from 
the interviewers, there was extensive reference to many of the issues considered in this 
study. Over 75% (17/21) referred to individual relationships with the local German population 
and over 50% (12/21) spoke about their attitudes to Russian soldiers or Displaced Persons. 
Between 25%-50% mentioned the Black Market (9/21) and the destruction they saw in post-
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war Germany (7/21) and four (4/21) referred to concentration camps, war crimes or the 
Holocaust.
20
 An analysis of interviewees by year of birth, education, rank, role in Germany 
and wartime experience is provided in Appendix B. 
Other sources 
Other sources were consulted where appropriate to provide further background and context, 
gain a greater understanding of the selected individuals or explore more fully the cross-
cutting themes considered in the thesis. These included the British Zone Review,
21
 
parliamentary debates, Cabinet and Foreign Office papers at TNA, accounts by visiting 
politicians and journalists, contemporary newspaper articles and two semi-autobiographical 
novels written by Chaloner. A full list is provided in the bibliography. 
                                                     
20
 No conclusion can be drawn from the small number making explicit reference to the Holocaust. It can be assumed 
that all had heard reports of war crimes and atrocities, but few would have had personal experience of the liberation 
of the camps. 
21
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Garrood 1919 Cranleigh None Kings Own / Gurkha Rifles 1945-6 Officer ‘Staff duties’ 
France (1940), India, 
Cyprus, Egypt, Italy 
Mallabar 1924 Not known None Not known / signals 1945-6 
NCO / 
Corporal 
Army Normandy, NW Europe 






None Navy 1947-9 Officer Naval officer Not known 







None Navy 1946-8 Officer Interpreter Japanese POW 





North Africa, Italy 
Dye 1923 Grammar school Birkbeck 

























North Africa / France, 
Italy 
Fisher 1913 Not known 
Teacher 
training 
Friends Ambulance Unit 1945-8 n/a FAU / BFES UK. Ethiopia 
Gregg-Rowbury 1925 Not known 
Teacher 
training 
RAF air crew 1947-9 
NCO / 
sergeant 
CCG / DPs UK, Bombers 












1916 Not known Not known ‘Armoured division’ 1945-?? Officer Army Malta, Italy, NW Europe 
Chambers 1924 Not known None Royal Engineers 1945-7 
NCO / 
sergeant? 
Army NW Europe 
Travett 1919 Not known None Not known 1945-?? 
NCO / 
Corporal 
Army Malta, Sicily, NW Europe 
Heppell 1922 Grammar School None 
Royal Corps of Signals / Indian 





Ashcombe 1925 Latymer None RAF 1945-7 
Leading 
aircraftman 
Welfare Normandy, NW Europe 
Harland 1920 Bootham Oxford Salvation Army Unit 1946-7 n/a DPs UK 
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References made to themes discussed in the study 
Name Destruction Black market Russians / DPs 




Garrood No Yes No No No 
Mallabar Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
James No No Yes No Yes 
Taylor No No No No Yes 
Bicknell No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Falle Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Lucas Yes Yes No No Yes 
Dye No No No No Yes 
Brown No Yes Yes No Yes 
Bland No No Yes No Yes 
Hastings (Stephen) No No No No Yes 
Fisher Yes No Yes No Yes 
Gregg-Rowbury No No Yes No No 
Greenhalgh No Yes No No No 
Norman Yes Yes No No Yes 
Hastings (Martin) No No Yes Yes Yes 
Chambers Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Travett Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Heppell No No No Yes Yes 
Ashcombe No No No No No 
Harland No No Yes No Yes 
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